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Abstract
European integration is perceived as an additional factor in the 'creative 
tension’ between state and regions in the last years. This relationship, that 
per definition can never be static, is undergoing a profound change in the 
emerging system of multilevel governance in the European Union. Political 
debate as well as juridical analyses have focused primarily on 
participation-structures for sub-national territorial units and on the shift of 
competences. These questions were, in addition, generally envisaged from 
a merely technical viewpoint. Yet regions do play the role of key actors as 
far as they are entrusted with the implementation of European law. Lacks 
in the implementation phase are seen as a serious challenge or a threat to 
the Community legal system as a whole. Instruments developed on the 
European level to improve compliance with Community law are well 
known: the direct applicability, the Francovich-approach and the 
possibility of the ECJ to impose a penalty payment or a lump sum under 
Article 171 ECT. Domestic means that aim to improve the implementation 
performance of sub-national units are far less known. This paper questions 
the premises of concept and legitimation of substitutive competences; it 
evaluates their effect in comparison to the other existing instruments. The 
study seeks to demonstrate that responsibility for non-compliance is shared 
rather than resting exclusively upon the state. It further argues that 
substitutive powers as a domestic instrument are determined in first case 
by the respective context. Case studies on substitutive powers in Germany, 
Italy and Austria demonstrate how constitutional reality and the dominant 
patterns of behaviour of the actors determine the outcome. The author 
concludes that the concept of substitutive powers reveals theoretical lacks 
in the process of further integration. In addition, the paper tries to 
contribute to the question of how (multidimensional) federalism works 
today.
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Substitutive Powers: Concept and Legitimation
LSubstitutive Powers vis-à-vis European Regions: 
Concept and Legitimation
"To balance a large state or society ... whether 
monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of 
so great difficulty, that no human genius, however 
comprehensive, is able, by the mere dint of reason and 
reflection, to effect it. The judgements of many must unite 
in the work; experience must guide their labor; time must 
bring it to perfection, and the feeling of inconveniences 
must correct the mistakes which they inevitably fall into 
their first trials and experiments. "
[Alexander Hamilton, The Federalist Papers, Number 
Eighty-five quoting David Hume, Essays and 
Treatises on Several Subjects, London, 1768,1,134]
1. Background
The notion that several constitutional1 and  adm inistra tive problem s are caused by  the 
coincidence of European In tegration with nation states, th a t have - to use a  very generic term  - 
a division of authority  betw een different levels of governm ent, m ight ap p ear cliché. It was 
only in the  1980s tha t the 'sim ultaneity ' of the in tegration  process and  states w ith  a federal 
structure, and  the problem s connected w ith this, found expression am ongst academ ics as well 
as am ong  a broader public. In G erm any, how ever, the sensibility tow ards this p rob lem  dates 
back to  the 1960s w hen Hans Peter ipsen described the C om m unity  to be Landesblind2, (blind to 
the regional level).
O ne reason w as, of course, the increasing 'deepening ' of the C om m unity, starting  with 
the W hite Paper of 1985. The extension of C om m unity  pow ers that w ere  perceived as hard 
core com petences of Länder, such as culture, w as perceived as a real th reat to the federal 
system  as such. Thus the G erm an Länder claim ed for 'com pensation '3 for this loss of ’pow er 
resources’ in the course of the ratification of the Single European Act (signed on February 17 
and  28, 1986). One im portant result was the participation-procedure 1986 at the  national
C learly the tension between federalism and integration might, in a broader context, be envisaged as 
part of the question of the consistency or inconsistency of national constitutional values with Community 
law. Compare, e.g.: De Witte, Community Law and National Constitutional Values, LIoEi 1991/2, 1-22.
I^psen, Als Bundesstaat in der Gemeinschaft, in: Cacmmerer/Schlochauer/Steindorf, FS Hallstein, 248.
The claim for 'compensation' is, however, not a new one. As early as in the mid 1970s the Enquete- 
Kommission had observed a 'continous loss of substancial power of the Länder' (kontinuierlicher 
Substanzverlusl). It pointed out that this process could neither be stopped nor reversed, but only 
'compensated for'. A further development of cooperative federalism was then proposed. It goes without 
saying that questions as well as answers must necessarily be similar. There has undoubtetly been a shift of 
competences to the European level since then (that affected many relevant fields of Länder competences). 
Dieter Grimm argued that the future of a 'balanced federalism' would lie more in European institutions than 
in the nation states. Nearly two decades later his argumentation might be seen as visionary.- See: Grimm, Die 
Revision des deutschen Grundgesetzes, ÖZP 1977, 403f.
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decision-m aking process in E uropean  m atters4. F urtherm ore, these claims fo r 'com pensation ' 
m ight be understood as an  im p o rtan t part in th e  tendency  tow ards 're-federalisation ' in 
G erm any and  in Austria.
W hen after the European Annus Mirabilis 1989 the 'deepening-process' accelerated even 
further, w ith  the M aastricht-Treaty signed on February 7, 1992, the  G erm an Länder w ere again 
successful in making a package-deal. The major resu lt w as a further developm ent o f the 
internal participation of the  Länder a t the  decision m aking process in European affairs and  its 
enshrin ing in Article 23 o f the G erm an Basic Law  (the so-called Europe-Article). C onnected 
w ith  this are, on the external (i.e. the  com m unitarian) level, the Com m ittee o f the Regions w ith 
advisory  sta tus and the possibility  of representation of a M em ber State o f the EU in  the 
European Council by a represen ta tive of a sub-national un it, w hich w ere  established by 
Article 198a and  146 of the M aastricht Treaty. The latter changes cannot b e  qualified  as a 
'm erit' of only federalist G erm any an d  its Länder b u t equally  of Belgium5, w hich since the 
state reform  of 1993 has constitu ted  a real federalist state6. The internal participation-m odel as 
well as the external participation an d  representation shall, how ever, only b e  dealt w ith  in  this 
paper as far as is absolutely necessary for an  overall v iew  o f the crucial relations and 
interactions betw een the European U nion, M em ber States a n d  sub-national units, and  thus for 
a better understanding  of o u r topic.
A second reason for the intensified appreciation  of the  problem s connected w ith 
(further) European Integration and  a federalist state-organisation  m odel w as, of course, the 
'w idening ' of the Union. The application  for m em bership b y  th e  federal state7 A ustria (July 17, 
1989) and  by one of the m ost traditional federal states, Sw itzerland (M ay 26, 19928), have 
u ndoub ted ly  had  an im pact on th e  discussion in course. In addition , a tendency tow ards 
’fédéralisation ' (understood in a b road  sense) is also visible am ong  som e of the M em ber States 
of the U nion itself. This process an d  its results as well as th e  'federal sta tus' of the above- 
m entioned  applicants dem and  closer observation.
4Art 2 dt Gesetz vom 19.12.1986 zur Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte vom 28,Februar 1986, dt BGBl II 
vom 24.12.1986, 1102.
C
Sec: Borchmann, Die Forderungen der deutschen Länder zur Politischen Union, Europa-Archiv 1991, 
340-348.
6See only: Delpérée ecl al (cd.), La constitution fédérale du 5 mai 1993, Bruxelles: BruylanI, 1993; )ean-l.uc 
Dehaene, prime minister of Belgium: "Dotée de cette nouvelle structure fédérale, la Belgique pourra tout 
mettre en oevre, en sa qualité de président de la Commauté européenne pendent le second semestre del' 
année, pour rendre le traité de Maastricht opérationnel, premier pas vers un véritable structure fédérale 
européenne. L'avenir de la Belgique et celui de' Europe résident, nous sommes convaincu, dans la 
concrétisation dynamique de 1' unité dans la diversité." - Delpérée ed al (ed.), La constitution fédérale du 5 
mai 1993, 242; Witte, Belgian Federalism: Towards Complexity and Asymetry, WEP 1992, 95ff; Article 146 EC 
Treaty goes back to a Belgique and German proposal.
Article 2, Section 1 of the Austrian Federal-Constitutional Law: Austria is a federal state.
8 Ihe negotiations with Switzerland have only been suspended since the negative result in the 
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2. 'Sub-national units' in the European Context
A t this po in t it  h a s  to  b e  rem arked  tha t o n e  has to  avoid being the slave of zvords (i.e. 
regionalism  and  federalism ) in  th e  debate ab o u t the federalising process in  E uropean nation ­
states. Such labels tend  to  be m isleading, like an  exam ination  of C om m unity  Law "through  the 
glasses o f dom estic constitu tional law"9 w ould be.
This paper avo ids trad itiona l categorisations10 betw een  federalist system s, Unitarian 
states a n d  m odels o f decentralisation  and rég ionalisa tion  in  constitutional law . Classical 
criteria like originary sovereign powers11 or relations based  o n  parity (betw een a  federa tion  and 
the federal states) are m ore  prescrip tive than descriptive. T hey are thus n o t idoneous criteria 
for an exam ination of the  im plications of E uropean law  on  'regions’.
Lander, Kantone a n d  Regions m ight therefore be u nderstood  as sub-national-entities w ith 
sim ilar interests in sa feguard ing  their, albeit different, p o w er resources12. E u ropean  law  
seem s - from  this point of view  - to  have very sim ilar im plications on 'European regions’ o r  sub­
national-units w ith a certain  - m in im al - level o f legislative a n d  adm inistrative com petences.
Renaud Dehousse has described the approach  w h ich  resembles the  territorial politics 
approach in political science thus:
"Si l’on renonce ainsi aux critères de différenciation proposés dans de nombreuses analyses 
constitutionnelles (participation des entités fédérées au gouvernement de la fédération, 
garantie constitutionnelle de leur existence, maîtrise des compétences résiduaires, absence 
de tutelle, etc.), c'est pour mieux mettre en lumière le fait que fédéralisme et régionalisme - 
pour autant que l'on puisse opérer une distinction nette entre ces deux concepts - font partie 
d’un continuum qui va de la centralisation de l'état unitaire à des formes très poussées de 
décentrait s a tio n 1 ^
Sub-national in stitu tions d o  m atter. Yet they  m atte r no t only because of com petences 
attribu ted  to  them  in constitu tions, b u t also because o f the  ever growing relations crossing  and 
transcending the national level or, in other w ords, a m u ltitu d e  of factors tha t determ ine their
QFrowein, Die rechtliche Bedeutung des Verfassungsprinzips der parlamentarischen Demokratie für den 
europäischen Integrationsprozeß, EuR 1983,301f.
10Compare, for example: Dalboni/Pastoh, II govemo regionale e locale, in: Amato/Barbcra, Manuale di 
diritto pubblico, 575ff.
11 For the overcoming of the concept of sovereignty in the course of European Integration see for 
instance: Christiansen, F.uropean Integration Between Political Science and International Relations Theory: 
The End of Sovereignty, EU1 Working Paper RSC No. 1994/4; The approach proposed here, however, is not 
to diminuish the merits of developing criteria of federal systems. This was particularly important as regards 
the interpretation of the Austrian Constitution in a 'federal way’. Compare: Fslerbauer, Kriterien föderativer 
und konföderativer Systeme - Unter besonderer Berücksichtigung Österreichs und der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften, Wien: Braumüller, 1976.
12It should not be forgotten that on the regional level we are confronted with diferent actors with 
distinguishable interests and not a 'monolithic' body. An analysis of the various interactions between these 
actors and the relations and networks to actors on the national level lies, though, far behind the scope of this 
study. For the mediation of the interests of actors of the Austrian Länder see only Morass, Regionale 
Interessen auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union, Wien: Braumüller, 1994.
^Dehousse, Fédéralisme et relations internationales: Un réflexion comperative, 5f.
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room  for manoeuvre. W hat w as observed  by  Fritz Scharpf14 in  the  Germ an federal experience of 
the  seventies, nam ely the interlocking of policies a n d  politics betw een the  different levels of 
governm ent, is exactly w h a t is likely  to  happen in  the  fram ew ork  of E uropean In tegration* 15. 
This, how ever, w ould be w ith  the  participation of th ree levels o f governm ent. The needs for 
coordination  have, in  fact, transcended  the boundaries o f national a n d  organisational 
hierarchies a n d  have led to  m ultilevel policy-m aking16. "Public policy is", as Scharpf argued , 
"increasingly the result o f in ternational and transnational netw orks o f negotiations. By 
contrast, conventional no tions of dem ocratic accountability p resuppose a m odel of the  nation 
state th a t is characterised by  ex ternal sovereignty and  in ternal hierarchical au thority ."17 *
H ow ever, an  exam ination of the effects that th is doppelte Politikverflechtung™ (double 
interlocking of policies an d  politics) has on interests and  the decision-m aking process as 
su ch 19 is beyond  the scope of this paper.
In addition , we have to be aw are  that it is necessarily inherent in the federalismg process 
now  in course in several E uropean  states that it w ill not stop  at a certain stage. This is no t to 
assert that a federalist system  m u st b y  autom atism  steer tow ards m ore and  m ore federalism , 
b u t only to say  that federalist s tructu res can by definition never be motionless. Even the long 
period of "hyperstability" th a t has characterized Swiss federalism  in the last decades is now  
p u t in question. This is caused  no t a t least by  the b road  differences betw een the french and 
germ an speaking regions in the recen t referenda abou t the  integration o f Sw itzerland in 
European an d  International o rganizations (EEA, Blue H elm ets). In Belgium for instance the 
end  of the federalizing process seem s alm ost im possible to  predict20. The sam e is tru e  for 
Italy, w here the governm ent after the  elections of M arch 1994 announced to  m ake a  p roposal 
in o rder to  change the structu re  of the Italian sta te  to w ard s a federal system  w ith in  six
^Scharpf/Reissert/Schnabel, Politikverflechtung: Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen Föderalismus in 
der Bundesrepublik, Kronenberg: Scriptor, 1976.
15Scharpf also understood the similar decision patterns (joint decision making) in Germany and the 
European Community as consequences of similar institutional conditions. This conditions have - according 
to him -led to the prevailing of a bargaining style' in decision making. - Scharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap: 
Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration, Public Administration 1988,239.
1 (iloScharpf, Community and Autonomy - Multilevel Policy-Making in the European Union, EUI Working 
Paper RSCNo. 94/1, Florence 1994,11,16.
17Scharpf Versuch über Demokratie in Verhandlungssystemen, Max-Planck-Institut für
Gesellschaftsforschung Köln Discussion Paper, 92/9,5.
16This term goes back to Rudolf Hrbek. - Hrbek, Doppelte Politikverflechtung: Deutscher Föderalismus 
und Europäische Integration - Die deutschen Länder im EG-Entscheidungsprozeß, in: Hrbek/Thayscn, Die 
deutschen Länder und die Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 17ff; The interlocking of politics and policy as 
characteristic for consensual democracies was first perceived by Lehmbruch in the cases of Austria and
Switzerland. - Lehmbruch, Proporzdemokratie. Politisches System und politische Kultur in der Schweiz und
Österreich, Recht und Staat 335/336, Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1967.
19For modalities of non-market coordination through positive and negative coordination in negotiation- 
systems, compare: Scharpf Positive und negative Koordination in Verhandlungssystemen, Max-Planck- 
Institut für Gesell schaf Isforschung Köln - Discussion Paper 93/1.
20Even proposals according to which Flandres, Wallonia and Brussel could as post-national entities 
belong directly to the Community and Brussels itself would be comparable to the 'District of Columbia’ are 
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m onths21. The failure o f this announcem ent w as one of th e  reasons for the  b reakdow n  of the 
three-party-coalition in  D ecem ber 1994. It rem ains to  b e  seen how  the  Italian Regions, 
characterised by  Salvemini "[un] vaso  vuoto ta rga to  Regione"22, can develop. Even A ustrian 
federalism  has not reached  a 'final point', given the  long debated  "federal-state reform "23 *and 
the o p en  question  of fiscal federalism .
Spain, w hich can  be called  a state of autonomous entities (Article 2 and  137ff Spanish 
C onstitution), is characterised b y  b road  com petences o f the  Comunidades Autónomas, the 
sta tu te  o f w hich can o n ly  be am en d ed  by consent o f the C ortes Generales and the A utonom ous 
C om m unity  Assem bly according to  Article 147, Section 3 Spanish C onstitu tion  (thus 
guaran teeing  the sta tus quo  of gained  autonom y). In this case the thin line between regionalism 
and federalism24 becom es particu larly  visible and  a t  the sam e tim e the usefulness o f such  labels 
b e c o m e s  q u e s t i o n a b le .
In th is fram ew ork  the C om m ission's intention not to  in troduce a C om m unity  definition 
of w hat constitutes a Region, because the historical developm ent o f the organisational and 
political structures in  the  M em ber States is very  different an d  because this is a m a tte r which 
falls w ith in  the exclusive com petence of the m em ber states25, seems to  be very  reasonable.
For the pu rp o se  of this paper, how ever, the sub-national units should n o t only  be 
qualified as territorial entities w hich  are im m ediately subordinated  to  the nation-state and 
have elected  (and n o t only  appoin ted) representatives26, b u t should have alm ost a certain 
pow er in legislation an d  adm inistration . 'European regions' fulfilling such a m inim al criteria 
in legislation and adm in istra tion  have to face, in  brief, the  follow ing problem s27 in the 
fram ew ork of ongoing E uropean  Integration:
"loss of (m aterial) legislative pow er in  th e  field o f the ir ow n com petences because not 
only fo rm er com petences of the  sta te  bu t also pow ers o f the  regions shift to  the European
level28
? 1
^ ‘Compare the reports of Lieven De Winter (The Impact of Regionalist Actors on the Belgium Political 
System) and Bruno Dente (Italy: The Thin Line Between Federalism and Regionalism) at the European 
Forum Conference: Regionalization in Europe: Evaluation and Perspectives - EUI Florence June 2-3, 1994
22Paladin, Diritto regionale, 11
23The "federal-state reform” that in the last four years had been at the centre of the debate between Bund 
and Lander was unexpectedly cancelled from the agenda in December 1994. However, it is for shure that the 
reform-projects will return on the agenda. Compare: Pochmarski, Noch einige Anmerkungen zur 
Bundesstaatsreform, Journal für Rechtspolitik 1995/1 (forthcoming) and Chapter II.3.
2^Dente, European Forum Conference, see FN 21.
25Commission's answer to Written Question No.858/92 by Mr.Robles Piquer, OJ 1992, C 274/48
26These are the criteria of article 3 of the statute of the Assembly of Regions in Europe.
*yj
A For the dangers and chances for federalism in Germany, Austria and Switzerland in the European 
Union see only the debates on the conference of German professors of constitutional law in Mainz, October 
6-9, 1993. - WDStRL 53: Hilf/Stein/Schweitzer/Schindler, Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den 
Föderalismus in Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz, Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1994.
^Schröder spoke of ’federal erosions that are taking place in the process of European Integration'. - 
Schröder, Bundesstaatliche Erosionen im Prozeß der Europäischen Integration, JöR 1986, 83ff.
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*if the  sub-national-entities also  participate in the legislation of the federation  (e.g. via a 
second cham ber), this trad itiona l participation-m odel becom es - m ore or less - useless29
In addition , w e can  also w itness a loss o f p o w er of the legislative b ranch  w ith in  the 
reg ion  in favour the executive b ranch30.
The obvious im plications o f European Integration, w h ich  were in general seen as an  
erosion or even loss of existing p o w er resources (the so-called 'integration losses' on  the 
regional level), have led G erm an and  Austrian Lander to  dem and 'com pensation '. This 
com pensation  occurred m ain ly  in tw o  areas.
First, in the form  of participation-models at the  internal decision-m aking process an d  in 
participation  a t the com m un itarian  level via th e  C om m ittee of the Regions an d  the 
establishm ent of direct contacts to th e  Com mission (lobbying offices in Brussels). Second, in a 
- albeit very  m odest - new division of competences betw een the different levels o f state au thority .
In A ustria European integration  w as also seen as a chance31 for the Lander to im prove 
their traditionally  w eak position in  the field of legislative com petences (especially w eaker 
w hen  com pared  to the G erm an Lander rem ain at the top  in every  'ranking' of federal states in 
E urope32). Even though the A ustrian Federal-Constitutional L aw  of 192033 (officially quoted  
as: ...in the version of 192934) has attribu ted  pow ers in legislation and adm inistration  to  the
As legislative competences of the state (the Bund) shift to the European level Lander face a real 
influence-loss that cannot be compensated by participation models. They are limited to the sphere of 
(former) Länder competences as such.
■in
In the new participation-models as regards European affairs both in Germany and in Austria it is the 
executive branch of the Land (via the German Bundesrat or the Austrian Integration Conference) which 
represents the Land and looks after its interests. Inner-Land participation (e.g. the binding of the executive to 
statements of the land parliament) must necessarily remain insufficient not least because of the temporal 
constraints and the need to associate with a majority of other Länder. For further details, see II.l. and H.3.; 
For a particular critique at this shift to the executive branch see: Graf Vitzthum, Der Föderalismus in der 
europäischen und internationalen Einbindung der Staaten, AöR 115, 1990, 286; Yet the tendency towards a 
strengthening of the executive is a general phenomenon. Compare, e.g.: Fiedler, The Strengthening of the 
Executive in the Contemporary Constitutional System, in: Sfflrdt(ed.), Rights, Institutions and Impact of 
International Law according to the German Basic Law, 95-114.
31This could thus be labelled as the fifih demand-program of the Austrian Länder. It found its expression 
in the political pactum of October 8,1992 signed in Perch told sdorf between the Federal Chancellor, Vranitzky, 
and the President of the Conference of Land Governors, Ludwig. [See Appendix III] The other four dem and - 
programs of the Länder (1964, 1970, 1976, 1985) led to several amendments of the Austrian Federal- 
Constitutional Law: BGBl 1974/444; BGBl 1983/175; BGBl 1984/490; BGBI 1988/685.
32To give only one - very significant - example: While ’culture' is seen as hard-core competence of the 
German Länder, it is according to article 10, section 1, number 13 of the Austrian Federal-Constitutional Law 
competence of the Bund in legislation and administration. For the tension between the competence of the 
German Länder and the European Community (Article 128 EC Treaty) in the field of culture, see: Bohr/Albert, 
Die Europäische Union • das Ende der eigenständigen Kulturpolitik der deutschen Bundesländer?, ZRP 
1993,61.
33For the controversy about the genesis of Austrian federalism (decentralisation of an Unitarian state or 
originary statehood of the Länder) see: Pernthaler, Die Staatsgründungsakte der österreichischen 
Bundesländer - Eine staatsrechtliche Untersuchung über die Entstehung des Bundesstaates, Wien: 
Braumüller, 1979.
34This is due to a constitutional amendment (BGBI 1929/392) whose political effect was overestimated. - 
Walter/Mayer, Grundriß, Rndz 63. In fact, the major change, namely the election of the Federal President by 
the people, did not fundamentally change the parlamentarían character of the Austrian constitution and the 
constitutional reality (Verfassungswirklichkeit). Given that on June 12, 1994 66.6% of the Austrians voted in 
favour of joining the European Union, that it was the first time that such a referendum - which is according
8
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Länder in  th e  form o f a  general clause (Article 15, Section 1 B-VG* 35), it  has reserved  all 
im portan t m ateria in  legislation  fo r the Bund in  the so-called com petence articles36. The 
jud iciary  is also m onopolised37 b y  the Bund. U ntil the 1970s there w as a  strong  tendency 
tow ards centralisation, w ith  several powers attribu ted  to  the  Bund ou tside  the com petence 
articles o f th e  constitution (especially in  the field of econom ic regulation). This tendency  was 
only  reversed  in  the la st tw o  decades w hen th e  dem and-program s38 o f the L änder w ere 
partially  fulfilled39. In  financial m atters, how ever, th e  B und has k ep t its 'com petence- 
com petence ' according to  the Finance-Constitutional Law40. A s regards A ustria w e  can  now  
w itness a  sim ultaneous upward movement of p ow ers to  th e  European U nion  and  the  attem pt 
tow ards a  (albeit v e ry  m odest) downward movement o f p o w ers  to  the Under from  the  Bund. The 
latter, how ever, is to  rem ain  in  a  central position given th a t th e  Bund is the  m ain acto r in  the 
decision-m aking p rocess a t th e  E uropean level41 an d  has the  position of a 'gatekeeper'42 as 
regards m atters of E uropean  Integration. It has righ tly  been  argued that w e  are n o t facing a 
kind o f zero-sum  confron tation43 between regional an d  national level b u t a developm ent 
tow ards a decision-m aking system  tha t integrates the actors o f all three levels.
In an article in 1927 w hich dealt with the Anschluß o f A ustria to  G erm any Hans Kelsen 
argued  "that a federal sta te  w ith in  another federal state w ill result in serious com plications 
from the  technical-organisational po in t of view". A part from  the conclusion that a three-storey 
federal state (dreistöckiger Bundesstaat) implies m an y  legal p roblem s, given the  doubling of "the 
m ost difficult form of a constitution, nam ely the  federal one"44, his article tried to  reconcile
lo Article 44, Section 3 B-VG obligatory for a total-change of the Federal-Constitutional Law 
(Gesamtänderung der Bundesverfassung) - was held and that thus the change of the basic principles of the 
constitution (Baugesetze) can take place, it would be, in my opinion, conceivable to speak of the Austrian 
iedcral-Constitutional law of 1920 in the version of 1994. Another argument in favour of this is that the joining of 
lhe Union not only concerns the identity of the constitution as regards content but, in addition, establishes 
the validity of a second constitution and thus of a second legal order in Austria. - Funk, Die bevorstehende 
Öffnung Österreichs in den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum und die Europäischen Gemeinschaften - Referat 
am 12.ÖJT, 8f; According to the 1994 amendment of the constitution (BGBI 1994/1013) the official title shall 
now be only: Bund es-Verfassungsgesetz. - see Appendix III.
35For Germany compare Article 70 GG.
Articles 10 to 15 B-VG. The competence articles entered into force on October 1,1925.
37Article82 B-VG.
38See FN 31.
onFor the actual demands for Te-federalisation' and the 'federal state reform', see II. 3.
40BGB1 1948/45, Article 3, Section 1.
4^Also in the case that a representative of the Länder is sent to the Council (Artilce 146 Maastricht 
Treaty) he will have to look after the interest of the whole state, and thus the Bund. Compare II.1.
42Morass, Regionale Interessen auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union, 14; Similar: De Witte, 
Community Law and National Constitutional Values, LIoEI 1991/2, 13; It seems thus more apt to speak of a 
'Europe with the regions" than of a "Europe of the regions" - Leonardi, Auswärtige Beziehungen und 
Europäische Angelegenheiten im Bund-Länder Verhältnis, in: Eivrs(IIrsg.), Chancen des Föderalismus in 
Deutschland und Europa, 157.
43Morass, Regionale Interessen auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union, 37; Christiansen, Territorial 
Politics and Multilevel Governance in the European Union: The Case of Wales, Paper for the 26th Annual 
Congress of the German Political Science Association, Potsdam, 25-27 August 1994.
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system s w ith  a different a n d  au tonom ous genesis an d  m ay th e reb y  serve as 'guideline' fo r this 
paper.
A lthough, the Anschluß can n o t b e  com pared45 w ith the  project o f European Integration 
from  a historical, social, cu ltu ral o r  legal po in t o f view , som e technical and  structural 
problem s a re  in  a  certain w a y  analogous: for instance, the m ultip lication  of legal sources and  
the p rob lem s connected w ith  it. A n exam ple is the publication  of acts as an expression o f the 
princip le o f the ru le of law . The telos o f  this publication is s im p ly  to  inform  about the content 
of a  law  in  a clear and  exhaustive w ay .
In decision 3130/1956, w hich h as  become ra the r fam ous a n d  is often quoted in  such  a 
context, the  A ustrian C onstitu tional C ourt (VfGH) stated:
"A rule which requires subtle knowledge in constitutional law, qualified juridical 
capability and experience and almost the diligence of an archivist to ascertain its sense is no 
valid norm."4*’
It seem s evident th a t the legal order of the  E uropean U nion w ith  so m any ru les, 
different languages and a  com plex law -m aking process m u st result in  som e com plications, 
regardless o f system s such a s  CELEX, CD-Rom (Eurocat) an d  the  Council's attem pts to  create 
clearer and  m ore sim ple no rm s47. It w ould , how ever, be too  sim ple to  b lam e especially the 
European level for the p roblem s resu lting  from com plexity  of procedures and solutions. 
A dm ittedly  all legal system s m ust inevitably be difficult to  oversee and to  com prehend  in a 
society w ith  such a high need  for regu la tion  (Regelungsbedarf). A ustrian  constitutional law  is a 
good  exam ple for that com plexity  a n d  has therefore even been characterised 'to  be in a  sta tus 
of progressive fragm entation '48. H ence pu tting  the b lam e on  the  European U nion  seem s to  be 
unw arran ted . However, E uropean law  m ight instead of all a ttem p ts  to  facilitate accessibility - 
alm ost at th e  beginning of (formal) integration, as is actually  the  case in A ustria - lead to  som e 
problem s due to a lack of expertise, inform ation an d  m aybe acceptance on  the p a rt of a 
bureaucracy  that has com e from  trad itiona l national pattern s49.
45I lowever, there are authors who argue that there are similar motivations of the Austrian population 
as regards the two events. - Pelinka, Zur österreichischen Identität - Zwischen deutscher Vereinigung und 
Mitteleuropa, Wien: Ueberreutcr 1990, 144. From my point of view, this is a very shortend argumentation 
which is, in addition, based on an overestimation of continuity in Austria. Pelinka here neglects the profound 
societal changes which have taken place in Austria during the last 50 years.
4^Verfassungsgerichtshof, Erkenntnis VfSlg 3031/ 1956; Compare also VfSlg 12420/1990.
47Council resolution of June 8, 1993 on the quality of drafting of Community legislation, OJ 1993 C 
166/1.
48Fnnlr, Die Entwicklung des Verfassungsrechts in: Mantl (Hrsg.), Politik in Österreich, 686.
49For the problems caused by non-acceptance of supranational law in the Swiss case see: Majer, 
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3. The subject of analysis
3.1. The important role of regions in the 'implementation 
phase'
This paper is, how ever, devo ted  to certain aspects o f the  federal princip le in relation  to 
the  im plem entation of E uropean  law , and  not to  the  various im plications in tegration  has on 
th e  rule o f law  or on th e  dem ocratic  principle50 51. R eturn ing  to  the quotation o f Kelsen it can be 
said  that th e re  are tw o m a in  p rob lem s the Union has to face w ith  regard to European regions:
*in the decision making phase?im. m ore (autonom ous) ac to rs  w ho w ant to  participate a t the 
decision-m aking process, m ak ing  policy-form ulation m ore difficult.
*in the implementation phase: the risk  of non-im plem entation  or w rongfu l 
im plem entation  by  au thorities w h ich  the Union cannot fo rm ally  sanction.
This pap e r is devo ted  to  the  latter problem  and  a com parative analysis o f internal 
m odels w hich aim  to  solve possib le im plem entation shortcom ings. It is based  on  the 
assum ption  that the im plem entation  phase is crucial52 fo r the success o r failu re of a 
p rogram m e. Considering tha t th e  percentage of directives in  the period from  1962 to  1992 for 
w hich m easures have been  notified  is about 90% 53 the im portance of th e  im plem entation 
phase m u st be em phasised. In the  w ords of Konrad Hesse: 'To be effective ru les m u st be 
realised (verwirklicht), they  m ust be  converted in to  social conduct'54. 'The task  of law yers is 
therefore no t to thw art the effects of legal rules, b u t to  h e lp  to p u t them  into opera tion '55. 
'Success', according to the Com m ission,'depends upon  tw o  things. It depends upon  political 
will and on  the ability to translate  tha t political w ill into practical achievem ent.'56
50For the implications of European Integration on the democratic principle and on the rule of law, see: 
Holzinger, Die bevorstehende Öffnung Österreichs in den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum und die 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften - Rechtsetzung unter besonderer Bedachtnahme auf den demokratischen und 
den rechtsstaatlichen Aspekt, Verhandlungen des 12, ÖJT Wien 1994.
51 According to German legal terminology these phases might also be called rising (aufsteigend) and 
declining (absteigend). They, according to the implementation theory, must be distinguished from the policy 
formulation (before) and the impact (after). - Siedentopf/Ziller, Making European Policies Work: The 
Implementation of Community Legislation in the Member States, 3 quoting Mayntz (Hrsg.), Implementation 
politischer Programme, 238f.
52for the importance of implementation, see: Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community Law: 
Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques, MLR 1993, 19,
53Denmark notified 96,0%, Greece notified 88.3%. - Commission, Tenth annual report 1992, 7; As 
regards the 263 White paper measures that have so far entered into force (93% of the 282 measures), 222 of 
which require national transposition measures, approximately 87% (in the field of public procurement only 
59%) of the total number of necessary transposition measures have been taken. Denmark has taken 93%, 
Ireland 81.4%. - Commission, The Community Internal Market 1993 Report, COM (94) 55 final, c.
54H«se, Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland11, Karlsruhe 1978, 17ff; 
Compare also Francis Snyder. '(.„) law mattere: it has its effect on political, economic and social life outside 
the law - that is, apart from simply the elaboration of legal doctrine.' - Snyder, New Directions in European 
Community Law, London: 1990, 3.
^Pescatore, The Doctrine of 'Direct Effect': An Infant Disease of Community Law, ELR 1983,155.
56Commission, Second report to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation of the 
Commission’s White Paper on completing the internal market, COM (87) 203 final, 24.
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H o w e v e r a certain in terdependence betw een the decision-making phase and the 
implementation phase cannot be  ignored. It has been no ted  that Länder w ould  be  m ore p repared  
to  accept a n d  Im plem ent E uropean  n o rm s if they w ere  engaged in  one w ay  o r  another in  the ir 
form ulation57. As interest g roups58 o n  the Union level are consulted  to  avo id  p roblem s in 
im plem enting  a  political p ro g ram m e a n d  to  assure th e  effectiveness of E uropean law , so , for 
the sam e reason, has the  C om m ittee o f the Regions been created  as a, albeit consultative, 
participation-m odel. This p resupposes also the covering of a lack  o f inform ation on the p a r t of 
the sub-national adm inistrations w hich  is considered as one o f the  m ain causes, apart from  
adm inistrative inertia, for im plem entation  problem s59. H ow ever, a w ord  of cau tion  is 
necessary here. M y argum entation  shou ld  not be seen as an  overall explanation fo r the 
conduct o f territorial-units in  the policy-im plem enting process n o r should it suggest th a t the 
actual participation-m odel w ou ld  b e  sufficient fo r advanced  European regions (like the 
G erm an Länder) o r even ’the  o p tim u m ’. First, th is institutionalised participation is to  be 
considered o n ly  as one am o n g  several external and  internal factorsand processes that m igh t 
determ ine 'the  w illingness' to  im plem ent European law. Second, the advisory  status o f the 
Com m ittee u n d e r Article 198a ECT (w hich has been harshly  criticised60) has to  be b o m  in 
m ind.
Some illum inating stud ies have been devoted to  the rising  phase as far as the relation  
Länder - C om m unity  is concerned61. Studies have a lso  been m a d e  about the  im plem entation  
of C om m unity  legislation in the M em ber States from  a E uropean  view point62. This p ap e r 
deviates from  the first approach  in th a t it concerns the declining phase and  from  the second 
approach in  that it tries to  reconcile the dem ands of 'federal system s’ w ith the  necessities of 
European Integration,
An institutional analysis of adm inistrative system s w ill necessarily be  the 'centre of 
gravity’, I shall but argue tha t a m erely  legal analysis is insufficient to com prehend  the 
relevance o f substitutive com petences in practice. I thus p ropose  to consider the politico- 
adm inistrative culture and  the  d om inan t patterns of behaviour of the states in  question. This
^Malanczuk, European affairs and the Länder, CML Rev 1985, 271; In this sense also: Blumenwitz, 
Europäische Gemeinschaft und Rechte der Länder in: Bieber/Bleckmann/Capotorti u.a. (Hrsg.), Das Europa der 
zweiten Generation - Gedächtnisschrift für Christoph Sasse I, 217; For Spain: González, Die Rolle der 
Comunidades Autónomas im spanischen Staat und ihre rechtlichen Einflußmöglichkeiten auf die nationale 
Gemeinschaftspolitik, in: Bayerischer Landtag, Die BRD und das Königreich Spanien 1992,62.
eo
For the about 1500 interest groups acting in Brussels, compare: Fflf/iA:(Ed.), European public affairs 
directory, Brussels: Landmarks, 1994.
59Dehousse, 1992 and Beyond: The Institutional Dimension of the Internal Market Programme, LIoEI 
1989/1,131.
60See, for example: Tomuschal, Bundes- und Integrationsgewalt des Grundgesetzes in: Magi era/Merten, 
Bundesländer und Europäische Gemeinschaft, 43; Kalhfleisch-Kottsieper, Fortentwicklung des Föderalismus in 
Europa, DÖV 1993, 549; Graf Vitzthum using the word 'pallative' - Graf Vitzthum, Der Föderalismus in der 
europäischen und internationalen Einbindung der Staaten, AöR 1990,294.
Birke, Die deutschen Bundesländer in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Berlin: 1973; Morass, 
Regionale Interessen auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union, Wien: Braumüller, 1994.
°*Sicdentopf/Ziller, Making European Policies Work - The Implementation of Community Legislation in 
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w ill be m ain ly  done in  P art II th a t aim s to analyse substitu tive pow ers in  their respective 
co n tex t As for G erm any and  A ustria63 this paper w ill also integrate som e em pirical 
inform ation  in order to  com plete th is theoretical study. T his m ay be seen as a v ery  m odest 
con tribu tion  to a better u n d ers tan d in g  of problem s w hich could  arise a t the  im plem entation 
stage d u e  to  an  internal division o f com petences.
W ithou t anticipating the resu lts  of this analysis I w ish  to say here that one  cannot 
suggest th a t Länder are  in  general ’Euro-sceptical’. It should  be  rem em bered that the  A ustrian 
Länder d em anded  for A ustria 's app lication  for m em bersh ip  o f the C om m unity  on N ovem ber 
13, 198764, i.e. before the  parties o f the  Great Coalition an d  the other national interest groups 
decided in favour of an  application65. The attitude of sub-national entities tow ards European 
In tegration  is determ ined by  a vas t variety  of factors. To d iscover and evaluate som e o f them 
and  the ir im plications on  the implementation phase o f E uropean  law  is one of the tasks of this 
paper. Yet the diagnosis that Kenneth Hanf m ade in the 1970s for W estern nation  states has 
extended to  the European level:
Territorial and functional differentiation has produced decision systems in which the 
problem solving capacity of governments is disaggregated into a collection of sub-systems 
with limited tasks, competences and ressources, where the relatively independent 
participants possess different bits of information, represent different interests, and pursue 
separate, potentially conflicting courses of action. At the same time, however, governments 
are more and more confronted with tasks where both the problems and their solution tend to 
cut across the boundaries of separate authorities and functional jurisdictions.66
It is intriguing to note that only one of the letters that were send to all Italian regions (and the 
autonomous provinces) was answered. The author wants to thank Dott Alberto Brasca and Dott.Pietro Tanzini 
from the Regione Toscana for their exhaustive letter.
^Landeshauptmännerkonferenz (Conference of the Land Governors) 13.11.1987; Compare also the 
reaffirmation and the demand for participation at the landeshauptmännerkonferenz (LHK) 25.11.1988 - 
Bundesministerium für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Außenpolitischer Bericht - Jahrbuch der 
Österreichischen Außenpolitik 1989, 186; For the prominent role of the Land governors and the eminent 
political de facto importance of the LHK see II.3.3.
65The Austrian government only applied for membership on July 17, 1989 in the so-called "Letter to 
Bruxelles" by now famous in Austria. Compare also the Declaration of the Austrian Länder of June 21,1993. 
This has so far been the only act taken by the Integration Conference of the Lander (which was constituted 
on the same day). Important declarations in the course of the negotiations with the EU were made directly 
by the Land governors, without using this apparatus, that may be considered to be to sluggish (almost for 
the negotiations about the admission). For the Land governors prominent rule see Chapter 11.3.3.; It is, in 
addition, intriguing in this context that the Austrian application was made before the events that led to the 
breakdown of the Berlin wall and of the GDR in November 1989.
66HanfIScharpf; Interorganizational Policy Making. Limits to Coordination and Central Control, 1.
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3.2. The implementation of European law
Before entering  into detail I p ropose taking a closer look a t som e federal aspects67 in 
the adm in istra tive system of the  E uropean Union. Given the lim ited  space and the inevitably 
m odest approach  o f this research  in  fron t o f such a vast area a s  adm inistration law  in the 
M em ber States o f the European U nion68, the reader should  b e  aw are that the follow ing 
rem arks sim ply serve as necessary preconditions of ou r m ain  topic.
W ith the  exem ption o f som e areas69 it is u p  to  the M em ber States to  im plem ent 
E uropean legislation. It is therefore the ir respective constitu tional a n d  adm inistrative law  that 
determ ines the  com petent institu tions, o rgans and the p rocedures to  be applied. This indirect 
execution70 recalls G erm an an d  A ustrian  executive federalism, w h ere  it is the Lander that - in 
general - have the  d u ty  to im plem ent o u t the  federal law s (Art 83 d t  GG71; Art 102 ö B-VG and  
Art 15[1] ö B-VG)72. In both m odels the  exercise of governing functions is shared betw een the 
federal governm ent and the Länder governm ents (which therefore is distinguished from  the  
m odel o f A m erican federalism , w here form al independence p lays a far m ore im portan t 
role)73. Both system s give the executing  authorities a crucial and  pow erfu l position:
"[...), l’opinion des représentants régionaux pèse souvent de façon décisive sur la décision 
finale. Dans un système d'administration décentralisée comme la Communauté européenne, 
le rôle des technicienes est souvent essentiel: lorsque le concours des administrations 
régionales est nécessaire, leur influence peut être considérable. De même, lorsqu’une 
intervention des régions est requise pour la mise en oevre des décisions communautaires, 
leurs représentants disposent de facto d’un pouvoir important, parfois équivalent à un 
véritable pouvoir de veto.”7“*
The com petent national authorities according to  their respective constitutions (and 
thereby also the sub-national units) thus have duties in tw o  fields:
67This parallelism in administration, however, leads to more questions rather than to a solution to the 
question about the legal character of the Union. - Everting, Elemente eines europäischen Verwaltungsrechts, 
DVB1 1983, 650.
68Sec the exhaustive study of Schwarze, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht - Entstehung und Entwicklung 
im Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, 2 Bde.Iîaden-Baden: 1988.
69In particular in competition law (Art. 87II, 89,90III, 93 EC-Treaty).
7%or this terminology, see: Everting, Elemente eines europäischen Verwaltungsrechts, DVB1 1983, 650; 
Schweitzer, Die Verwaltung der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Die Verwaltung 1984, 139ff;
Beutter/Bieber/Pipkorn/StreU, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft, 200f; Schwarze, Europäisches Verwaltungsrecht, 
24; Nicolaysen, Europarecht 1,74; Schweitzer/1 lummer, Europarecht, 96f.
7*Compare also the Articles 30, 91b, 108, 115f, 115i, 120a GG. Eor the federal character of the German 
administration, see: lladura, Staatsrecht, München: 1986,41 Iff.
72See Article 34 (Executive Function - Implementation of Legislation) of the Draft Constitution of the 
European Parliament (A3-0064/94; 10.2.1994): The Member States shall implement the laws of the Union.; 
Compare also the opinion of Advocate General Rocmer in Case 40/69: In fact these organizations are run on 
the basis that the necessary central decisions are made by the Community institutions whilst the 
administrative implementation is the responsibility of Member States. - ECJ Case 40/69 (llauptzollamt 
Elammburg v liollmann), ECR 1970, 87.
7"\/JScharpf, The Joint-Decision Trap: Lessons from German Federalism and European Integration, Public 
Administration 1988, 242f.
^Dehousse, Autonomie régionale el intégration européenne: les leçons de l'expérience communautaire, 
in: jacüt-Guillarmont (éd.), Accord EEE - Commentaires et réflexions, 703.
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*to transpose (ausführen) E uropean legislation th a t needs to  be p u t in to  concrete form s 
via legislation75
*to implement (vollziehen)76 d irectly  applicable E uropean legislation via administrative 
measures in  a n  individual case77
The transposing  of European la w  via legislation show s, again , that today the (horizontal) 
organisational separation o f pow ers does not coincide w ith a material separation of functions. 
Thereby the transposing o f C om m unity  directives b y  the executive branch m igh t ap p ear as 
quasi-legislative just as the sam e d o n e  by the legislative b ranch  m ight ap p ear as quasi- 
administrative78. In any  case, given the  detailed character that E uropean  law often assum es, the 
states' room  for m anoeuvre and  th u s the ir pow er to  legislate (materielle Legislativkompetenz) 
often tend to  be  notably reduced.
H ow ever w hile, it rem ains tru e  that - in general - regulations fall into the first o f the 
above categories and directives in to  the second, it should  be  noted  that these recognised 
classifications tend to b reak  dow n: a directive m ight (under certain  conditions) be directly  
applicable79 and  a regulation  m ight need to be com pleted b y  certain supp lem entary  or 
additional m easures80.
In the  absence of a single Unitarian adm inistrative law 81 and  of a unified  European 
bureaucracy, the  transposing via legislation and the im plem entation  via adm inistration  of 
European law  are to be effected accord ing  to  dom estic law . This also  implies th a t it is u p  to  the
7^The term legislation is to be understood in a material sense. This means that regulations by the 
executive branch may also fall into this category. What matters is that the provisions of national law (into 
which Directives are to be transposed) have mandatory force. Compare: ECJ, Case 361/88 “Technical 
Circular Air" (Commission v FRG), ECR 1976, 2567.
76For this terminology: tpsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 218f.
^The individual-case criteria is decisive for the distinguishing of the term implementation (Vollziehung 
bzw. Anwendung) from transposing (Ausführung). Compare: Zuleeg, Das Recht der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften im innerstaatlichen Bereich, 47. Categorizations, however, tend to break down in the 
framework of European Integration.- See the following footnotes.
76)ustice Jackson-. ”(...)Administrative agencies have been called quasi-legislative, quasi-executive or 
quasi-judicial, as the occasion required, in order to validate their functions within the separation-of-powers 
scheme of the Constitution. The mere retreat to the qualifying 'quasi' is implicit with confession that all 
recognized classifications have broken down, and 'quasi' js a smooth cover which we draw over our 
confusion as we might use a counterpane to conceal a disordered bed." - Federal Trade Comission v 
Rubercoid Co., 343 US 470, 487/488 (1952) K.C.Davies, Administrative Law, Cases-Text-Problems, Minesota 
1978, 28ff.
79ECJ Case 41 /74 (Van Duyn v Home Office), ECR 1974, 1137.
finFor the limits of such a completition of non self-executing Regulations, see: ECJ Case 40/69 
(Hauptzollamt Hamburg-Oberelbe v Bollmann), ECR 1970, 69; ECJ Case 39/70 (Fleischkontor v 
Hauptzollamt Hamburg), ECR 1971, 49, especially the opinion of Advocate General Dutheillet De Lamothe: It 
follows from a combination of the two principles [first, that Community law must be equally enforcable in 
all Member states and second, the obligations of Member States under Article 5 EC-Treaty] that Member 
Statef may adopt any necessary implementing measures to the extend to which such measures are 
indispensable, that their object or effect is not to modify the scope nor add to the provisions of the 
Community measure in question and finally that they respect all Community legislative provisions.; ECJ 
Case 32/72 (Wasa v Einfuhrstelle Getreide), ECR 1972,1181.
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legal system  of the  individual M em ber S tate to determ ine the com petent organs for the 
im plem entation of E uropean law. The ECJ has expressed this a ttitude as follows:
"Each Member State is free to delegate powers to its domestic authorities as it considers fit 
and to implement directives by means of measures adopted by regional or local authorities.
That division of powers does not however release it from the obligation to ensure that the 
provisions of the directive are properly implemented in national law."8^
A sim ilar judgem en t w as taken  by  the C ourt on Decem ber 11,1973:
(...)it is for the internal legal system of every Member State to determine the legal procedure 
leading to this result.8^
In o ther decisions the ECJ84 *has em phasised  the responsibility  o f the  M ember S tates for 
the im plem entation o f C om m unity law:
A Member State cannot rely upon domestic difficulties or provisions of its national legal 
system, even its constitutional system, for the purpose of justifying a failure to comply with 
obligations and periods resulting from Community directives.
Under Article 169 of the Treaty, the Member States are liable no matter which organ of the 
State is responsible for the failure. A Member State may not plead provisions, practices or 
circumstances existing in its internal legal system in order to justify a failure to comply with 
obligations and time-limits under Community directives.86
The latter ph rase  has been frequently  used in sim ilar cases a n d  constitutes perm anen t 
jurisdiction87 of the Court. A ccording to 'the well-established case-law ’88 of the European 
Court of Justice "the liability of a M em ber State is incurred u n d er A rticle 169, irrespective of 
the organ o f the S tate w hose action or inaction is responsible for the failure"89. In Case 33 /90  
the ECJ stated:
II alone is responsible towards the Community under Article 169 for compliance with 
obligations ar.sing under Community law, irrespective of the use which it has made of the 
freedom to allocate areas of internal legal competence. That is why, in the case where a 
directive imposes an obligation on Member States to designate the authorities responsible 
for its implementation and places specific obligations on those authorities, (...), the fact that 
a Member State after designating such authorities, refrains from taking the measures
8^ ECJ Case 227 to 230/85 "Waste" (Commission v Belgium), ECR 19881,1.
88ECJ Case 141/73 "Investment aid" (Lohrey v ERG and Land Hessen), ECR 1973,1527.
^Besides, in both the following cases the Italian Republic as defendant tried to explain its failure to 
adopt within the prescribed period the measures provided for by directives of the EEC by means of the 
instability of the Italian political system (early dissolution of the chambers, governmental crises), adding in 
the second case that the delay in implementing the directives would be easily explicable in the light of the 
complex nature of the matter.
88 ECJ, Case 100/77 "Metrology" (Commission v Italian Republic), ECR 1978, 879.
86ECJ, Case 52/75 "Vegetable Seed" (Commission v Italian Republic), ECR 1976 I, 277.
87ECJ Case 74/89 "State Aid” (Commission v Belgium), ECR 1990, 491: 'As the Court consistently helt a 
Member State may not plead provisions, practices or circumstances existing in its internal legal system in 
order to justify a failure to comply with its obligations under Community law.'; Out of the large number of 
cases see the recent: ECJ Judgement of May 18, 1994 Case 303/93 "Electrically Operated Lifts" (Commission 
v Italy) and Opinion of Advocate General lacobs delivered on April 13, 1994, 2. However, it should be noted 
that the principle that a state may not plead internal provisions for the purpose of legitimising a failure to 
fulfil international obligations is an established fundamental axiom in public international law.
88ECJ Case 167/90 "Pharmacy Diplomas" (Commission v Belgium), ECR 1991, 2535.
89ECJ Case 52/75 "Vegetable Seed", ECR 1976 I, 281.
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necessary to ensure that those authorities meet their obligations constitutes a failure within 
the meaning of Article 169 of the EEC Treaty.90
Recently th e  ECJ referred  even m ore specifically to  the situation  of a state w ith  a federal 
structure:
It is for all the authorities of the Member States, whether it be the central authorities of the 
State or the authorities of a federated state, or other territorial authorities, to ensure 
observance of the rules of Community law within the sphere of their competence.9 ^
The la tte r tw o  judgem ents o f the ECJ are particularly in trigu ing  not only because they  
state th a t a M em ber State cannot d ischarge its obligations tow ards the C om m unity b y  relying 
on the  fact th a t it has delegated to  its sub-national entities the pow er to  adop t the 
im plem enting legislation b u t also because the Court verified th e  efficiency of dom estic 
m easures in th e  fram ew ork of a vertical div ision  of com petences. In  so far as the C ourt d id  no t 
limit itself to  th e  usual em phasising  o f the  general duty o f (all o rgans of) the M em ber States to  
fulfil their obligations b u t also evaluated  the effectiveness of the M em ber States’ internal legal 
system  and of the m easures foreseen b y  it (for exam ple, the  adm inistrative directives o f 
Lander92) or its structures (delegation o f pow ers to regions), the C ourt had show n a slightly  
'new '93 attitude: It is no  longer entirely  blind vis-a-vis the dom estic  legal system  and th u s 
federal system s an d  their m echanism s. In fact, this change is m ore  sem antic than  substantive, 
because it is o n ly  the states tha t are held responsible in p roceedings under Article 169 ECT.
This 'n ew  attitude', how ever, m igh t also have an o th er - negative - side: The 
Com m ission a rgued  in Case 33 /90  tha t 'a  M em ber State is no t obliged to delegate its pow ers 
to regions, provinces or com m unes, particularly  if it m ay  consider that such a  delegation is 
likely to  h inder the  proper application  o f a directive'94. H ere the Com m ission ignored  the fact 
that a M em ber S tate - like Italy - m ay w ell be obliged by its legal system  to delegate pow ers to  
sub-national entities. The position taken by  the Com m ission in C ase 33/90 recalls the position 
of the centralist Italian state a t the beginning of the 1970s (also supported  b y  the Corte 
Costituzionale). Interpreted in th is w ay it could  well be u tilized  by  centralists in Italy w ho w an t 
to re tu rn  to the infant years of Italian regionalism .
Sum m arising, domestic difficulties, provisions of national legal systems, even constitutional 
systems, practices or circumstances existing in its internal system a re  by  no m eans a justification
90ECJ Case 33/90 "Toxic and Dangerous Waste" (Commission v Italian Republic), ECR 1991, 5987f.
9 E^CJ Case 8/88 "EAGGF-Disallowance of expenditure" (Federal Republic of Germany v Commission),
ECR 1990, 2321.
93See also II. 1.1.
^Effectiveness has always been a yardstick of the Court. However, it seems to me that the Court has 
recently been evaluating mechanisms within federal systems in a more exhaustive way. An example is Case 
237/90 in which the ECJ decided that the German Federal Government ought to have imposed a notification 
duty on the Länder in order to fulfill its own obligation vis-à-vis the Community. The Federal Government's 
statement that such an explicit provision concerning a notification duty of the Lander towards the Bund 
would be unnecessary given that such a duty is the result of the principle of federal comity [principe de la 
loyauté envers le BundJ, was considered insufficient by the Court. - ECJ Case 237/90 
"TrinkwasserVerordnung" (Commission v FRG), ECR 1992, 5973.
94ECJ Case 33/90 "Toxic and Dangerous Waste" (Commission v Italian Republic), ECR 1991,5993.
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for non-com pliance before the ECJ. To the  above listed factors m ay  be added an  unstable 
political system (w hich  can be subsum ed  u n d er dom estic difficulties as well a s  un d er 
constitutional system 95), the complex nature o f  the m atter, independent administrative authorities 
or a regional or federal order. Even the  arg u m en t o f force majeure a n d  th e  'practical difficulties' 
arising from  it canno t be relied o n  indefinitely:
Although a Member State which has encountered momentarily insurmountable difficulties 
may plead force majeure to justify its failure to comply with its obligations imposed by a 
Community directive, this applies only to the period needed by an administration showing a 
normal degree of diligence to overcome those difficulties.9**
If the  E uropean C om m unity  accepted 'internal difficulties' (understood in  the  broad  
sense defined above) as a valid  justification for the failu re to  im plem ent directives, its 
effectivness w ou ld  really be a t stake. It does no t require an  enorm ous insight to  im agine the 
argum ents that M em ber States w o u ld  then  b e  able to use in  case o f a  procedure u n d e r Article 
169 EC T reaty  in  o rd e r  to  justify a  failure in  im plem entation. The Italian  Republic for exam ple, 
has in th e  past g iven justifications such a s  a terrorist bom b-attack  tha t destroyed statistic 
m aterial97. It w o u ld  indeed  be an  easy  w ay  o u t for M ember States. Such an  attitude could not, 
how ever - as the Com m ission sa id98 - be to lerated  in the fram ew ork  o f the Com m unity.
Leaving th e  M em ber State the choice of the im plem enting au th o rity  as well a s  o f the 
forms and  m ethods (Article 189, Section 3 EC-Treaty) an d  rely ing a t the same tim e on the 
classical m odel o f state responsibility (for an  eventual failure) is in tended  to render European 
law effective. It is perm issible tha t "the application (...) o f C om m unity  rules (...) depends on 
the com bination o f a num ber o f provisions adopted  at C om m unity , national an d  regional 
level"99, if only th is guarantees the effectiveness of its ru les. The preparatory  process o f 
European law has the same task:
"Since the governments of the Member States participate in the preparatory work for 
directives they must be in a position to prepare, within the period prescribed, the draft 
legislative provisions necessary for their implementation."*®®
95 Ad vocale General Maryas said: "In fact, by virtue of a constitutional practice which goes back several 
years, parlamentary work is interrupted during a Government crisis." - ECJ, Case 52/75, ECR 1976, 290.
96ECJ Case 101/84 "Statistical Returns - Terrorist Attack" (Commission v Italian Republic), ECR 1985, 
2629.
97ECJ Case 101/84 "Statistical Returns - Terrorist Attack" (Commission v Italian Republic), ECR 1985, 
2629.
98ECJ Case 39/72 "Premiums for slaughtering cows" (Commission v Italian Republic), ECR 1973, 107.
99ECJ Case 272/83 "Agricultural producer groups" (Commission v Italian Republic), ECR 1985, 1057.
*®®ECJ Case 148/81 "Public Limited Liability Companies" (Commission v Belgium), ECR 1982, 3555; ECJ 
Case 361/85 (Commission v Italian Republic), ECR 1987, 479; ECJ Case 364/85 "Bovine Animals" 
(Commission v Italian Republic), ECR 1987, 487; ECJ Case 386/85 "Fresh Meat" (Commission v Italian 
Republic), ECR 1987, 1061; Compare the Commission's statement in ECJ Case 39/72 "Premiums for 
slaughtering cows" (Commission v Italian Republic), ECR 1973, 106f: "Further, it is proper to note that the 
Italian Republic, just as the other Member States, was intimately involved in formulating and working out 
the Regulations in question; at this stage it would have been open to the Italian authorities to present all the 
arguments of a technical and political nature that they considered appropriate, in the general interest of the 
Community as well as in Italy’s own interest."
18
4
Substitutive Powers: Concept and Legitimation
The sam e is true for th e  participa tion  o f sub-national un its  in  the p reparato ry  w ork  th a t 
w as ensh rined  in  the M aastricht T reaty and  in  provisions on the  dom estic level. This allow s 
regions and  parliam ents to  take (form ally) part in this process no t only  out o f respect fo r the 
federal an d  th e  dem ocratic p rincip le101 b u t also to  im prove the effectiveness of European 
in tegration  itself. In addition , the  'legitim ation th roughout p rocedure ' (Luhmann102) also aim s 
at im prov ing  th e  effectiveness of E uropean  law. O n th e  o ther h an d  it is also the effectiveness 
of C om m unity  law , its achievem ents a n d  its results, tha t p rov ide for legitim ation. H ere w e 
com e full circle: effectivness o f C om m unity  law  an d , in  o u r  case, the correct and  tim ely  
im plem entation  of European law  b y  the  organs of m em bers' reg ions is not an  en d  in  itself. Its 
objective is to  prom ote econom ic a n d  social progress, and  to  strengthen the protection of 
h u m an  rights. Thus it is a lso  effectiveness that gives legitim ation to  the project o f European 
Integration103.
Given the different structu res o f M em ber States and  the v as t variety of institu tions the 
so-called 'regional-b lindness'104 of the  European C om m unity  cannot be understood  a s  an 
expression o f a centralist though t, b u t m u s t be seen as a  m ere resu lt o f these b road  differences 
and the  p redom inan t w ish to  render the  European legal o rder effective.
In its decision 52 /75 , the C ourt repeated "that, in  accordance w ith  the general 
obligations im posed  on the States b y  A rticle 5 of the  Treaty, it is for every M em ber State to 
adop t on a national level m easures w hich  are the consequences of its m em bership  of the 
C om m unity"105. The du ty  "to take all appropria te  m easures, w hether general o r particular, to 
ensure the fulfilm ent o f the obligations arising ou t o f this T reaty  or resulting from actions 
taken by the  institutions o f the  C om m unity" is not o n ly  a resu lt o f loyalty to the Community- 
principle of A rticle 5 EC-Treaty b u t equally  of Article 189 an d  o f particular provisions in  the 
secondary law  itself. It thus b in d s  all competent state organs106 o f the M ember States.
3.3. Internal Provisions that oblige state organs 'to 
contribute' to European Integration
This leads to the question  of w hether provisions in dom estic  law  which im pose a d u ty  
on (independent) state au thorities to  im plem ent E uropean law  are superfluous, o r even 
inadm issible. O ne m ight a rg u e  that a double loyalty o f state o rgans to  European Integration 
w ould  be 'better' than a single one an d  th a t it could lead  to a m o re  effective im plem entation  of 
E uropean law . On the o th er hand  such  a dom estic provision m ay result in  a  m isleading
10lThcse are, for example, basic principles (Baugesetze) of Ihe Austrian Federal-Constitutional I.aw: 
Article 1 and 2 B-VG.
102Luhmann, Legitimation durch Verfahren, 3.Auflage, Darmstadt: 1978,174ff.
103Compare: Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and 
Techniques, MLR 1993,19ff.
104/psen, Als Bundesstaat in der Gemeinschaft in: Caemmerer/Schlochauer/Steindorf, FS 1 Iallstein, 257.
105ECJ, Case 52/75, Reports of the Cases before the Court 19761,281.
^^Daig/Schmidt, in: Croeben/Thiesing/Chiermann, Kommentar zum EWG-Vertrag Bd 4, Art 189 Rndz 40; 
Geiger, EG-Vertrag, Art 5 Rndz 14, Art 189 Rndz 10.
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in terpretation  of th e  basis of the  state o rgans ' obligation to im plem ent European law . We have 
to rem em ber that:
"The law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, could not because of its 
special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, 
without being deprived of its character of Community law and without the legal basis of the 
Community itself being called into question."107
R egulations also bind the  M em ber States (understood in  a  b ro ad  sense as above) and  
have th e  force o f law  in their territo ries w ithou t the need for transform ation or confirm ation 
by their legislatures:
The direct application of a Community regulation means that its entry into force and its 
application in favour or against those subject to it are independent of any measure of 
reception into national law.10®
A dom estic 'parallel-legislation' is prohibited  because it w o u ld  disguise its C om m unity  
character. "C onsequently”, so the  ECJ, "all m ethods of im plem entation  are con trary  to the 
Treaty w hich w o u ld  have the resu lt of creating  an  obstacle to the  d irec t effect of C om m unity  
Regulations and  of jeopardising their sim ultaneous and uniform  application in the  w hole o f 
the C om m unity"109
In our case, however, national provisions have, on the contrary, the function o f 
avoiding a jeopard ising  of the sim ultaneous and uniform  application  o f European law  in the 
M em ber States. I therefore th ink  tha t they  are com patible w ith C om m unity  law  in as far as 
they do not conceal the C om m unity  na tu re  of the du ty  to  im plem entation. 'Parallel loyalty- 
provisions' do  no t disguise the  'European character' o f this d u ty  if they refer explicitly to  
European In tegration  or if their position in  the C onstitution leaves n o  doub t about this.
Such a refering  is good to  be seen in Article 16, Section 6 o f the  A ustrian Constitution:
The Länder are obliged to take measures in their independent domain, which become 
necessary to implement acts within the framework of European Integration; (...).
A n exam ple for the 'position  in the  constitution' argum en t can  be found in  th e  Spanish 
Constitution Article 93 in C hapter III (Concerning International Treaties) of w hich assum es 
the character of a fulfilment-guarantee on th e  p art of the central authorities:
(...) It is the responsibility of the Cories Generales or the Government, depending on the 
cases, to guarantee compliance with these treaties and the resolutions emanating from the 
international or supranational organisations who have been entitled by this cession.
A sim ilar provision is to  be found  in Article 1 o f the Italian  legge La Pergola (legge 
n.86/1989):
107ECJ Case 6/64 (Costa v ENEL), ECR 1964, 586.
108 ecj çase 50/76 (Amsterdam Bulb v Produktschap), ECR 1977,137.
109ECJ Case 39/72 "Premiums for slaughtering cows" (Commission v Italy), ECR 1973, lOlf.
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Con i procedimenti e le misure previste dalla presente legge, lo Stato garantisce l’adempimento
degli obblighi derivanti dall'appartenenza dell’Italia alle Comunità europee che consistono: (...)
W hereas in  the Spanish and  Italian cases it is the d u ty  o f central institutions to see th a t 
E uropean law  is im plem ented and  au tonom ous institutions a re  th u s  only  indirectly b ou n d  b y  
such dom estic  provisions, in  A ustria the  sub-national un its  (the Lander) are d irectly  obliged to 
do  so. The s ituation  in  G erm any is slightly  different: th e re  the Länder are obliged (vis-à-vis the 
Bund) to  im p lem en t E uropean law  th rough  the unw ritten  constitutional principle of federal 
comity110.
In m y  opin ion  it is ra th e r doub tfu l w hether an d  to w hich degree such provisions in 
practice facilitate the adm inistrative tasks of the European U nion. As said, there is a m u ltitude 
of factors111 (am ong w hich the legal fram ew ork is to  be considered only as one, albeit 
im portant, factor) that determ ine the im plem entation by  states, sub-national un its o r 
independent adm inistrative agencies, so  that additional dom estic provisions th a t oblige state 
o rgans 'to contribute ' to E uropean  Integration m ust necessarily b e  of secondary im portance. It 
cannot be said th a t states w ith  such provisions have show ed a better perform ance as regards 
the im plem entation  of C om m unity  ru les than states th a t do  no t know  such provisions. They 
m ight thus be  considered as o f a m erely 'symbolic' value.
H ow ever, a second telos of these provisions is undo u b ted ly  that o f p rov id ing  a legal 
basis for a substitu tive competence vis-à-vis authorities that a re  autonom ous from  the central 
governm ent.
4. Substitutive competences
Substitutive com petences regard ing  the im plem entation  of European law  exist in 
several M em ber States of th e  E uropean Union. This chap ter w ill deal w ith the general concept 
of substitu tive pow ers of central institu tions vis-à-vis independen t entities (especially regions) 
in  the  fram ew ork  of E uropean Integration.
In th is context the follow ing questions arise: first, are such  provisions really  legitim ised 
by  the  argum entation  that it is only the  M em ber States w hich a re  subject to p rocedures u n d e r 
A rticle 169 EC-Treaty (given the liability  of territorial un its  according to  the  Francovich- 
judgement112) ; second, w hether the foreign-policy pouvoir of central institutions is adequate in 
the process o f European Integration, o r w hether these m atters should  be considered hom e 
affairs; third, are such provisions really  necessary as a 'big stick1, o r are they  destined  to 
rem ain  dead  law; fourth, if substitu tive provisions are an  idoneous m eans to p rom ote  *1
llclSee, Chapter II.2.
^ 'The preconditions for the effectiveness of Community law are complex,' - Snyder, The Effectiveness 
of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques, ELR 1993, 53.
11 ^ Regions as legal entities might be made liable according tt the rules of public liability for the actions 
or ommissions of their organs. See p 36ff.
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com pliance w ith  E uropean law, could  such  provisions exist in  favou r o f the Länder vis-à-vis 
the Bund on  a p a rity  basis; fifth, is the idea  of devolution113 lim ited  to  the rela tion  state- 
regions o r  is it also  applicable vis-à-vis independent adm inistra tive agencies o r other 
independen t u n its  (such as courts).
H aving  d iscussed this, I w ill exam ine three solutions in  their institutional a n d  politico- 
adm inistrative fram ew ork: the G erm an, the Italian and  the A ustrian . I shall a rg u e  that 
'fram ew ork ' has to  be  understood  in  a  b road  sense, transcending  the limits o f a  m erely 
technical approach  an d  considering that the relationship betw een the  different territorial actors 
m ust be  perceived as m ultidim ensional114.
There a re  several reasons for hav ing  selected these, an d  no t for instance the 
(tem porary) substitu tion  foreseen in Article 68, § 7 of the C onstitu tion  of Belgium o f M ay 5, 
1993 w hich  is to be  p u t into concrete term s by a law under the special conditions o f Article I er, 
last section. Belgium  w as not chosen as subject of a com parative analysis in sp ite of the fact 
that in a  few years it has m oved  from  being from a centralist to  a  federalist state, and  is 
therefore an avan tgarde in constitutional policy. That this could  occur in  the fram ew ork of (an 
even intensified) European In tegration is, in m y opinion, a good exam ple of the openess of the  
European U nion as regards in ternal constitutional questions of M em ber States115. H ow ever, 
the novelty  of these fundam ental changes as well as the uncertain ty  o f the future developm ent 
of Belgium m ake a clear assessm ent very  difficult. The substitu tive pow ers foreseen in the 
Dutch M unicipalities and Provinces A ct116 are not dealt w ith because of the different position 
of these entities com pared with the  regions in the three states in question.
G erm any an d  Italy are founding m em bers of the E uropean  Com m unity. A ustria has 
m em ber of the EE A as an EFTA-state (since January 1, 1994) an d  has joined the  European 
Union on January  1, 1995. So tw o  'old' m em bers will be com pared  to  a  brand new  one. The 
A ustrian (albeit short) EEA m em bersh ip  (on the EFTA-side) allow s to  integrate som e 
experiences as regards the im plem entation  of EEA law.
G erm any is always quo ted  as an  exam ple for a w ell-established and  advanced 
federalism . A ustria  could, in brief, be characterised as a  developing federal system. Still in the 
1950s \Nheare h ad  argued:
(...) There was a sphere, it is true, where the federal principle applied and to this extent
Austria had a federal constitution. But this sphere was so small, and, after a constitutional
11 devolution is here understood as a shift of competence because of inertia of the former competent 
authority. - Compare: Adamowich/Funk, Österreichisches Verwaltungsrecht, 321.
114"The context-ignorant comparativist is likely to be wrong, however, in the interpretation and, in its 
wake, in the explanation." - Sartori, Comparing and Miscomparing. Journal of Theoretical Politics 1991,253
115This thesis cannot deal with the question of how far the domestic process was influenced by further 
integration in comparison to internal incentives.
116I want to thank the Raad van der Staate, the Ministcrie ran Binnenlandse Zaken and particularly 
Mr.A.Ch.M.Ryron, Ministry of Home Affairs, for their cooperation.
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amendment of 1929, so insignificant, that there is little experience to be discovered from
Austria of the working of federal government.11^
In the course of this s tu d y  it w ill becom e apparen t that his judgem ent can no  longer b e  
justified in th e  1990s.
W here the  Italian 'federalising-process' m ight lead  to, seem s to  be m ore incertain than  
before 'tangentopoli' and  the  so-called 'end  of the first republic'. H ow ever, also  the Italian 
m odel o f a central states' substitu tive pow er in a regional ist context - w hich is p robab ly  
destined to becom e legal h is to ry  - cou ld  b e  of some com parative value. If on ly  it m ight be  
perceived as an  outstanding exam ple of continuity  of patterns of behaviour and persistency o f 
'adm inistrative-culture'. If these effects w ere  decisive in the last q u arte r of a century, it w ou ld  
be likely that th ey  are destined to  p lay  a prom inent role also in the  'second republic*.
Third, it has been said  th a t "the political culture o f the coun try  (i.e. of A ustria) usua lly  
places a g rea t deal of em phasis on  legality  and legal regulations"118. That substitu tive 
com petences w ere  em bodied in  A ustria o n  the constitutional level m ight be understood  also  in 
this light. H ow ever, in the last years w e  can w itness th a t a m aterial understanding  of law  has 
becom e m ore im portan t in A ustria. The A ustrian C onstitutional C ourt (Verf ass u ngsgerich tshof) 
- em phasising  its judicial self-restraint - h as sw itched to  a m ore substantive interpretation of the 
Federal-C onstitutional Law, w hich  is to  b e  seen in som e fam ous cases119. A thinking in 
form alistic categories of law  has rem ained  m uch stronger in  the  Italian case. The form al 
com pexity o f the  Italian provision regard ing  substitutive action is undoubted ly  unique. In 
G erm any, on  the other hand, doctrine and  in particular the Federal Constitutional C ourt have 
traditionally  stressed questions of content and  played a m ore active role.
A fourth  aspect is the d ifferent position of substitutive com petences in the legal system  
of the  three states: the substitu tive pow er is based on an unw ritten  constitutional principle (the 
federal-com ity) in  Germ any, on  a prov ision  in the constitution in A ustria and an  article on 
only s ta tu to ry  level in Italy. This aspect, which to m e seem s significant because of the 
divergent attitudes tow ards a constitution, and  because it is one of a hierarchical structure of 
sources of law  (Stufenbau dcr Rechtsordnung^®), m erits fu rther consideration.
1 ^ Wheare, Federal Government, Third Edition, London: 1953,24f.
1 l°Gerlich/MiiHer, Austria: Routine and Ritual, in: Blondel/Muller-Rommel (Ed.), Cabinets in Western 
Europe, 138; Compare also Article 18[1) B-VG: The entire public administration shall be based on law.
119See only VfSlg 8871/1980 "Witwerpension" that forced parliament to introduce a "widowers' 
pension".
^^Merkl, Allgemeines Verwaltungsrecht, Wien: 1927,172.
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4.1. The liability of the Member States
The m ost com m on arg u m en t121 in favour of a substitutive power of 'central institu tions' 
vis-à-vis sub-national units is the  in ternational responsibility of the state , i.e. in the fram ew ork  
of European In tegration  the ind iv idual M em ber States can be b ro u g h t before the European 
Court of Justice according to Article 169-171 EC Treaty. Judicial responsibility  on  the  part of 
the regions, how ever, for failure in  this context does not exist.
In Sw itzerland the problem s connected with an internal separation  of authorities (i.e. 
between the  Bund an d  the Kantone) and  the  responsibility o f the Bund in the fram ew ork  o f 
European In tegration  have been  b roadly  discussed. Daniel Thiirer and  Philippe Weber122 
argued that in the  case of persistent non-com pliance w ith ECJ-judgements on  the p a rt of a 
Kanton the  com petences could devolve to the Bund. A m eans of oblig ing a Kanton to  carry  ou t 
its d u ty  w ould  b e  federal execution (Article 85, N um ber 8 BV) an d  especially substitutive 
action123. They on ly  refer to a possible condem nation o f Sw itzerland by the ECJ124, an d  
em phasise that such a substitutive action shou ld  only be taken as an  ultima ratio, after all o ther 
available legal (and also non-legal) m eans have been brought to bear on  the Kantone.
In Italy the  Constitutional C ourt a rgued  that the state w hich is the only responsible 
subject vis-à-vis the C om m unity  w ould  be  completely disarmed w ith o u t such a substitutive 
com petence125.
W as ’in ternational responsibility ' a sufficient basis to legitim ise substitutive pow ers and  
were the possible consequences for M em ber States really serious enough to  p lead for 
additional pow ers of central institutions?
N o doubt, from  an in tegration  perspective the failure to  im plem ent European law  is a 
serious m atter (w hich becomes even  m ore serious if it concerns a judgem ent o f the ECJ126)127
121See, for example: Riegel, Überlegungen zum Problem EG-Richtlinien und nationale
Rahmenkompetenz, EuR 1976, 86; Riegel, Gliedstaatkompetenzen im Bundesstaat und Europäisches 
Gemeinschaftsrecht, DVBI 1979, 248 who, however, in this article put the main emphasis on a jeopardizing 
of the Community in this article.; Schwan, Die deutschen Bundesländer im Entscheidungssystem der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaf tea 155; }ooss/Scheuerle, Die bundesstaatliche Ordnung im Integralionsprozeß, 
EuR 1989, 232; Kössinger, Die Durchführung des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts im Bundesstaat, 37; 
implicit: Zulegg, Die Stellung der Länder und Regionen im europäischen Integrationsprozeß, DVBI 1992, 
1332 FN 43; ƒtessel/Mortelmans, Dezentralized Government and Community Law: Conflicting Institutional 
Developments?, CML Rev 1993,930f.
^^ Thürer/Weber, Zur Durchführung von Europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht durch die Gliedstaaten 
eines Bundesstaates, Schweizerisches Zentral bl att für Staats- und Verwal lungsrecht 1991, 431-465, 
particularly 46 Iff.
12^l*JSchindler proposed a power of the Bund to transpose European law in case of urgency and stressed 
the parallelism with the implementation of state treaties. - Schindler, Verfassungsrecht in: 
Schindler/1 lertig/Kellenberger/Thürer/Zäch(IIrsg.), Die Europa Verträglichkeit des Schweizerischen 
Rechtes/ Le droit suisse et le droit communautaire: convergences et divergences, 29; See also: Epiney, Der 
Stellenwert des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts in den Integrations vertragen, LL.M. Thesis Florence 1992, 
FN 161.
124See also: Majer, Rechtsprobleme beim Vollzug von F.G- und EWR-Recht im Bundesstaat am 
Modellfall der Schweiz, EuGRZ 1992, 525.
125CC sentcnza 22 luglio 1976, n.182 ("Agriculture-Community-Directives"), Giur.Cost. 19761,1138ff.
12^ ECJ Case 131/84 (Commission v Italian Republic), ECR 1985, 3531.
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From the  po in t o f view  of the single M em ber States the situation  seem ed to be different: fo r a 
long period  th e  price to p ay  for the failu re to transpose a D irective w as non-existent o r 
m inim al. It consisted  of a m ere  declaration  that the M em ber State h ad  breached the law * 128. It 
is a basic fea tu re o f the C om m unity  as a 'com m unity of law '129 th a t it does not have  m eans of 
coercing the M em ber States o r its organs. The Treaty o f Rom e does not expressly provide for 
any effective sanction against a state w hich  fails to tem per its obligations (to the detrim ent o f 
those w hich d o )130. The C om m ission h as no pow er to issue o rders addressed to  state organs 
{as in the case of indirect adm inistra tion  o r  w hen state o rgans act as  agents of the federation in  
som e federal system s131) o r to  substitu te  the com petent state organs. The C om m ission’s 
interference in  the  internal p rocess is lim ited  to  being ab le to  contact132 state o rgans for th e  
pu rpose of collecting inform ation an d  to  check the perform ance o f the tasks en trusted  to  it. In 
the case of non-com pliance w ith  E uropean law  the C om m ission m ight only  then  initiate 
proceedings before the EÇJ. Follow ing a  top down approach it  is the  C ourt and its (declaratory) 
judgem ents th a t are o f central im portance for im proving com pliance w ith  European law.
Focusing attention on  th e  record o f the Italian Republic a s  regards infringem ents o f 
European law 133, one can com e to the conclusion that the  Republic h as not taken its d u ty  an d  
responsibility seriously  enough . C ertainly no t seriously enough  to  u se  it as an  argum ent for 
founding  a(n  additional) substitu tive pow er vis-à-vis 'aw kw ard ' regions. Here the 
contradiction betw een  em phasising  the responsibility o f the sta te  on  the one h an d  and  the 
'neglectful' practice on the o th e r  becom es particularly visible. The inescapable conclusion th a t 
em erges from  the Italian case is tha t the 'responsibility-argum entation ' can be an d  has been in 
fact used to  cover diverse interests an d  other argum entations. These interests an d  
argum entations w ill be considered fu rth e r in the chap ter entitled  'Italy-the patriarchal 
solu tion’. H ow ever, in this m ore  general context the Italian case show s that it is n o t sufficient 
to rely  only on 'international responsibility ' in order to legitim ise a substitutive com petence.
One m ight now  a rgue  that th is responsibility has recently  become m ore relevant 
because of the new  provisions in  the T reaty  on European U nion am ending  Article 171 (Section 
2) EC Treaty that allow  the C ourt o f Justice to im pose a lump sum  and penalty payments on  
M em ber States w ho fail to com ply  w ith  Court judgem ents w h en  they are found to be in
117Compare Chapter 1.4.3. which is devoted to the question of whether substitutive powers are an 
idoneous means to promote compliance with European Law.
128IAOThe fact that the unsuccessful party is ordered to pay the costs under Article 69, Section 2 of the Rules 
of Procedure cannot be considered as a sanction but only as the natural result of its being unsuccessful.
1 ^ Haltstein, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft, 5.Auflage, 1979, 51ff.
1 If)Coppct, Individual Enforcement of Community Law: The Future of the Francovich Remedy, EUI 
Worling Paper LAW No.93/6, FN 14 quoting the ECJ. 
t 11
*-ilCompare H.3.; For the German 'Auftragsverwaltung' see Article 84 GG.
^ 2Daig/Schmidt in: Grocben/Thiesing/Ehtermann, Kommentar zum EG-Vertrag Bd 4, Art 189, Rndz 40; 
Geiger, cG-Vertrag, Art 189, Rndz 10.
1 11lJJSee: Commission, Tenth annual report on the monitoring of the application of Community law 1992, 
COM(93) 320 final, p 152, suspected infringments: Italy: 1988-245; 1989-285; 1990-255; 1991-175; 1992-207; 
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breach of their C om m unity  obligations. These provisions aim  to im prove the im plem entation 
of Court judgem en ts that, due to the ir declara tory  character, a re  no t enforceable134. It has been 
rightly po in ted  o u t that the om ission of sanctions to com pel states to  fulfil their obligations 
had posed  a  real th reat to  the  un iform  application of C om m unity  law , indeed  to  the 
C om m unity 's very  existence135.
The in troduction  of penalty  paym ent an d  lum p sum  in to  the EC Treaty is undoub ted ly  
- like the  Francovich judgem ent - a  b ig  norm ative step fo rw ard  in  E uropean Law b u t, in m y 
opinion, does n o t fundam entally  change the  situation o f responsibility  as regards the 
relationship betw een  state and sub-national entities. First, because p ena lty  paym ent as well as 
lum p sum  only concern  the second p rocedure  (the ECJ has ju s t declared  tha t the M em ber State 
has no t fulfilled its  obligations o u t o f the treaty), and are therefore o n ly  im posed in  a  m inor 
num ber of cases. Second, because th e  state u p o n  which a lu m p  su m  o r a  penalty paym ent is 
im posed can  have this paym ent refunded  b y  the sub-national un it th a t is - again according to 
the national legal system  - responsible for the  non-im plem entation of a  C ourt judgem ent. Such 
a refundation  is, fo r exam ple, forseen in  A rticle 12, Section 2 of the  agreem ent betw een  the 
A ustrian B und a n d  the Lander regard ing  the  decision m aking p rocess in  European affairs 
[BGBl 775/1992, see A ppendix III]. One m igh t thus argue tha t in th is case an, albeit indirect, 
financial liability o f regions for non-com pliance w ith E uropean law  cam e into being w ith  the 
M aastricht Treaty. If states can pass  on penalties to regions, they  n o w  have an  additional 
sanction vis-à-vis regions. A dm ittedly  it  should  not be forgotten  th a t in dem ocracies like 
G erm any136 and  A ustria w here policy tends to be the resu lt of bargain ing  betw een several 
actors (in ou r case the  actors of the  national and  the regional level) such a passing o n  m ight 
also becom e an object of bargaining (as fiscal questions are in one w ay  o r another in federal 
systems).
A nother case w here regions could now  be m ade financially liable for the non ­
im plem entation o f European law  is the Francovich case137, that as an  individual enforcem ent , 
action could  be understood  as com plem ent of the Article 169 enforcem ent action and  that 
could be com prehended  as shap ing  the grass roots approach^. The ECJ stated:
In the case that a Member State which fails to fulfil its obligation under the third paragraph 
of Article 189 (...) there should be a right to reparation where three conditions are met, that is 
to say, first, that the result prescribed by the directive should entail the grant of rights to 
individuals; secondly that it should be possible to identify the content of those rights on the 
basis of the provisions of the directive; and thirdly, that there should be a causal link
134Gei'^ er, Kommentar rum EG-Vertrag, Art 171, Rndz 12.
1
‘ Steiner, From direct effects to Francovich: shifting means of enforcement of Community Law, ELR
1993, 3.
136 A recent study significantly described the path from a 'chancellor-democracy' to a 'coordination- 
democracy'. - Jäger, Wer regiert Deutschland? Innenansichten der Parteiendemokralie., Zürich,/Osnabrück:
1994.
1X7ECJ Case 6/90 and 9/90 “Francovich" (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Preture of Vicenca 
and Bassano di Grappa), ECR 1991, 5357; ECJ Case 22/87 "Protection of employees - employer's insolvence" 
(Commission v Italy), ECR 1989, 143; For the Francovich case see, for example: Coppel, Individual 
Enforcement of Community Law: The Future of the Francovich Remedy, EUI Working Paper LAW No. 93/6.
i^Ehtermann, Die Europäische Gemeinschaft, das Recht und die Juristen, NJW 1992,1859.
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between the breach of the State's obligation and the loss and damage suffered by the injured 
parties.
In the absence of any Community legislation, it is in accordance with the rules of national 
liability that the State must make reparation for the consequences of the loss and damage 
caused. 139
The Francovich-case is u ndoub ted ly  of enorm ous constitu tional significance for the  
C om m unity  an d  its approach  certainly provides strong encouragem ent for the M em ber States 
to im plem ent directives w ith in  the  prescribed periods140. In o u r  context it is im portan t th a t 
the judgem ent refers to dom estic law  according to w hich - in  th e  absence of an y  C om m unity  
legislation - the  loss and dam age is to  be obtained. "Nevertheless", th e  C ourt stated  that:
"the relevant substantive and procedural conditions laid down by the national law of the 
Member States must not be less favourable than those relating to similar domestic claims 
and must not be so framed as to make it virtually impossible or excessively difficult to 
obtain reparation."141
A dvocate General Mischo said:
That means at least that the most appropriate remedies existing in the national legal system 
must be interpreted in such a manner as to comply with those requirements, and even that 
an appropriate remedy must be created if it does not exist.14^
R egarding the A ustrian situation  this means th a t Länder as entities143 (Rechtsträger) 
could be m ade liable according to  to  the rules of pub lic  liability  (Article 23 B-VG, A rt 1 
A m tshaftungsgesetz BGBl 1949/20) for their organs. A rticle 23, Section 1 B-VG states:
The Federation, the Länder, the districts, the communes and other public law corporations 
and institutions are liable to whomever for any damage caused by persons acting as their 
organs in execution of laws by illegal behaviour.
As in G erm any (Article 34 GG144) the rules of public liability  do  not foresee a liability 
for legislative default till now . In the von Colson case the ECJ had  s ta ted  that national courts m ust 
guarantee real and  effective pro tection145 for individuals' C om m unity  rights. It follows that
139F.CJ Case 6/90 and 9/90 "Francovich" (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Preture of Vicenca 
and Bassano di Grappa), ECR, 5359.
140Opinion of Advocate General Mischo - ECJ Case 6/90 and 9/90, F.CR 1991,5402.
141ECJ Case 6/90 and 9/90 "Francovich” (Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Preture of Vicenca 
and Bassano di Grappa), ECR, 5359.
1 ^ Opinion of Advocate General Mischo - ECJ Case 6/90 and 9/90, ECR 1991, 5380; Compare: ’It is for 
the national courts, in application of the principle of cooperation laid down in Article 5 of the EEC Treaty, to 
ensure the legal protection which persons derive from the direct effect of provisions of Community law.’ - 
ECJ Case 213/89 The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd (reference for a 
preliminary ruling by the I louse of Lords), ECR 1990,2433.
143Also the districts, municipalities and corporations of public law. - Compare Article 1
Amtshaftungsgesetz (public liability law).
144If any person, in the exercise of a public office entrusted to him, violates a third party, liability shall 
rest in principle on the state or the public body which employs him.
145ECJ von Colson v Land Nordrein Westfalen (reference for a preliminary ruling from the 
Arbeitsgericht Hamm), ECR 1984,1891
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'the national court is required to interpret its national law in the light of the wording and the 
purpose of the directive'146. If, in our case, the national rules of liability of public authorities 
could not be interpreted in such a manner as to comply with the requirements of Francovich 
(which is very likely), then the Austrian judge must 'create an appropriate remedy'. The judge 
would therefore have to apply only the procedural provisions of the public liability law 
(Amtshaftungsgesetz) filling them with the substantive content of the Francovich-judgement. 
Thus, one conclusion that emerges from Francovich is that the Austrian147 (and the 
German148) rules of public liability should be revised in order to complete them with a 
liability for legislative default149. 'These steps towards the gradual reshaping of national 
remedies can be viewed as an (...) element in the Community liability system'150. 
Notwithstanding the consequences of Francovich for the domestic public liability law sketched 
out above, we should be aware that the ECJ would always declare the Member State 
responsible.
It might be argued that extending public liability on legislative default would 
counteract the concept of parliamentary sovereignty. As far as legislative default in the 
framework of European Integration is concerned, the constrains for national parliament's 
autonomy seem to me not only unavoidable but also legitimised: Not by case have the 
profound changes that the concept of parliamentary sovereinty has to undergo within the 
integration process been stressed on several occasions151. In addition, the existing internal 
participation-models of (national and regional) parliaments at the comunitarian law-making 
process should be taken into account. Overall, relying on legislature’s freedom of discretion is 
inappropriate in the case of European Integration because:
The acts or omissions for which states will be liable under Francovich will not involve the
exercise of discretion. A failure to achieve the ends required by a directive is a matter in
which a state has no discretion. As Advocate general Mischo commented in francovich, "as
146See FN 112; See also: ECJ Case 106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentación 
(reference for a preliminary ruling by the Juzgado de Primera Instancia e Istrucción, Oviedo, Spain), ECR 
1990, 4158L
147Fhhá: pleaded for an amendment. - Funk, Die bevorstehende Öffnung Österreichs in den Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsraum und in die Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Referat am 12.ÖJT 1994,27.
148For Germany, see: Häde, Staatshaftung für legislatives Unterlassen, BayVBl 1992,449.
149Steincr argued that 'unless a right in respect of such acts (i.e.wrongful acts or omission by act of 
parliament) is admitted in all Member States the effective application of Francovich will be seriously 
undermined’. - Steiner, From direct effects to Francovich: shifting means of enforcement of Community Law, 
MLR 1993, 14; Another question, beyond this paper's scope, concerns the need for culpability. While 
culpability is a precondition in the Austria) law of public liability even merely accidental failures to 
transpose directives would, according to Francovich, create liability.
^®Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community Law; Institutions, Processes, Tools and 
Techniques, MLR 1993, 46
151 See: MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, MLR 1993, 16: "(...) it seems obvious that no state in 
Western Europe any longer is a sovereign state. (...) Where at some time past there were, or may have been, 
sovereign states, there has now been a pooling or a fusion within the communitarian normative order of 
some of the states' powers of legislation, adjudication and implementation of law in relation to a wide but 
restricted range of subjects. (...) We must not envisage sovereignty as the object of some kind of a zero sum 
game, such that the moment X loses it Y necessarily has it”; Christiansen, European Integration Between 
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far as implementation of Directives is concerned the legislature is in a situation similar to an 
administration under an obligation to implement a law".15^
A third situation where sub-national units could be subject to a claim is the case of 
direct applicability of directives. It has just been said that in this case recognised classifications 
tend to break down* 153, or, in other words, that 'the dear cut distinction between regulations 
and directives implied in the Treaty has been blurred'154. Although distinguishable from 
regulations in that they are addressed to the Member States and not to the entirety of Union 
Citizens directive might 'produce direct effects in the relations between the Member States and 
their citizens (and create for the latter the right to enforce them before the courts)’155.
In the van Duyn case the ECJ stated that 'if the obligation imposed on Member States is 
clear and predse the rule (i.e, provision of the directive) is suffident in itself and the 
provision confers on Community national rights then these rights are enforceable by them in 
the national courts'156. It was the prinriple of effet utile that was the rationale of van Duyn. 
Until then the reasoning of the Court had been constant157 and individuals could rely on 
provisions of directives (after the expiration of the deadline for transposition of the provisions 
of the directive into the internal legal order of the Member States158) that were suffiriently 
clear and unconditional before a national court, if a directive was either not timely or had not 
been transposed correctly into domestic law by the competent authorities. This was - as Curtin 
argued - theoretically underpinned by the notion of a 'Community estoppel'159, namely that 
Member States should not be able to rely on their own failure to implement.
15^ Steiner, From direct effects to Francovich: shifting means of enforcement of Community Law, ELR 
1993,16; See also my argumentation on page 13.
153Compare FN 78 ff.
1 ^ Lasok/Bridge, Law & Institutions of the European Communities, 4.Ed., London: 1987, 126; See for 
example: Wägenbaur, Ist die Unterscheidung zwischen Verordnungen, Richtlinien und Entscheidungen nach 
Artilel 189 EWG-Vertrag hinfällig geworden, DVB1 1972, 244; ’(...)legal rules by their very nature have a 
practical purpose. (...) The non-operation of a rule of law appears thus to be not an ordinary phenomenon, 
but a real antinomy in the legal system. In other words, 'direct effect' must be presumed, it has not to be 
established a priori. To return to medical comparisons, I would say that 'direct effect' is the normal state of 
health of the law; it is only the absence of direct effect which causes concern and calls for the attention of 
legal doctors.' - Pescatore, The Doctrine of ’Direct Effect’: An Infant Disease of Community Law, ELR 1983, 
155.
1SSECJ Case 9/70, ECR1979,837.
156ECJ Case 41/74 van Duyn v Home Office (preliminary ruling requested by the Chancery Division of 
the High Court of Justice), ECR 1974, 1356; Compare just: ECJ Case 9/70 Grad v Finanzamt Traunstein 
(reference for a preliminary ruling by the Finanzgericht München), ECR 1970, 825: "(...) the effectivness 
(Veffet utile') of such a measure would be weakened if the nationals of that State could not invoke it in the 
courts and the national courts could not take it into consideration as part of Community law.”
157See: Everting, Zur direkten innerstaatlichen Wirkung der EG-Richtlinien: Ein Beispiel richterlicher 
Rechtsfortbildung auf der Basis gemeinsamer Rechtsgrundsätze in: Bömer/Jahrreiß/Stern, Einigkeit und 
Recht und Freheit - Festschrift Carstens, Bd 1,95-113
158ECJ Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v Tullio Ratti (preliminary ruling requested by the Pretura 
Penale, Milan), ECR 1979,1630
159Cur/m, The Province of Government: Delimiting the Direct Effect of Directives in the Common Law 
Context, ELR 1990, 196f, 199 quoting Lord Donaldson; See but: Pescatore, The Doctrine of 'Direct Effect’: An 
Infant Disease in Community Law, ELR 1983,169.
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In the Marshall case the ECJ stated 'that a directive may not of itself impose obligations 
on an individual and (...) a provision of a directive may not be relied upon as such against 
such a person'160. Thus a directive could have a direct effect only in the relation individual 
vis-à-vis 'the state' and not vice versa. A horizontal effect is thereby, in general, precluded161. 
The direct effect of directives is confined to the vertical plane and does not exist in 'relation to 
third parties (Drittvnrkung)'162. Direct effect of directives should, however, be related to all 
emanations of the state, including a state authority163 acting as employer. In 'recognising the 
unity of public authority'164 the ECJ applied a very wide interpretation of bodies that 
constitute 'the state* for the purposes of a Community estoppel165. In Fratelli Costanzo the ECJ 
ruled in the context of the direct effect of directives that the state was to be understood as 'all 
organs of the administration, including the decentralised authorities'166. Thus, from the 
viewpoint of European Law as well as national law, (independent) sub-national units 
constitute emanations of the state167 (and this also in their quality of employers), so that a 
Union citizen can rely upon unimplemented, but directly applicable, directives against 
regional entities in the national courts.
To sum up: first, a Member State that is brought before the ECJ under Article 171 EC 
Treaty for the non-implementation of a Court judgement by one of its sub-national units can, 
according to domestic law, have this payment refunded by the responsible region (when this 
possibility is foreseen). Second, according to Francovich, regions can be made liable under the 
domestic rules of public authority liability (which should either be interpreted in the sense of 
the wording or be amended in order to extend them to defaults of the legislative branch). 
Third, individuals might rely on provisions of an unimplemented directive in national courts
160ECJ Case 152/84 Marshall v Health Authority (preliminary ruling requested by the Court of Appeal 
of England and Wales), ECR 1986, 749.
161Such an effect could only be achieved by a back-door interpretative method’. This, however, requires 
the existence of a national legislation which is - albeit ambigous - capable to be interpreted. Then national 
courts could give provisions of directives an (indirect) impact on horizontal legal relations. Sec: Steiner, The 
province of Government: Delimiting the Direct Effect of Directives in the Common Law Context, ELR 1990, 
220ff.
1 ^ Compare also ECJ Case 14/83 von Colson v Land Nordrhein-Westfalen (reference for a preliminary 
ruling from the Arbeitsgericht Hamm), ECR 1984, 1901; The recognition that a directive could, under certain 
conditions, have vertical direct effect 'formed the first plank in the judicial liability system'. - Snyder, The 
Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and Techniques, MLR 1993, 40.
163Eor the debate and the criteria of a delimitation of public authorities, especially in Great Britain and 
Ireland, see: Curtin, The Province of Government: Delimiting the Direct Effect of Directives in the Common 
Law Context, ELR 1990, 200ff: The concept of 'public authority' (...regardless of the capacity in which the 
latter the state - is acting, whether employer or public authority...) upheld by the ECJ in the Marshall case 
is, in fact, very loose. It will be no easy task to reconcile the different concepts of public authority existing in 
the Member States according to criteria such as public and private company with state participation 
('national airlines') or sufficiently close links, structural or otherwise: for example, bodies that regulate 
profession or buisiness, 'quasi non-governmental institutions' or universities.
164ECJ Case 14/83 von Colson v Land Nordrhein Westfalen (reference for a preliminary ruling from the 
ArbeitsgerichtIlamm), ECR 1984,1900.
165See EN 159.
ECJ Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo Spa v Commune di Milano (reference for a preliminary ruling 
from the Tribunale amministrativo regionale per la Lombardia, Italy), ECR 1989,1839f.
167Compare also Article 2 of Council Directive 80/723/EEC on the transparency of financial relations 
between Member States and public undertakings where 'public auth >rities' were defined as 'the State and 
regional or local authorities'. - OJ L 195/36.
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against regions (as emanations of the state) according to the constant jurisprudence of the ECJ. 
This possibility, however, existed before November 19, 1991 and November 1, 1993 (i.e. the 
Francovich judgement of the ECJ and the entering into force of the Maastricht Treaty).
Thus, what we are facing today is that a combination of European law and national law 
leads to a much more complex system of responsibilities and (financial) liabilities than 
claimed by the advocates of states’ substitutive powers. Besides the traditional scheme of the 
international responsibility of a state, a variety of possibilities exist to make regions (directly or 
indirectly) also liable for failure to implement provisions of European law. It should be added 
at this point that increasing liability goes hand in hand with an ever growing participation of 
regions at the decision-making process on European affairs. However, from a merely formal 
point of view the international responsibility of the (Member) State remains a valid argument 
for the leghimiation of a substitutive power. In substance, however, the situation of de facto 
responsibilities is - as shown in this sub-chapter - too complex to allow for such a simple 
solution. It remains to be seen whether there are other arguments that justify a substitutive 
power of the state vis-à-vis regions.
4.2. Community policy: Foreign policy or 'home affairs'?
Advocates of a centralised competence for the states in the field of European 
Integration have also put forward the argument that these matters would fall within the 
competence of foreign affairs. In Italy this argument was used at the beginning of the 1970s to 
maintaiin the central state’s power to transpose directives and implement regulations in the 
field of regions' competences168. A similar discussion took place in Germany in the 1950s 
when the Bund (and the Land Berlin) sought to derive from the Bund's power to conclude 
international treaties (Article 32, Section 1 GG) its own power to transpose and implement 
foreign policy169.
Since then the situation has changed significantly: sub-national units now implement 
and transpose international treaties as well as European law. Despite the above-mentioned 
debate in Germany, this task was entrusted to the Länder. In Italy Article 6 of d.P.R. 
n.616/1977 finally transferred the competence to implement regulations and transpose 
directives to the regions. After much discussions this was accepted by the Italian 
Constitutional Court170.
The power to implement also has another side: in Austria, Article 16, Section 4 B-VG 
states that "the Länder are obliged to take the measures necessary to implement international
168d.P.R. n.10/1972 and d.P.R. n.l 1/1972; Corte Costituzionale sentenza n.142/1972, Giur. Cost. 1972, 
1432; See 11.2.
^^Fastenrath, Kompetenz Verteilung im Bereich der auswärtigen Gewalt, München: Beck, 1986, 115ff; 
This argument was also made by Birke in the mid-sixties. See: Birke, Die deutschen Bundesländer, 78; 
Compare also Chapter II. 1.2.
170Corte Costituzionale sentenze n.304/I987, n.433/1987, n.632/1988.
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treaties in their independent domain"171. In the case of non-timely compliance with this duty 
the state has a substitutive power. The Bund's substitutive power ’in the framework of 
European Integration’ was to be modelled on this provision172. Sub-national units today have 
a (limited) powers to conclude treaties173 or even to confer sovereign powers to (adjacent) 
institutions174. Thus it can be seen that foreign relations in the context of federal state 
models175 have become far more complex. Political scientists questioned the traditional model 
of foreign policy as early as the 1960s176, stressing that the foreign policy at Montesquieu's177 
times has little to do with today's foreign policy. Yet we are confronted with massive mutual 
interferences of the states as regards economy, human rights, environment, to list only some 
inportant fields178. In addition the role of the state as such has significantly changed: it has 
become a modem welfare state broad tasks {Sozialstaat).
The interferences are even clearer in the field of European Integration. To quote Neil 
MacCormick:
Where at some time past there were, or may have been, sovereign states, there has now been 
a pooling or a fusion within the communitarian normative order of some of the states' 
powers of legislation, adjudication and implementation of law in relation to a wide but 
restricted range of subjects.179
What we are facing in the context of European Integration is a sort of 'melange' of 
legislative, judicial and administrative action at various levels. European policy can no longer 
be seen as classic foreign policy anymore, according also to the German Lander180. Rather it 
could be classified as 'European home affairs'181.
1^ 1 Version according to Article I Z 3 BVG 1992/276.
172Compare H.3.; Appendix III - Article 23d, Section 5 B-VG (BGBl 1994/1013).
1^ 3See, for example: Germany - Article 32, Section 3 GG; Austria - Article 16, Section 1 B-VG; Belgium 
Article 68, § Ier Constitution fédérale du 5 mai 1993.
174Germany: Article 24, Section la GG. ?■'* '* ■ 1
125For this topic see the exhaustive study of Renaud Dchousse, Fédéralisme et relations internationales, 
Bruxelles: Bruylant, 1991, revised version of Ph.D. Thesis, EUI Florence, 1988.
176Krippendorf, Ist Außenpolitik Außenpolitik?, PVS 1963, 243-266.
177According to whom executive power was defined as follows: '(...) he makes peace and war, sends or 
receives embassies, establishes security, and prevents invasions’ - Montesquieu, De 1' esprit des lois, 1748, 
Book 11, Chapter 6 - english translation in: Cohter ed al, Montesquieu - The Spirit of the Laws, Cambridge 
University Press: 1989.
178'Wriiers, politicians and the course of international affairs remind us constantly that politics 
everywhere is connected with politics everywhere else. Through a variety of processes and channels, power 
is now exercised at a global level in a variety of spheres and with a bewildering variety of political effects. 
(...) This process of extension has had its effect not only on the empirical reality of world politics but also on 
the way analysts and practitioners conceive of the global arena.' - Smith, Modernization, Globalization and 
the Nation-State, in: McGrew/lswis (Ed.], Global Politics - Globalisation and the Nation State, Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1992.
179MacCormick, Beyond the Sovereign State, MLR 1993,16; Compare also: Obradovic, Community Law 
and the Doctrine of Divisible Sovereignty, LIoEI 1993,1-20.
180See for example: Wolfgang Clement, Minister of Nordrhein-Westphalia, Der Spiegel 13/1992, 68; Der 
Spiegel 46/1992,37.
18 ^ or this term see: Spinner, Das Abkommen über den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum im Lichte der 
schweizerischen Integrationspolitik, in: Jacot-Guillarmod (éd.). Accord FEE - Commentaires et réflexions, 42.
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The participation of German Lander in the internal decision-making process (now 
enshrined in Article 23, Section 2 to 7 GG) on European affairs was characterised as 'a step in 
the decentralisation and federalisation of foreign and European policy'182. The same is true of 
Article 146 and 198a EC Treaty.
One might remember Jaques Delors' well-known dictum that in a few years up to 80% 
of Member States' economic and social regulation will be determined by the European 
Community. Europeanization (and globalisation), however, does not stop at this point: there 
are, for example, environmental questions to be considered (130r EC Treaty). It is obvious that 
this ever growing field of activities cannot be left up to a corps diplomatique. Neither European 
nor foreign are monopolised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in any Member State. Striking 
proof of this are the journeys of ministers, Land ministers and parliamentarians abroad or the 
creation of Land offices183 (Länderbüros) in Brussels. Both vertically and horizontally many 
actors participate in European coordination, the needs for which 'have gone far beyond the 
capacity for hierarchical coordination within the framework of the nation-state184.
After the positive result in the Austrian referendum of June 12, 1994, a debate started 
over who should coordinate European Integration within the government: the Chancellery or 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs185. It has been argued that European Integration 'constitutes 
domestic policy transferred to the comunitarian level' and would as such 'fall under the 
category of general governmental policy (allgemeine Regierungspolitik)'166. Apart from the fact 
that this political quarrel shows the importance attributed to European policy by a new 
Member State, it again gives evidence that European Integration policy (with the broad areas it 
comprises) cannot by definition, be the prerogative of one institution: it would be 
presumptuous to predict the final outcome of the Austrian controversy over 'European 
Integration competences' within the government (e.g. to prognosticate the creation of an 'Euro­
ministry' or an institution modelled on the French SGC/)- Furthermore the debate will
182f?«s, Das deutsche Zustimmungsgesetz zur Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte - Ein Schritt zur 
"Föderalisierung” der Europapolitik, EuGRZ 1987, 362.
183For their constitutional legitimacy and the interpretation of Article 32 GG [foreign policy], see: 
rastenrath, Länderbüros in Brussel - Zur Kompetenzverteilung für informales Handeln im auswärtigen 
Bereich, DÖV 1990, 125ff.
184Scharpf, Community and Autonomy - Multilevel Policy-Making in the European Union, F.UI Working 
Paper RSC No.94/1; To conceptualise the relationship between the (territorially defined) actors has yet 
become far more complex than it was in hierarchical systems and than it would be in the ideal-type of a 
'round-table' negotiation system: ”[...] actors' ressources are distributed very unequally, and not all the 
bargaining includes all the actors. The process implied by the term multilevel governance is to all means and 
purposes a horizontally as well as vertically asymetrical negotiating system." - Christiansen, Territorial 
Politics and Multilevel Governance in the European Union: The Case of Wales, 3.
185NZZ Femausgabe Nr.144, 24Juni 1994, 3; Because the Chancellor, Vranitzky, and the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Mock, are representatives of the two coalition parties the outcome of this quarrel will 
depend not least on the new coalition-negotiations after the result of the elections held on October 9, 1994. 
However, it is likely that there will be a 'divided coordination competence'. Apart from a formal-juridical 
point of view one has to consider also the strong de facto position of the chancellor in Austrian politics. For 
the role of the chancellor, especially the trend towards leader-centered recruitment see: Müller, Austrian 
Governmental Institutions: Do They Matter, in: Lutfier/Müller, Politics in Austria - Still a Case of 
Consociationalism?, 108ff.
1 fifilooHolzmger, Die bevorstehende Öffnung Österreichs in den Europäischen Wirtschaftsraum und die 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften - Gutachten, 187 FN 537; Section A Z 1 of Part 2 of the Enclosure to § 2 of the 
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probably resurface after other elections that change the actual *balance of power' between the 
parties. One parameter, however, seems to be fixed - there will be a horizontal division of 
competences. As regards the vertical dimension we have to consider the internal participation 
models187 as well as the participation of regions on the European plane created by the 
Maastricht Treaty.
The notion of Bernd-Christian Funk, 'that in the long run the end of the constitutional 
state lies in the logic of development'188 may appear bold but justifiable. Far less visionaiy is 
the conclusion that the end of traditional foreign policy (as of sovereignty189) lies in the logic 
of European Integration. Another argument in favour of this perspective is the public 
discussion about European policy as envisaged by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in its 
judgement of October 12, 1994. Even though according to the judgement a 'European public' 
would not yet exist190, it observed that a democratic debate about European affairs is taking 
place within the states. This debate has to fulfil certain criteria:
"If democracy is not to remain a formal principle of accountability, it is dependent upon the 
existence of specific privileged conditions, such as ongoing free interaction of social forces, 
interests, and ideas, in the course of which political objectives are also clarified and modified 
(see BVerfGE 5, 85 <135,198,205>; 69, 315 <344ff>), and as a result of which public opinion 
modules political policy.’’191
The form of qualified discussion required by the Bundesverfassungsgericht seems to 
confirm the slogan that 'democracy replaces diplomacy'. Although it is certainly premature to 
claim 'the end of foreign policy’, traditional patterns of foreign policy no longer have the 
dominant or even solely place in European Integration. An ever more intensified public debate 
about European affairs, referenda about the Maastricht Treaty in several Member States (and 
also in states seeking membership i.e. the Scandinavian states and Austria) and fundamental 
decisions of Constitutional Courts show that European Integration is envisaged much more as 
a sort of ’home affairs' than as traditional foreign policy. It follows from this assessment that 
both a power of the state to implement and to transpose European law as well as a power to a 
substitutive action, however framed, cannot be based only on a overcome foreign-policy 
argumentation.
187See II.3.
188/unit, Die Entwicklung des Verfassungsrechts, in: Mantl (Hrsg.), Politik in Österreich, 706.
189Compare Christiansen, European Integration Between Political Science and International Relations 
Theory: The End of Sovereignty, EUI Working Paper RSC No.94/4.
190The thought that every process of forming political will can only take place on a relatively 
homogenous basis - spiritually, socially and politically - which is today the State, goes back to Hermann 
Heller. - Heller, Politische Demokratie und soziale Homogenität - Gesammelte Schriften, Bd 2, 1971, 421, 
427ff; Zuleeg, on the other hand, argued 'that the media shows everyday that an European public does exist' 
and that 'the framework of the nation-state not necessarily guarantees the absence of problems'. - Zuleeg, 
Demokratie in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, JZ 1993, 1074; In fact, both depart from pre-legal premises 
that can more easily be falsified than verified.
191BVcrfG, Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 12-Oktober 1993 - 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92 - English 
version in: International Legal Materials 2/1994.
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4.3. Substitutive powers: An idoneous means to promote 
compliance with European Law?
Compliance has been called 'the new challenge for Community law'192, due to the fact 
that the inadequate implementation of directives 'represents not only a drain on the 
Commission's limited enforcement capacity, but also an obstacle to the credibility of EEC law 
as a whole and to the creation of the internal market in particular'193. In the framework of the 
Community as well as in the EEA there is a variety of means to promote compliance. The task 
of this chapter is to evaluate whether substitutive powers could - compared with other means 
- be an effective instrument in achieving compliance with European law.
Judgements of the ECJ under Article 169 EC Treaty, although for the public the most 
visible instrument to assure compliance with European law, concerned only 2.4%194 of the 
complaints (suspected infringements) in 1990. In 62.5% of the cases a letter of formal notice 
was send, in 16.4% a reasoned opinion was delivered and only 5.0% were referred to the ECJ.
As regards the EEA it seems - in the light of the present experiences - likely that the 
number of suspected infringements that reach the final stage, i.e. a judgement of the EFT A 
Court195, will not be significantly higher (probably even lower) than in the case of the 
European Community. If one regards the number of more than 1500 norms (about 12 000 
pages of the OJ of the EC196) that had to be integrated by the EFTA states it is interesting to 
note that Sweden was able to notify 100%(!) of the required measures by January 1, 1994. It 
has been said that this is because the Swedish administration was given clear instructions to 
fulfil the obligations towards ESA completely197 This was admittedly only possible in a 
system with only one real centre of power. Where there are no significant political actors 
outside central government, or in the words of Wildenmann no 'partial contra- 
gouvernments’198 and the power of all public bodies stems from this central source, 
implementation can (presupposing the political will) quickly be achieved. Other EFTA 
countries did not fulfil their obligations so perfectly: the first letter of formal notice in the 
framework of the EEA was send to Austria, Finland, Iceland and Norway on March 17,1994. 
Austrian Länder were concerned in 4 cases, the delays of which are explained as follows:
—i. — ,i* * -O
1 Q91 ¿Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community Law: Institutions, Processes, Tools and 
Techniques, MLR 1993, 21.
1 01Anderson, Inadequate Implementation of EEC Directives: A Roadblock on the Way to 1992?, Boston 
College International and Comparative Law Review 1988, 96.
*9^For the following numbers, see: Snyder, The Effectiveness of European Community Law; Institutions, 
Processes, Tools and Techniques, MLR 1993, 29,
101
* The procedure according to Article 31 of the ESA-Court Agreement corresponds broadly to that 
under Article 169 EC Treaty. The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) plays a role similar to the Commission 
in the framework of the EEA.
10fi17°Botschaft des schweizerischen Bundesrates zur Genehmigung des Abkommens über den EWR, 
18.5.1992, BR-Drucksache 92.052,1/36 und 1/643
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* awarding of public contracts - new EC directives (after July 31, 1991) should be 
integrated
*$ludge in agriculture - contradictory interests of environment and agriculture have 
complicated the matter
*law regarding the civil service (communes and Under) and *legislation concerning health and 
safety at ivork - should be oriented on the Bund's law regarding the civil service and health at
work199
Considering that there were few cases, despite the large number of European norms 
that had to be integrated in the framework of the EEA, it can be concluded that ESA has 
'achieved its goals through cooperation and dialogue'200. Reasoned opinions in the framework 
of the EEA are to be expected only in singular cases, and judgements seem to be even more an 
ultima ra/io201 than in the European Community. As further experience had shown the ESA 
has received the notifications for practically all directives by June 1, 1994, which made it 
possible to call off the formal action202.
The German Under have also delayed implementing Community directives only in a 
minor number of cases as can be seen by the following numbers203: on January 1, 1994, the 
Federal Republic had not implemented 137 directives, only 11 of them concern the 
competences of the Under. In the Saarland, for example, the implementation of 6 directives 
was delayed. In three of these cases the Und was waiting for a frame-legislation of the Bund, in 
the other three cases it was inadequate to initiate an own legislation procedure because of the 
small seize of the matter. According to Regierungsrat Mueller from the Bavarian Ministry for 
Federal and European Affairs, in the case of the Council Directive 88/48/EEC204, regarding 
the recognition of higher-education diplomas (time-limit: 4.1.1991), the frame legislation of the
^R udolf Wildcnmantt, Die Rolle des Bundesverfassungsgerichtes und der Deutschen Bundesbank in der 
polilischen Willensbildung, Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1969,10.
1 "Letter from Dt Mei rer, Direktor der Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer, to the author. May 26,1994.
200vo« Hertzen, Activities of the EFTA Surveillance Authority in the Fields of Capital Movements and 
Financial Services, in:EFTA, Making the EEA Work - Papers delivered at an EFTA workshop in Brussels on 
13 October 1993, 29.
2°l"An infringement procedure would only be initiated when there seemed to be a lack of effort or an 
unacceptable timetable for adjusting the flawed law, and when it could therefore be expected that such a 
procedure would actually lead to an improvement in this respect. If, in the interim, economic operators 
suffered losses, due to a gap in the existing law, the individual Member States concerned might be made 
liable, as the ECJ had ruled in its judgement in the case Francovich and Bonifaci." - F.FTA, Making the F.EA 
work - Papers delivered at an EFTA Workshop in Brussels on 13 October 1993, 59f.
202EFTA Surveillance Authority, Semi-Annual Report January-June 1994, Brussels: 1994, 5, 24: "In 
general the EFTA States have so far shown great willingness to co-operate and solve the problems before 
formal procedures had to be invoked."
203I want to thank HMatschiner, Chef der Staatskanzlei - Saarland and Regicrungsrat Müller, 
Bayerisches Staatsministerium für Bundes- und Europaangelegenheiten, for the following information.
204Council Directive of 21 December 1988 on a general system for the recognition of higher-education 
diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least three years' duration, OJ 
L 19, 24 January 1989.
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Bund for the public service (Beamtenrechtsrahmengesetz) was only amended on December 20, 
1993205 One Land enacted its legislation in this field only one day later. This empirical 
information shows, first, that it is not the federal structure of Germany that in first instance 
can be blamed for delays in the implementation and transposition of EC directives and, 
second, that a referral to the ECJ is to be expected only in some of the few cases were Lander 
are responsible.
What field of application can therefore remain for a substitutive power in this framework 
where a referral to the ECJ is a spectacular, albeit a rare, ultima ratio means? Substitutive powers 
themselves are in general seen as an ultima ratio means, as a form of last resort of the state vis- 
a-vis inactice or even awkward regions. In Italy the invoking of the government's substitutive 
power presupposes that the inactivity of the regional authorities is verified (Art. 2 of legge 
n.382/1975 used the term 'persistent inactivity'), and that the government - after having heard 
various institutions - had set a congruent time-limit for the region to provide for measures* 206. 
In Austria the Bund can use its substitutive power only after either a judgement of a court in 
the framework of the European Union. In addition, its substitutive competence is - in contrast 
to the Italian solution - only of temporary character: it automatically loses its force when the 
Land takes the necessary provision. Although this respects more the federalist principle or the 
principle of subsidiarity it again reduces the theoretical field of application of the substitutive 
power. In Germany the substitutive power as a result of the unwritten constitutional principle 
of federal comity is undoubtedly an ultima ratio means that is also limited by the principle of 
proportionality207. Whether the substitutive power is of temporary or permanent character is a 
contentious point208. That a substitutive action should be taken only as an ultima ratio has also 
been argued for Switzerland209. Given these conditions and criteria, the substitutive power 
seems to be really an ultima ratio. If it is perceived as having only temporary character it is 
even more hypothetical in its practical use. Thus it seems more than doubtful that it can really 
be an idoneous means of promoting compliance.
Let us now contrast these substitutive powers with the means developed on the 
European level to improve compliance with Community law: The first approach taken by the
20^ Zehntes Gesetz zur Änderung dienst rechtlicher Vorschriften vom 21.12.1993, dt BGBl 1993 I, 2136ff, 
particularly § 14 c, § 20a.
206Art. 6 d.P.R. n.616/1977 - Compare II. 2.
20^ After having used all other (non-legal) means. In this sense e.g.: Grabitz, Die Rechtsetzungsbefugnis 
von Bund und Ländern bei der Durchführung von Gemeinschaftsrecht, AöR 1986, 32; Although, it has been 
argued that the area of discretion of the Federal Government would be limited only politically and not 
legally. - Maunz in: Maunz/Dürig, Kommentar zum Grundgesetz, Art 37, Rndz 31; Compare also II.2.
208 Zulecg, Die Stellung der Länderund Regionen im europäischen Integrationsprozeß, DVB1 1992,1332 
stressed the temporary character of the substitutive legislative competence of the Bund ex Article 37 GG and, 
in addition, argued that such a scenario would be quite unlikely.; In this sense also Gubelt: "(...) that the 
(legislative) measures are to be repealed as soon the Land will fulfil its duties." - Gubelt in: von Münch, 
Grundgesetz Kommentar2 Bd 2» Art 37, Rndz 15; For Riegel the basis for the substitutive legislative 
competence is to be found in Article 24 GG, which would have permanent character. - Riegel, Überlegungen 
zum Problem EG-Richtlinien und nationale Rahmenkompetenz, EuR 1976, 86f; Riegel,
Glied Staatkompetenzen im Bundesstaat und Europäisches Gemcinschaftsrecht, DVB11979,250.
^^Thürer/Weber, Zur Durchführung von Europäischem Gemeinschaftsrecht durch die Gliedstaaten 
eines Bundesstaates, Schweizerisches Zentralblatt für Staats- und Verwaltungsrecht 1991, 461 ff.
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ECJ was the development of the doctrine of direct effect*10 of directives. In a way this 
represents a substitutive action in that the directive substitutes its (lacking) transposing act. 
The merits and the limits of this approach are well known. Another (complementary) 
instrument of improving compliance is, of course, Francovich and thus the financial liability of 
public bodies for non-implementation of directives. Soon after the Francovich judgement 
Article 171 of the EC Treaty introduced the the imposition of a penalty payment and a lump 
sum in order to stop the worrying growing number of proceedings for non-observance of a 
previous judgement of the Court* 211. Last but not least the procedure under Article 169 EC 
Treaty, with its administrative and judicial phase, has to be taken into consideration. Yet 'the 
Court has a range of weapons available against inadequate implementation of directives, all of 
which involve national tribunals and private individuals, rather than just the Commission, in 
the struggle against reluctant Member States'212.
It has become obvious that a substitutive power of a Member States' central institution 
vis-ä-vis constitutionally autonomous sub-national units is not part of this broad arsenal of 
weapons. It must necessarily be superfluous in such a framework. Zuleeg, in fact, argued that 
’given the present experiences an invoking of a substitutive power is quite unlikely'213. In 
more than thirty years of German membership of the Community the substitutive power of the 
Bund has had no practical relevance at all. Given the implementation record of the Austrian 
Länder in the framework of the EEA it is likely that in Austria too the substitutive competence is 
destined to remain unused. It might thus be considered a new but at the same time dead letter 
in the Federal Constitutional Law. This explains why Austrian Lander had no problem214 
with the enactment of Article 16, Section 6 B-VG (now Art 23d, Section 5 B-VG, BGBl 
1913/1994). To conclude: substitutive powers within federal systems remain theoretically 
hypothetical and practically unused, if not useless. They are not an idoneous means of 
promoting compliance with European law at all.
21®One may add also 'refusing to give effect to national laws that conflict with directives and 'requiring 
national laws to be interpreted with reference and in the light of directives.
211See Commission, The Community Internal Market 1993 Report, COM (94) 55 final - Annex 3 (Court 
of Justice decisions not implemented by Member States infringement procedure initiated under Article 171 
of the Treaty) that lists 21 such cases: Italy-6; Belgium-5; Germany-4; Greece-3; France-2, Luxembourg-1.
*^*Anderson, Inadequate Implementation of EEC Directives: A Roadblock on the Way to 1992?, Boston 
College International and Comparative Law Journal 1988, 111; In addition to the range of judicial weapons 
we should also remember the other effords of the Commission in order to ensure effective implementation of 
Community rules: administrative cooperation and the interchange of data between administrations - COM 
(93) 69 final, the exchange of national officials (Karolus programme), improving the access of Union citizens 
to justice (e.g. the Green Paper on access to justice for consumers and the setting of consumer disputes in the 
single market - COM (93) 576 final), improving the transparency of Community rules - See: Commission, The 
Community Internal Market 1993 Report, COM (94) 55 final.
*^Zuleeg, Die Stellung der Länder und Regionen im Europäischen Integrationsprozeß, DVB11992,1333.
214I,etter from HR Dt.Gerhard Wietinger, chief of the legal service of the Styrian government, to the 
author, March 1,1994; The same is true for the German Länder.- Letter from G.Matschiner, chief of the state 
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4.4. Other cases for a substitutive competence
Having concluded that substitutive powers of Member States of the Community vis-à- 
vis their regions are neither sufficiently legitimised by the international responsibility and the 
state's competence in foreign policy nor idoneous in the framework of European Integration 
with its ever more sophisticated compliance-means, such a chapter must appear superfluous. 
However, it should again confirm that the European Community and states have no real 
necessity for a substitutive power vis-à-vis an independent institution.
Naturally such a (hypothetical) argumentation must depart from the premise that 
substitutive action can per se promote compliance with Community law. Another premise is 
certainly the fact that the institution against which a substitutive power is invoked must be 
independent. It would not make sense to exercise such a substitutive power against an 
institution that is subject to instructions, or in a field in which an institution that in general is 
independent must obey instructions, the non-compliance of which could be enforced via 
constitutional courts215.
In Italy a substitutive competence of the government is foreseen vis-à-vis public 
entities. Article 12 of legge n.86/1989 {legge La Pergola) states:
1. Se l 'inadempimento di uno degli obblighi previsti dall' articolo 1, comma 1 [gli obblighi 
derivanti dall' appartenenza dell' Italia alle Comunità europee], dipende da inattività di un 
ente pubblico diverso dallo Stato, da una regione o da una provincia autonoma, il 
Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, su proposta del Ministro per il coordinamento delle 
politiche comunitarie, di concerto con i Ministri competenti per materia ed aquiste le 
osservazioni dell' ente interessato, emana le direttive necessarie, assegnando all' ente 
medesimo un termine per provvedere.
2. Perdurando L'inattività oltre il termine predetto, il Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri 
conferisce ad un commissario i poteri per provvedere in sostituzione degli organi dell' ente.
The fact that the Italian government has a right to issue directives as well as to act in 
substitution of the public agency, seems quite puzzling in the light of the above reasoning. As 
in the case of regions216 the state possesses overwhelming powers to bring its interests to the 
fore. The substitutive power must in practice be superfluous, given the other possibilities of 
interference the state has. It is also intriguing that the substitutive power vis-à-vis Italian 
public agencies is enshrined in the article following that which embodies this competence vis- 
à-vis the regions. Thereby the regions, whose autonomy is enshrined in the Italian
215This is, for example, true in Austria as regards the field of the so-called indirect federal 
administration {miltclbare Bundesvenvaltung), where the Land governor (Landcshauptmann), is obliged to 
follow the instructions of the federal government as well as those of its single ministers. Compare Article 
103, Section 1 and Article 20, Section 1 B-VG. In the case of non-compliance the Federal Government 
(Bundesregierung) can bring the Land governor before the Constitutional Court (Verf ass u ngsgerich tshof) 
according to Article 142, Section 2, lit e B-VG. In its decision the Constitutional Court can order a dismissal 
from office, (adding in severe cases eventually) a loss of political rights as well as only state that there has 
been an infringement of the law (Article 142, Section 4 B-VG). Such an impeachment has only taken place 
once since 1945: In VfSlg 10.510/1985 "Fall Haslauer” the Constitutional Court stated that the non- 
compliance with the instruction of the minister for social affairs on part of the I.and governor of Salzburg 
was a breach of the law (the case concerned the opening of shops on Lady Day, December 8,1984).
216See Chapter U 2.3.
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Constitution of 1948, are treated in the same way as [dependent] public agencies. This is at 
least significant for the status of the Italian regions. Let us now focus on other - more general - 
concepts of substitutive powers vis-à-vis institutions that are independent.
First we will examine courts, which are also bound to comply with and to apply 
European law. To invoke a substitutive power against a judgement of a court, especially a 
highest or constitutional court, seems heretical. This feeling of 'heresy' is because of the long 
tradition of judicial independence, dating back to Montesquieu217. Can it, nevertheless, be 
excluded that judgements of national courts may be in contrast with Community rules? 
Courts, especially constitutional Courts, are, in general, very cautious in their reasoning. In a 
controversial judgement a court might emphasise that it is only acting "in cooperation with the 
EQ"218 jn addition, the danger of a 'non-decision' is very slight, although the duration of 
some procedures acquires the quality of a 'non-decision'. For example, the average duration of 
a case at the European Court of Human Rights is 5 years and 6 month27 *19; another prominent 
example is the Italian courts220. Thus the same argumentation as for sub-national entities 
could be applied. Here, the state's openness towards European Integration would prevail over 
the principle of separation of powers, and not over the federal principle. European Integration 
or international responsibility would, in any case, be stronger than the vertical as well as the 
horizontal separation of powers.
In Austria, Article 6, Section 1 of the ECHR221 finally led to the introduction222 of 
independent administrative tribunals within the Länder (Unabhängige Verwaltungssenate in den 
Ländern) that are competent to decide about civil rights and obligations in individual cases. 
Thus a broad range of former powers of Länder authorities have shifted to an independent 
tribunal. Should substitutive action be admissible vis-à-vis such courts that decide about 
individual administrative cases in the field of Länder competences (in last ordinary instance)? 
Or should substitutive action be limited to general norms? If the international responsibility of 
the state is considered more important than the vertical and the horizontal division of powers, 
the answer would clearly be in favour of a substitutive competence also in individual cases
2l7Io see that the vertical division of powers also has a long tradition in Europe, we only have to think 
of the I loly Empire before the era of absolutism began in the 17. century .
21%VerfG Urteil des Zweiten Senats vom 12.10.1993 - 2 BvR 2134792, 2 BvR 2159/92 translation in 
International Legal Materials 1994,396.
219The number concerns the 80 judgements of 1992, the average duration for the first 6 judgements of 
1993 was 6 years and 2 month. - Peukert, Vorschläge zur Reform des Europäischen 
Menschenrechtsschutzsystems, EuGRZ 1993, 183. This raises the question of whether even the European 
Court of Human Rights itself violates Article 6(1) of the ECHR (the right to a public hearing within a 
reasonable time).
220Out of the 59 cases of the ECHR regarding the duration of the procedure (till 31.12.1991) Italian 
courts were concerned in 40 cases. - Peukert, Vorschläge zur Reform des Europäischen 
Menschenrechtsschutzsystems, EuGRZ 1993,175 FN 28.
221 Article 6(1) ECHR: In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge 
against him, everyone js entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. (...).
222B-VGN 1988 BGBl 685 - See: Article 129, 129a, 129b B-VG; The so-called UVS (Unabhängige 
Vermltungssenate) were constituted on January 1, 1991. Compare: Pernthaler, Unabhängige
Verwaltungssenate und Verwaltungsgerichtsbarkeit, Wien: Braumüller, 1993.
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vis-à-vis courts. These short reflections demonstrate that the concept of substitutive powers as 
such is the result of a weighing up of values and principles, the outcome of which cannot be 
conclusive.
A second case were the concept of substitutive powers is applied are independent 
agencies. Such independent boards have no tradition in the Member States of the 
Community223 that can be compared with that of courts or sub-national units. In Sweden, 
where central agencies (verken) have a longer tradition224, a restructuring of the Swedish 
central administration is taking place225. At this time the boards are all responsible to the 
government, which issues general instructions to direct their activities. The boards act on the 
basis of residual powers in the sense that the government has a general right and obligation to 
run the country. In most cases the boards are only truly independent where they have to 
render an individual decision, because no public body or minister may intervene and decide 
in the individual case. They are thus mainly concerned with technical matters and subject to 
general instructions226. The same is true for Norway, where the government retains, in 
principle, the powers to give instructions to all subordinate state bodies, including various 
directorates (the equivalent of the Swedish verk)227. As said above, substitutive powers are by 
definition senseless vis-à-vis institutions that are subject to instructions.
i
Therefore, we should, for example, look at national central banks (especially the 
German Bundesbank228) and standardisation-institutes that exercise autonomous 
administrative and legislative229 functions. There are good - not only technical - reasons for
223In the United States independent government agencies date back to the end of the 19th century (e.g. 
the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887). For the vast number of American agencies, see: Whitnah (F.d.), 
Government Agencies - The Greenwood Encidopedia of American Institutions, Westport: Greenwood Press, 
1983; Only recently has there been some proliferation of more or less independent agencies in Member States 
of the Community, e.g.: France: autorités administratives indépendantes, Great Britain: regulatory offices; 
For the experience of American regulatory agencies, the independence of which is limited mainly by the 
capacity of Congress to amend the respective agency's statute and by budgetary appropriations, and for the 
European Community see: Dehousse ed al, Europe after 1992 - New Regulatory Strategies, EUI Working 
Paper LAW No.92/31.
22^Strömholm, An Introduction to Swedish Law, Second Edition 1988, 85; Wise/Amna/Sinclair, National 
Administrative Agencies in Transition: A Comparison of Sweden and the United States, International 
Journal of Public Administration 1994,1825-1851.
225Letter from Prof.Strömholm, President of Uppsala University, to the author, June 22,1994.
Letter from Doc.Lyse«, Uppsala University, to the author, August 13,1994.
227l.etter from Prof.Backer, Department of public and international law - University of Oslo, to the 
author, July 4,1994.
228For the independence of the Bundesbank - Article 12 Cesetz Uber die Deutsche Bundesbank idF vom 
22.10.1992, BGB1 L 1782: (...) In exercising the powers conferred on it by this act, it is independent of instructions 
from the federal government.; For the necessity that also the ECB is independent - Article 88 GG; (...) In the 
framework of European Integration their rights can be transferred to the ECB, which is independent and has the 
primary task of assuring price stability.
229This in as far as they have the power to issue regulations. In theory, norms of the Austrian 
standartization institute (Österreichisches Normungsinstitut) enter into force only by virtue of law of 
parliament or a regulation or directive based upon such a bill. In practice, however, these acts only refer to 
the norms of the standartization institute. Such a dynamic rcfferral (dynamische Verweisung) is not adressable 
in the light of the constitution, because it constitutes a delegation of the power to legislate. However, in this 
case the aspect of expertise has become so important as to ’override’ this principle.
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their independence230. The independence of national banks will not change in the course of 
European Integration. Article 107 EC Treaty expressly states that the ECB, national central 
banks and of members of their decision making bodies are independent with regard to 
Community institutions/ governments of Member States and any other body. This leads to the 
question of whether a substitutive power vis-à-vis such an institution could be compatible 
with an independence that is guaranteed even on the level of primary Community law. Here 
preferences have been set up in favour of an independent agency, ruling out anything like a 
substitutive power vis-à-vis this kind of institution.
A third hypothetical case for substitutive competences could be states themselfes. If 
European Integration is to be at the fore and substitutive powers are an idoneous means to 
promote compliance with European law, why should there not be a substitutive power of 
either sub-national units or the Commission vis-a-vis the State (the Bund)? A substitutive 
competence of the former would theoretically be possible if we consider the relationship of 
Länder and Bund one of parity. Every use of such a competence has, however, to take the 
principle of federal comity into account. What implications does this principle have in this case? 
It is - as we will see in the Chapter II. 1. - the basis for a substitutive power of the Bund vis-à- 
vis the Lander. Should it have the opposite effect here? Its vagueness, particularly in context 
with the principle of openness towards European Integration, limits its judicial importance 
noticeably. A reference to this principle in a procedure before the Bundesverfassungsgericht 
(according to Article 93, Section 1, Number 3 GG) in order to invalidate the substitutive act 
taken vis-à-vis the Bund would confront the German Constitutional Court with a very difficult 
weighing up of principles. It might be hard to give reasons for a different outcome as in the 
case of the invoking of a substitutive power vis-à-vis a Land.
However, any invoking of a substitutive power against a body that not only has de jure 
the quality of a state (such as the Bund or a Land) but that de facto is to be understood as an 
indispensable partner in the process of problem-solving must necessarily involve serious 
political difficulties. A substitutive action, especially when of permanent character, would 
easily be interpreted a strong act of interference. 'Symbolic questions' play an important role in 
federal systems23*, hence substitutive powers as such will probably be perceived as a sort of 
'unfriendly act'. In federal systems, which are - like the German and the Austrian systems - 
shaped by cooperative patterns and an interlocking of policies and politics between the 
different levels of government232, it seems unlikely233, if not even impossible, to use such a
230It has, in addition, often been argued that the greatest support for the Bundesbank's independence 
comes not from the statute book (FN 196), but that its independence ultimately rests on societal support and 
the competence of the men in charge. - Marsh, The Bundesbank - The Bank that rules Europe, 25; Coodman, 
Monetary Sovereignty - The Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe, 59.
23*It has become quasi a 'compulsory exercise' for politicians both of the federal and slate level to 
emphasise in official speeches the positive effects of federalism. This has led to the caracterisation that the 
German federalism would be ’protected mainly literally’. - Lhotta, Der verkorkste Bundesstaat, ZParl 1993, 
129.
232Scharpf/Reissert/Schmbel, Politikverflechtung: Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen Föderalismus in 
der Bundesrepublik, Kronenberg: Scriptor, 1976.




Substitutive P owers: C oncept and  Legitim ation
'heavy means’ vis-à-vis the other actor or rather partner. Under such conditions and 
circumstances the debate about substitutive powers vis-à-vis Länder must at first be of a 
theoretical value. However, it again reveals that the coincidence of European law with a 
multilevel legal structure is conceptulalised mainly in traditional patterns of constitutional 
law, which must necessarily remain inadequate. In practice, though, the conclusion of Benz 
seems to be affirmed:
The theory of federalism should take into account the fact that the problem-solving capacity 
of states is to a considerable extent dependent on their ability to adapt and to change their 
structures and to react to changed conditions, Therefore régionalisation and decentralisation 
should not only be discussed in normative perspective but also taken as indicators of 
processes of necessary adaptation and self-transformation of the intergovernmental system 
in the welfare state.^^
In a system that is characterised by subordination of the sub-national entities and 
patterns of confrontation the situation must be different. In such a structure the state will have 
other and stronger means available to ensure its dominance. In this framework a substitutive 
competence will be of secondary importance because hierarchical instruments are invoked. 
For example, the competenza d'indirizzo e coordinamento. The Italian case also shows the 
resistance of a hierarchical and monistic power structure to change, i.e. to 'régionalisé'.
For different reasons substitutive competences remain unused. In the respective 
constitutional and politico-administrative context they are either perceived as for being too 
strong or too weak. Thus they are no instrument of which states make de facto use of. 
Notwithstanding the practical improbability of their usage and the notion that substitutive 
powers have not proven to be an idoneous remedy to improve compliance with European law, 
they are provided for in several legal systems. As the case study will further show substitutive 
powers reveal a certain neglect for the value of decentralisation in the process of weighting up 
of different values. *14
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IL Cases of Substitutive Powers
1. The Federal Republic of Germany: The unwritten 
constitutional principle of federal comity at the centre
1.1. Is the European Community 'Landesblind'l
It is not the intention of this chapter to deal with the genesis and the development of 
German federalism. It is well-known that since the entering into force of the Grundgesetz in 
1949 there has been a trend towards centralisation, as noted in Konrad Hesse's classic work 'Der 
unitarische Bundesstaat', published in 1962.
Structures, especially federal structures, are never static'235. The centralising tendency, 
which has taken place particularly in the field of the concurring legislation (Article 72 GG) and 
by the extension of competences of the Bund under Article 74 GG236, is, however, primarily 
counterbalanced by the principle of federal execution or administrative federalism. According to 
Article 83 GG it is 'the Länder [that] shall execute federal laws as matters of their own concern 
in so far this Basic Law does not otherwise provide or permit’. This Article also plays an 
important role in the implementation of Community law: Article 83 GG has been used in an 
analogous way by the German state-practice although the supranational law [of the EC] is 
neither a law of the Bund nor of a Land. According to Stern 'this was inevitable because other 
solutions would not fit into the constitutional order'232. Another counterpoint to the 
centralisation trend is undoubtedly the Bundesrat. As regards the European Integration we 
have to take the new Article 23 GG into consideration; this article constitutes a 'massive
235Hrbek, The political dynamics of regionalism: FRG, Austria, Switzerland, in: Morgan (Ed.), 
Regionalism in European Politics, 30; Compare also: Benz, Föderalismus als dynamisches System, Opladen: 
1985.
23<*It should be remarked that within the ongoing reform of the Basic Law the 'necessity-clause' for the 
exercise of the concurring legislation by the Bund will be put into more concrete terms and its use thereby 
restricted. Compare: Sannwald, Die Reform der Gesetzgebungskompetenzen nach den Beschlüssen der 
Gemeinsamen Verfassungskommission von Bundestag und Bundesrat, DÖV 1994, 629-637; However, 
debates about 're-federalisation' have traditionally focused to much on the institutional-constitutional level, 
neglecting the dimension of constitutional reality (i.e. the interloking of the different levels, the highly 
consensual politics in the framework of German federalism). See: Lhotta, Der "verkorkste Bundesstaat" - 
Anmerkungen zur bundesstaatlichen Reformdiskussion, ZParl 1993, 117-132; The limited outcome of the 
ultimate federal-state reform’ confirms the assumption of Benz: "Although founded on a new paradigm of 
decentralisation, most of these tendencies toward decentralisation and régionalisation remain informal 
processes, which change only the mode of interaction. [...] no structural changes of bureaucratic 
administration and only unimportant reductions of centralist regulation have followed as yet." - Benz, 
Regionalization and Decentralization, in: Bakvis/Chandler (Ed.), Federalism and the Role of the State, 140f.
232Sfern, Das Staatsrecht der BRD, Bd II, 785; For the constitutional background for the implementation 
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improvement of the legal position of the lander in the participation at the decision-making 
process in matters of the European Union238 *via the Bundesrat.
In addition to this institutional framework, the interlocking of policies and politics 
between the different levels of government (the Bund and the Land), the so-called cooperative 
federalism239 and some effects of Politikverflechtun^0 should be borne in mind. Yet inter­
governmental relations are undoubtedly the crucial mechanism in the German federal system, 
so that political science241 in this field has largely focused on their development. For the 
purpose of this chapter I shall restrict myself here to a few remarks regarding one outstanding 
effect cooperative federalism has for our case: that the close interdependence of the participating 
units, combined with the high need for consensus in such a system, must necessarily replace 
traditional tools of administration such as the issuing of instructions and supervision. For 
Ernst-Hasso Ritter 'the principle cooperation is the correlate of of decentralised carrying out of 
tasks'242. 'Bargaining and compromise are the dominant patterns of political behaviour in this 
system, since the different levels and actors are linked with each other in various respects and 
are interdependent.'243 24Lehmbruch244 has, in addition, pointed out that the remarkable strengh 
of this patterns of inter-governmental bargaining and accomodation is by no means a recent 
phenomenon but has its roots in a traditition that dates back almost to the era of Bismarck. An 
invoking of a substitutive power obviously does not fit into these patterns. That, in practice, 
the use of a substitutive power is not only improbable245 but de facto impossible - given the 
role of the Bundesrat in the procedure of invoking the substitutive power - should always be 
borne in mind when writing about the theoric framework of this competence. Also 'federal
238ƒ ]erdegent Die Belastbarkeit des Verfassungsgefüges auf dem Weg zur Europäischen Union, EuCRZ 
1992,593; For critique at this new 'Europe-Artide' see only: Oppermann/Classen, Die EG vorder Europäischen 
Union, NJW 1993, Ilf; Classen, Maastricht und die Verfassung: kritische Bemerkungen zum neuen ’'Europa- 
Artikel" 23 GG, ZRP 1993,57ff.
259Cooperative phenomena are at first phenomena within the executive branch. Their role in the 
framework of the judiciary and the legislature is undoubtedly much smaller. Yet we face a multitude of 
cooperative forms. For a categorisation of cooperative phenomena in federal systems see: Bothe, Die 
Kompetenzstruktur des modernen Bundesstaates in rechtsvergleichendcr Sicht, 282f; Compare also: 
Pietzcker, Landesbericht Bundesrepublik Deutschland, in: Slarck (Hrsg.), Zusammenarbeit der Gliedstaaten 
im Bundesstaat, 17-76.
^°Scharpf/Reissert/Schnabet, Politikverflechtung: Theorie und Empirie des kooperativen Föderalismus in 
der Bundesrepublik, Kronenberg: Scriptor, 1976.
241 The debate started with the study of Schrapf et al, see previous footnote; recently see: Scharpf, 
Optionen des Föderalismus in Deutschland und Europa, Frankfurt: Campus, 1994.
242 Ritt er, Zentrale Steuerung bei dezentraler Aufgaben Wahrnehmung, in: Scharpf/Reissert/Schnabel 
(Hrsg.), Politikverflechtung II, 1977,151.
243Hrheit, The political dynamics of regionalism: FRG, Austria, Switzerland, in: Morgan (Ed.), 
Regionalism in European Politics, 41.
244Lehmbruch, The Lander in German Federalism, paper presented at the European Forum Conference 
'Regionalization in Europe; Evaluation and Perspectives’, EUI: June 2-3,1994.
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enforcement' in general as foreseen in Article 37 GG has never been taken into consideration 
till now.
At the centre of the analysis in this chapter is the unwritten constitutional principle of 
federal comity or loyalty. This paper does not claim to represent a thorough and exhaustive 
analysis of this principle246, but mainly has the purpose of gaining deeper understanding of 
the legal implications of this principle in the 'tripolar European relationship, [the] magical 
triangle of Community, Bund and Länder’247. The following paragraphs also give an idea of 
an hard attempt on the part of German doctrine to legitimise a power, that will never be used. 
Certainly, it lies in the very nature of an emergency competence or ultima ratio power that it 
can and will only be invoked in those particular circumstances for which it was created: here, 
however, it seems almost to be a case of real dead law. One might not only come to the 
conclusion that constitutional doctrine has neglected the realities of German federalism, that is 
to say the preponderance of cooperative patterns, but that their argumentation demonstrates 
difficulties in the conceptualising of the impact of European integration on the nation state as 
well as of federalism as such248.
Reflections on the implications of European Integration on the federal structure of 
Germany often take as their starting point the famous statement of Hans Peter Ipsen, who 
described the EC as "being inevitably Landes-blind"249. He was absolutely right when, in 1966, 
he lamented that the EC Treaty, in speaking generally of Member States and in using the term 
Länder only for non-Member States and not for sub-national units (such as for the Lander of 
the Federal Republic of Germany), it would ignore Länder as representatives of sovereign 
rights of their own.
Since the Maastricht Treaty the situation has changed slightly: under Article 198a250 
ECT the Committee of the Regions was established. Some authors are, it seems to me, over- 
optimistic in their evaluation of the Committee251, which has only advisory status and whose 
members are, in addition, not subject to directives. The development of the Committee may be
246For such an analysis, see: Bayer, Die Bundestreue, Tübingen: 1961; An overwiew on the principle of 
federal comity in english is to be found in: Blair, Federalism and Judicial Review in West Germany, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981,146-206.
247Christiansen, The Länder between Bonn and Brussels: The Dilemma of German Federalism in the 
1990s, German politics, Vol.l, No.2 (August 1992), 240.
248See particularly Birke, Die deutschen Bundesländer in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 64.
249/pserr, Als Bundesstaat in der Gemeinschaft, in: Caemmerer/Schlochauer/Steindorff, FS Hallstein, 
257; See also: ßirite, Die deutschen Bundesländer in den europäischen Gemeinschaften, 128: The organs of the 
Community not have to take the federal structure of Germany into consideration.; For today's validity of 
Ipsen's statement see e.g.: Schweitzer, Europäische Union: Gefahr oder Chance für den Föderalismus in 
Deutschland, Österreich und der Schweiz - Thesen, EuR 1993, 329.
2511A Committee consisting of representatives of regional and local bodies, hereinafter referred to as 'the 
Committee of the Regions', is hereby established with advisory status.
251 See, for example: Schink, Die europäische Regionalisierung, DÖV 1992, 385; Compared with the 
inner-stale-participation-procedure the Committee will for the time being be second important for the 
German Lander. - Kalbßeisch-Kottsieper, Fortentwicklung des Föderalismus in Europa, DÖV 1993, 549.
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uncertain252, it might 'for the time being remain only second important for the German 
Lander compared with the inner-state participation procedure'253. However, it can be 
perceived as an important step forward and as an acknowledgement of the role of regions for 
European integration. In addition, the alteration of Article 146 EC Treaty254 legitimised that a 
representative of the Lander was send to the European Council. According to Artide 23, 
Section 6 GG255 the exercise of the rights as Member State of the Union ought to be conferred 
upon a Länder representative to be nominated by the Federal Coundl, if exclusive legislative 
competences are 'prindpally' concerned. The exerdse of this rights should, though, safeguard 
the 'responsibility of the state as a whole'.
This provision has been harshly criticized. It has been said that Article 23, Section 6 GG 
introduces 'a mixed-administration as regards foreign affairs, damaging thereby the unity of 
the federal state outwardly'256. This statement reflects a traditional position in favour of a 
Bund's monopoly over external relations. It is, however, not least European Integration that 
has 'called the dichotomy between internal and external affairs, and [thus] the monopoly of 
the national governments over the latter in question'257. Another much critidsed aspect is the 
partiripation of and the coordination with the Federal Government258. The responsibility of 
for the whole state, emphasised in the last sentence of the provision implicates that here the 
principle of federal comity259 towards the Bund has to be at the fore. This 'guiding prindple’ 
for the conduct of the Land representative in the Coundl seems, in any case, not
252The opinion of Tomuschat that such a Länderkammer would be in the way, seems too harsh to me. - 
Tomuschat, Bundes- und Integrationsgewalt des Grundgesetzes, in: Magiera/Merten, Bundesländer und 
Europäische Gemeinschaft, 43; For an assessment of the Committee see particularly the reports of Thomas 
Christiansen and Gary Marks at the workshop on the Committee of the Regions, EUI Florence, January 13, 
1995 (forthcoming as EUI Working Paper).
^Kalbfleisch-Kottsieper, Fortentwicklung des Föderalismus in Europa, DÖV 1993,549.
254The Council shall consist of a representative of each Member State at ministerial level, authorized to 
commit the government of that Member State.
255Introduced by German Constitutional Law December21,1992 - dt BGBl 19921,2086.
^^Herdegen, Die Belastbarkeit des Verfassungsgefüges auf dem Weg zur Europäischen Union, EuGRZ 
1992, 593.
257Dcfto«ssc, Regional Autonomy and European Integration: The Lessons of Maastricht, paper prepared 
for the European University Institute, Florence, 1993; Compare also 1.4.2.
258For Randzelhofer the provision is 'a very dark one'. - Randzelhofer in Maunz/Dührig, Kommentar zum 
Grundgesetz, Art 24 I Rdnr 209.
259Maybe the principle of Community comity (Article 5 EC Treaty) is even more important in this case. In 
this sense Birke, Die deutschen Bundesländer in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 129; Bleckmann proposed 
a new interpretation of Article 31,109 GG and the principle of federal comity in order to bind the Länder to 
the 'goals' of the Bund's politics. His argumentation not only follows the model of the 'unitarian federal 
state’ (Konrad Hesse) but represents a unilateral understanding of the principle of federal comity. In the 
understanding of doctrine and Constitutional Court, however, the principle of federal comity is not only 
mutual (BVerfGE 13, 75) but also a principle that should lead to coordination and not to the subordination to 
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'justiciable'260. It is neither foreseen in Article 23 GG that the Constitutional Court might 
decide about (mis)conduct of the Lander-representative in the European Council nor does it 
fall under Article 93 GG261. It is also uncertain how it could otherwise be enforced. The 
representative lacks accountability vis-à-vis the Bundestag262 as well as vis-à-vis the 
Bundesrat. He can be made politically accountable only by his respective Land parliament. 
For Herdegen 'this construct is the proof of Kelsen's theory of the impossibility of a Federal 
State within another Federal State'263. In spite of these unfavourable judgements it seems that 
the participation of a Land representative in the European Council is another element in the 
field of cooperative federalism on the German as well as on the European level.
In the light of these, albeit modest, changes, Ipsen’s statement of 1966 must be 
reevaluated. In addition to the improvements for the regions by the Maastricht treaty we 
should also take the changes on the domestic level (Article 23 GG and the Law about the 
Cooperation of Bund and lander in Matters of European Integration264) into consideration. One 
might also add that Germany is no longer the only state with a federal-structure within the 
Community265 (as it was in 1966). Although the position of regions in general in the 
European Community remains weak and that it had been not erroneously argued that regions 
'continue to be objects rather than participants in the decision-making process'266, yet the 
Community is no longer fully Landesblind. Whether the Community will open its eyes fully to
260In the 1994 amendment of  the Austrian Constitution (BGBL 1013/1994) a similar participation of a 
representative of the Lander was foreseen (in case legislative competences of the Länder are concerned): Art 
23d, Section3 B-VG. In addition the possibility to impeach the Austrian representative in the council was 
added by Article 142, Section 2, letter c B-VG. Compare Appendix III.
261Without going into too much detail it can be said that the Bundesverfassungsgericht is certainly not 
empowered to anull acts taken by the representative of the Länder in the Council. There are, for example, 
intermediate measures when a conduct not in line with the general interest of the hole state is forseeable. 
This intermediate measure could - given that the representative of the Länder is not subject to instructions - 
in fact only consist in the decision that instead of the Länderminister a minister of the federation must 
participate in the Council. This, however, seems quite unlikely. It is also not possible to make the 
representative legally responsible after he has, for example, voted in the Council. An accusation of a 
representative of a Land, as foreseen in the Austrian Constitution, does not exist in Germany. Compare FN 
260.
262For further critique of the lack of accountability of the representative of the Länder, see: Badura, Der 
Bundesstaat Deutschland im Prozeß der europäischen Union, 22.
263Herdegen, Die Belastbarkeit des Verfassungsgefüges auf dem Weg zur Europäischen Union, EuGRZ 
1992, 594.
26^ Article 7 I obliges the Federal Government where legislative competences of the Länder are 
concerned to bring the matter before the ECJ. See Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und lÄndern in 
Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union. BGBl 1993 I, 313 (Appendix I).
265Compare 1.1.
266Christiansen! The Länder between Bonn and Brussels: T e Dilemma of German Federalism in the 
1990s, German Politics, Voll, No.2 (August 1992), 260.
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the regions and endow them with constitutional status within a three tired federation remains 
an open question267 for the time being.
However, landesblindheit plays a certain role in the judgements of the ECJ. This is clearly 
connected with the fact that it is the Member States who are held to account before the Court 
for non-compliance with European law. Advocate General van Greven has argued:
There is rightly no dispute between the parties that the internal constitutional arrangements of 
the Member States are not in principle directly influenced by Community law but that, on the 
other hand, those arrangements are not and cannot be a pretext for a lesser degree of 
compliance with Community obligations, including the obligations flowing from Article 5 of 
the Treaty.26®
Here Landesblindheit means that the Court is not willing to accept the argument of an 
internal (vertical) division of competences as justification for non-compliance with European 
law. It also means that '(...) it is not for the Commission to rule on the division of competences 
by the institutional rules proper to each Member State, or on obligations which, in a State 
having a federal structure, may be imposed on the federal authorities and on the authorities of 
the federated States respectively’269. This does not, however, mean that the ECJ today is 
ignoring sub-national units and their importance270 for the transposition and implementation 
of Community law. In the above-quoted judgement (Case 8/88) concerning the carrying-out 
of suckler cow and sheep meat premiums [which according to the GG is to be done by 
German Lander] the Court decided that the Commission ’(...) may only verify whether the 
supervisory and inspection procedure established according to the arrangements within the 
national legal system271 are in their entirety sufficiently effective to enable the Community 
requirements to be correctly applied'. It is true that the ECJ does 'not rule on the division of 
competences by the institutional rules proper to each Member State', but this does not hinder 
the Court from examining and evaluating the efficiency of mechanisms and principles of 
federal systems for the carrying out of Community law. A recent case of such an evaluation is 
the Court's decision 237/90272. The German Federal Government had argued:
En ce qui concerne 1' obligation de notification au gouvernement fédéral de part des autorité 
des Lânder, elle n' est pas imposée par la directive et serait, en tout état de cause, inutile dans la 
mesure où elle résulte déjà du principe de la loyauté envers le Bund (Grundsatz des 
bundesfreundlichen Verhaltens).
267'(„.) the question of allocation of responsibilities and competences between European, national and 
regional level will continue to dominate the institutional discussion.' - Schäfer, Die institutioneile 
Weiterentwicklung der EG, DÖV 1991, 268,
26®ECJ Case 8/88 "EAGGF" - Disallowance for expenditure" (FRG v Commission), ECR 1990,2337.
269ECJ Case 8/88 "EAGGF" - Disallowance of expenditure" (FRG v Commission), ECR 1990, 2337.
270See Chapter I. 3.1.
271 In this case the administrative directives in three Länder were mainly not sufficient in order to 
guarantee the proper observance of the substantive and formal conditions of the grant in question because of 
the lack of any form of organization for on-the-spot inspections and comprehensive administrative checks.
272ECJ Case 237/90 "TrinkwasserVerordnung" (Commission v FRG), ECR 1992, 5973.
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The EÇJ decided that:
(...) le principe de la loyauté envers le Bund ne suffit pas pour garantir aux gouvernement 
fédéral l'obtention, en temps utile, des informations relatives aux dérogations accordées par les 
Länder.
The ECJ stated that the Federal Government ought to have imposed an explicit 
notification duty on the Länder in the (federal) directive on water for human consumption 
( Trinkwasser Verordn u ng) about the introduction of derogations permitted temporarily under 
Council Directive 80/778. The fact that for the ECJ the reference to the principle of federal 
comity was insufficient seems particularly important, because German doctrine is basing the 
substitutive power of the Bund vis-à-vis the Länder on exactly this principle. In the 'Wallonian 
Case' Advocate General Mancini had argued that in the legal system of Belgium "there is no 
legislation conferring on the State the power to compel the regions to implement Community 
legislation or to substitute itself in order directly to implement legislation in the event of a 
persistant delay on their part"273. In Case 237/90 the ECJ now stated that even the reference to 
a general principle of national constitutional law such as federal comity would not be enough 
and that more concrete means (e.g. a duty and right of the Bund to monitor the Lander's 
conduct) would be required.
1.2. T h e  u n w r i t t e n  c o n s t i t u t i o n a l  p r i n c i p l e  o f  fe d e ra l c o m ity
Regardless of some initial attempts by German doctrine to give the Bund general 
responsibility for the transposing274 of Community law, this has, in fact, been given to the 
Länder according to Article 70 GG275.
It should be remembered that in the 1960s some authors276, following a traditional view 
in international law, argued that the Bund, which is competent for the conclusion of an 
international treaty "is (in such a case) obliged in international law to secure the corresponding
273Opinion of Advocate General Mancini - ECJ Cases 227 to 230, ECR 1988 "Toxic Waste”(Commission v 
Begium), 6f, Compare also Chapter I.3.2., p 22ff.
274It has been argued, for example, that the Bund could rely on Article 74, Number 11 (the law relating 
to economic matters). It has correctly been argued that the use of this provision as a general clause for the 
transposing of Community law would in fact render the competence catalogue (and especially Article 70) 
absurd. See: Grabitz, Die Rechtssetzungsbefugnis von Bund und Ländern bei der Durchführung von 
Gemeinschaftsrecht, AöR 1986,17; Schwan, Die deutschen Bundesländer, 151.
27%ee Basic Law Article 70 (Legislation of the Federation and the Länder)
II] The Länder shall have the right to legislate in so far as this Basic Law does not confer legislative 
power on the Federation.
(2] The division of competence between the Federation and the Lander shall be determined by the 
provisions of this Basic Law concerning exclusive and concurrent legislative powers.
276Glaesner, Deutscher Landesbericht, Droit Europeeen in, Paris, 1965, 8; Birke, Die deutschen 
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constitutional means to be able to carry out all obligations assumed"277, and has therefore the 
complete competence to transpose Community law. However, the integration treaties are neither 
Concordats nor pre-constitutional treaties but treaties based on Article 24 German Basic 
Law278 (or Article 23).
Some of the arguments from the 1960s are relevant to this paper because they are the 
pattern for the legitimation of a substitutive competence of the Bund. Birke placed the main 
emphasis on the so-called 'power of integration' attributed to the Bund by Article 24279 and 
concluded:
"The only responsible partner of the founding Treaties and the only responsible participant in 
the realising of the aims of the Treaties is the Bund. Complete responsibility presupposes 
complete competence."2^
As far as substitutive competences are concerned the argumentation would be: complete 
responsibility (of the state) necessitates a substitutive competence. In Italy the Corte 
Costituzionale stated in 1972 that every distribution of the power to implement Community 
rules in favour of sub-national entities differing from the contracting state (which is the only 
responsible for the observing and fulfilling of the obligations assumed vis-à-vis the 
Community) presupposes the possession on the part of the central state of appropriate means 
(in concreto: a substitutive competence) to assure their implementation281. At this time the 
nation-state is no longer 'the only responsible participant' in European matters. I have also 
argued in part I of this paper that the hypothesis of 'complete responsibility (of the Bund)' has 
been replaced by a much more complex system of responsibilities in the framework of
277BVerfGE 6, 366 (309) "Konkordat”= Members of the Federal Constitutional Court, Decisions of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht - International Law and Law of the European Communities 1952-1989, Volume 
1/1,135 (99).
Gipsen, Als Bundesstaat in: Caemmerer/Schlochauer/Steindarf, FS Hallstein, 264f; For a differentation 
from classic international law in this sense see also: Randzelhofer in Maunz/Dürig, Kommentar zum GG, Art 
241, Rndz 30; In fact, the Concordat decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court cannot be applied 
to the transposition problem of EC-norms (especially directives): First, the BVerfG was concerned here with 
a duty arising from international law which has been handed down to the Bund (the Concordat had been 
concluded by the German Reich); second, the BVerfG stated that Concordâtes do not come under the 
provisions of Articles 32 and 59 GG, and therefore the competence to conclude Concordâtes follows 
domestic legislative competence (i.e. it is up to the Länder to conclude such treaties in the field of their 
exclusive legislative competences); third, the BVerfG argued that the Lander are in this case not bound to the 
observance of the concordat-provisions (ie schools provisions) by the principle of federal comity (and are 
constitutionally restricted in the denominational structure of schooling only by Article 7 GG). - BVerfGE 6, 
361 ff (309) = Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court 1952-1989, Volume 1/1, 132ff (99); In this sense 
also Riegel, Gliedstaatskompetenzen im Bundesstaat und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, DVB1 1979, 247.
279This power would, according to Birke, not expire with the conclusion of the founding treaties but 
would renew itself with every act of implementation. Without going into the details of this debate I want to 
say that Article 24 (and now Article 23 I) only refers to the conclusion (and ratification) of a (European) 
integration treaty, which can - now according to Article 23, Section 1 GG - only be carried out parlamentary 
law (Bundestag with consent of the Bundesrat) and to a certain purpose (a united Europe...).
Birke, Die deutschen Bundesländer, 78
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European integration. Hence the argumentation on which substitutive powers are based seems 
to be merely a continuation of an almost overcome reasoning.
Today there is no doubt282 that in the field of their legislative competences the Lander 
are empowered to transpose Community and to implement Community law, according to 
Article 83 GG283 (to be applied analogously284). Thus the position taken by Birke in the mid­
sixties has had had no effect as regards the implementation of Community law. With the 
incorporation of the new Article 23 into the Basic Law (and therein the 'constitutionalisation' 
of the participation procedure in European affairs), one might, in addition, argue that when 
the Länder even have the constitutional right of participation at the decision-making process 
on EC affairs, they have to have a fortiori the right - and also a certain interest285 - to bring the 
result of that (albeit very complex) decision-making process into force.
There is no doubt that EC law as such is binding all (competent) state organs286 and thus 
also the organs of Länder. There is no real need for additional domestic provisions that oblige 
state organs to fulfil the duties resulting from the integration treaties287. Nevertheless German 
doctrine has also brought forward another cause that would oblige Länder to implement
282See, for example: Stern, Das Staatsrecht der BRD, Bd II, 784; Vogel, Die bundesstaatliche Ordnung des 
Grundgesetzes in: Benda/Maihofer/Vogel, Handbuch des Verfassungsrechts der BRD, 1074ff; Schwan, Die 
deutschen Bundesländer, 154 with references, 172; Malanczuk, European affairs and the Länder, CMLRcv 
1985, 263; Magiera/Merten, Bundesländer und Europäische Gemeinschaft, 186; Grabitz, Die deutschen Länder 
in der Gemeinschaft, EuR 1987, 3Uf; Joos/Scheurle, Bundesstaatliche Ordnung im Integrationsprozeß, EuR 
1989, 228; Kössinger, Die Durchführung des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts im Bundesstaat, 39ff, 46f; 
l lailbronner, Die deutschen Bundesländer in der EG, JZ 1990, 157; Ehlers, Die Einwirkungen des Rechts der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften auf das Verwaltungsrecht, DVB1 1991, 610; Zuleeg, Die Stellung der Länder 
und Regionen im europäischen Integrationsprozeß, DVB1 1992, 1332; In the conclusion also Riegel, 
Gliedstaatkompetenzen im Bundesstaat und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, DVB1 1979, 250; Korzinek, 
Die Mitwirkung der deutschen Länder in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Integration in: 
Ginther/Isak/Posch, Recht und Politik in einem größeren Europa, 161.
283See Basic Law Article 83 (Execution of federal laws by the Länder)
The Länder shall execute federal laws as matters of their own concern in so far as this Basic Law does 
not otherwise provide or permit.
Compare also: Ipsen, Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, 220; Malanczuk, European affairs and the Länder, 
CML Rev 1985, 265; Grabitz, Die deutschen Länder in der Gemeinschaft, EuR 1987, 31 If; ¡oos/Scheuerle, Die 
bundesstaatliche Ordnung im Integrationsprozeß, EuR 1989, 228 FN 25; Kössinger, Die Durchführung des 
Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts im Bundesstaat, 46f, 58f; Ehlers, Die Einwirkungen des Rechts der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaft auf das Verwaltungsrecht, DVB11991, 610.
284CompareII. 1.1.
285In this sense also Malanczuk, who envisages the Länder-participation primarily functional to 
European integration: 'It is obvious that they (i.e. the Lander) are more prepared to loyally accept and 
implement European norms if they have been engaged in one way or another in their formulation.' - 
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European law correctly, namely the 'unwritten constitutional principle'288 of federal comity. If 
this reference might be superfluous in practice, it has primarily another purpose: to serve as a 
legal basis for an eventual substitutive action of the Bund vis-à-vis the Länder. In a recent 
decision the ECJ held that the mere reference to the principle of federal comity by the Federal 
Government would be insufficient as a justification for non-compliance289. If this principle is 
not understood together with other basic choices and principles it must in effect be of a great 
vagueness290 and can thus not assume more than the value of a programmatic principle and 
an, albeit unwritten, expression of cooperative federalism.
For Ipsen the principle of federal comity was too vague29* to be a basis for an 
enforcement of Community law292. He argued that with the integration treaties the domestic 
division of competences has been "mutated". As a consequence the Länder ought to exercise 
their powers in a different, namely a communitarian, way. This obligation would arise from a 
'commuta ri sa fiori ( Ver gemein schaft u ng) of the German state as a whole, the limbs of which are 
the Lander293. Ipsen was heavily reproached for ’’not verifying such a silent change of the 
Constitution"294 as well as for "using a new - likewise unwritten - legal construction"295. In 
fact, the Vergemeinschaftung of the state seems to me to be in the end just the same as European 
Integration as aim of the state (Staatsziel), that was finally enshrined in the new Article 23 GG.
A principle like the federal comity is typical of a federal state296. Even though its 
concrete meaning may vary from state to state its main task remains the same: coordination
288The characterisation as an 'unwritten contitutional principle' for the federal comity (ungeschriebenes 
Verfassungsprinzip) was used first by Smend in 1916. - Smend, Staatsrechtliche Abhandlungen und andere
Aufsätze, 32.
289F,CJ Case 237/90 "TrinkwasserVerordnung" (Commission v FRG), ECR1992,5973
290"It is in the nature of the principle of federal comity to be uncertain as regards content. (...) It can only 
be put in concrete forms by decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court." - Bayer, Die Bundestreue, 127.
291 It is intriguing that in the so-called Concordate-decision of the Bundesverfassungsgericht the Länder 
took the position that ’[...] an infringement of the principle of federal comity cannot be scrutinised in a 
judicial proceeding, because it would lack a clear legal definition.' - BVerfGE 6, 328 (309) "Konkordat" - 
Compare FIM 278.
292/psen, Als Bundesstaat in der Gemeinschaft in: Caemmerer/Schlochauer/Steindorf, Festschrift Hallstein, 
264; "It is in the nature of the principle of federal comity to be uncertain as regards content. (...) It can only be 
put in concrete forms by decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court.” - Bayer, Die Bundestreue, 127.
^  Ipsen, Als Bundesstaat in der Gemeinschaft in: Caemmerer/Schlochauer/Steindorf, Festschrift 
Hallstein, 264.
294Schwan, Die deutschen Bundesländer im Entscheidungssystem der Europäischen Gemeinschaften,
162.
295Kössmger, Die Durchführung des Europäischen Gemeinschaftsrechts im Bundesstaat, 79.
296The German principle federal comity has undoubtedly had influence on the interpretation of Article 
5 EC Treaty (compare also Article 86 ECSC, 192 EAEC). Member States and organs of the Community are 
thereby obliged to loyal cooperation and support. - Grabitz in: Grabitz, Kommentar, Art 5 Rdnr 17; Compare 
also ECJ case 2/88 "Zwartfeld" (Request for judicial cooperation - Order of the Court), ECR 1990, 3366: "That 
principle not only requires the Member States to take all measures necessary to guarantee the application 
and effectiveness of Community law, if necessary by instituting criminal proceedings but also imposes on 
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between the different levels of government, understood as the contrary of subordination as 
well as of separatism* 297. One of its basic characteristics is therefore that it is mutual. The 
German Bundesverfassungsgericht stated in an early decision:
The Länder, just like the Federation, have the constitutional obligation to cooperate in 
accordance with the essence of the constitutional alliance that ties them together and to 
contribute to its strengthening and to the safeguarding of the well-understood interests of the 
Federation and its members (Glieder).29®
The Austrian Verfassungsgerichtshof argued 'that the Bund and the Länder have to take 
the interests of the other sovereign authority into consideration whenever they exercise their 
own competences'299. It goes without saying that it depends on the situation which 'partner' of 
the constitutional alliance has to change or adapt his conduct300 (understood in a broad sense] 
to make it compatible with the interest of the other. In different situations different interests 
will prevail. Every judgement based upon the principle of federal comity must therefore in the 
end be a weighing up of interests.
In Germany it was the Constitutional Court that had to put the principle of federal 
comity as '[a] constitutional norm intrinsic to the Basic Law that regulates the relationship 
between the Federation and the Länder, which can be properly understood only if looked at 
together with the other norms that regulate this relationship’301 into concrete terms. This also 
indicates that the principle of federal comity per se cannot be more than a programmatic 
sentence.
In a leading decision of 1957 regarding the non-application of school-provisions of the 
concordat between the German Reich and the Holy Seat, the Bundesverfassungsgericht stated:
(...) in the Federal State nothing should happen that harms the whole or one of the members. 
Accordingly, federal comity requires the consideration of every member for situations of 
interests and tensions that arise in the Federation in particular the outward-directed interests 
of the Federation. It must be concluded that particularly in the area of foreign relations, in
deutschen Bundesländer in der Europäischen Gemeinschaft, JZ 1990, 152; For a survey of the principle of 
loyally to the Community, see only: Temple Lang, Community Constitutional Law: Article 5 EEC Treaty, 
CMLRev 1990,645.
297Maunz/Zippelius, Deutsches Staatsrecht23, 102.
298gverfGE 6, 361f "Konkordat"  ^Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court 1952-1989, Volume 1/1. 
132f.
299VfGH 3.12.1984, G 81, 82/84 ,VfSlg 10292, VfSlg 8831; Strictly against any 'unilateral character of the 
principle of federal comity: Adamowich/Funk, Österreichisches Verfassungsrecht3, 164; Pemtìutler, Allgemeine 
Staatslehre und Verfassungslehre, 430f.
30°The German Constitutional Court stated that it also concerns the 'procedere' and the style of 
negotiations. - BVerfGE 12,255 (205) "Deutschland-Fernsehen".
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which the Federation has the presumption of competence in its favour, the Länder's duty of 
loyalty towards the Federation is to be taken particularly seriously."302
Having said this, the Bundesverfassungsgericht nevertheless concluded that the Länder are 
not obliged by the principle of federal comity to apply the school-provisions of the concordat 
because it is the Länder that are, according to Article 7 GG, competent for schooling, and this 
provision explicitly excludes other duties. In addition, the BVerfG stated that concordats do 
not come under the provisions of Articles 32 and 59 GG (foreign policy competence), and as a 
consequence of this the Bund cannot interfere in the Länder's exclusive power to conclude 
concordats in the field of their own legislative competences. The interest of the Bund did not 
prevail in this case. The concordat-case is not directly comparable with the implementation of 
Community law because of its special character. First, it dealt with a duty (arising of 
international law) that was only handed down to the Bund303; second, the conclusion of such 
concordats as well as their implementation are, according to the Basic Law, a competence of 
the Länder, so that, by definition, no tension should arise.
Nevertheless German doctrine has focused on the Bundesverfassungsgericht's statement 
that in foreign relations the loyalty-duties of the Länder towards the Bund are to be taken 
particularly seriously and has relied on this also in the context of European Integration. Taken 
together with the new Article 23 GG that proclaims a certain type of European Integration 
(namely one that respects the principle of democracy304, the rule of law, the social state, the 
federal structure and the principle of subsidiarity) as a state-goal, this would mean that the 
Länder are also bound by the principle of federal comity (and not ’only' by the EC Treaty) to 
exercise their legislative and executive power in a 'communitarian' way. The principle of 
federal comity does not change the competences of the Lander as such but limits the exercise 
of its powers303. In 1961 the BVerfG stated:
"The principle of federal comity, (...), constitutes or limits only rights and duties within an 
existing legal relation between Bund and Länder, but does not create an independent legal
302BVerfGE 6,361f "Konkordat"= Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court 1952-1989, Volume 1 /I. 
132f.
303The concórdate was concluded between the German Reich and the Holy Seat on July 20, 1933; See 
also FN 278.
304The principle of democracy in the context of the European Integration not only gave raise to a lively 
debate in the last years but was also at the centre of the so-called Maastricht-judgement of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht of October 12,1993. - BVerfG - 2 BvR 2134/92, 2 BvR 2159/92 - EuGRZ 1993, 429, 
English translation in: International Legal Materials 1994, 388; CML Rev 1994, 1; For the debate about the 
democratic principle in the Maasticht-jugement see: Herdegen, Maastricht and the German Constitutional 
Court: Constitutional Restraints for an "Ever Closer Union", CMLRev 1994,235.
303Compare BVerfGE 14, 215 (197) "Bundesbank"; I shall not, once again, repeat the broad debate of 
whether the the principle of federal comity can be the basis for only ’accessorial’ duties or also for 
'independent' duties. This' merely semantic differentiation' (Kössinger) is for our purpose irrelevant, because 
no 'new or additional* duties of the Länder shall be founded by the Bundes!reue. For the debate see: Schuvm, 
Die deutschen Bundesländer im Entscheidungssystem der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, 160ff; Kössinger, 
Die Durchführung des Gemeinschaftsrechts im Bundesstaat, 76f.
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relation. The mutual relations, within which the comity is to be respected, must exist or must be 
founded by negotiations."306
For the implementation of European law this will in principle mean that the Lander 
ought to transpose directives correctly via legislation as well as implementing regulations via 
administrative measures307. If they did not do so it would consequently be a 'misuse of 
[legislative] freedom'308. In such a case the Bund would, according to German doctrine, have 
the right to enforce compliance by way of federal enforcement309. Article 37 GG is as follows:
[1] If a Land fails to comply with its obligations of a federal character imposed by this Basic Law or 
another federal taw, the Federal Government may, with the consent of the Bundesrat, take the 
t* necessary measures to enforce such compliance by the Land by way of federal enforcement.
J2) To carry out such federal enforcement the federal government or its commissioner shall 
i n have the right to give instructions to all Länder and their authorities.
v It is particularly interesting to note that the implementation of European law by Länder 
would thereby - strangely enough - become an ’obligation of a federal character'. A provision 
that aims to guarantee the federal principle310 would thus become functional in the 
safeguarding of European integration. By federal enforcement the Bund could invoke a 
substitutive power to legislate311 as well as give instructions to Länder authorities as regards 
administration312. Doctrine has emphasised that an invoking of a substitutive power can take
306BVerfGE 13, 75 (54) "Neugliederung".
307See Chapter I. 3.2.
308Compare BVerfGE 4,140 (115) "Hessische Gemeinden"; BVerfGE 14, 215 (197) "Bundesbank"; Grabitz, 
Die Rechtssetzungsbefugnis von Bund und Ländern bei der Durchführung von Gemeinschaftsrecht, AöR 
1986, 31.
309In the Austrian Constitution federal enforcement is only foreseen for decisions of the Contintutional 
Court. It is incumbent on the Federal President and carried out in accordance with his instructions by the 
organs, comissioned by him thereto by the Federation or the Länder, including the Federal Army.- Article 
146, Section 2 B-VG. Up to now there has been no case of such a federal enforcement.
310 Vogel, Die bundesstaatliche Ordnung des Grundgesetzes, in: Benda/Maihofer/Vogel, Handbuch des 
Verfassungsrechts, § 22, Rndz 51.
^Malanczuk, European affairs and the Länder, CMLRev 1985, 263; Grabitz, Die Rechlssetzungsbefugnis 
von Bund und Ländern bei der Durchführung von Gemeinschaftsrecht, AöR 1986, 31 f; Hailbronner, Die 
deutschen Bundesländer in der EG, JZ 1990, 157; Ehlers, Die Einwirkungen des Rechts der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften auf das Verwaltungsrecht, DVB1 1991, 611; Zuleeg, Die Stellung der Länder und Regionen 
im europäischen Integrationsprozeß, DVBI1992,1332.
312As concerns the implementation of Community law according to Article 83 GG by Länder, the Bund 
also has the power of supervision under Article 84 GG and the following possibilities:
a. ) The Federal Government may send comissioners to the highest Land authorities with their consent or, 
if such consent is refused, with the consent of the Bundesrat, also to subordinate authorities. (Art 84, Section 
3GG)
b. ) Should any shortcomings (which the Federal Government has found to exist) in the execution of 
Community Law in the Länder not be corrected, the Bundesrat shall decide (on the application of the Federal 
Government or the Land concerned), whether a Land has violated applicable law. The decision may be 
challenged in the Federal Constitutional Court. (Art 84, Section 4 GG)
c. ) With a view to the execution of Community Law, the Federal Government may be authorized by a 
federal law requiring the consent of the Bundesrat to issue individual instructions for particular cases 
(addressed to the highest Land authorities unless the Federal Government considers the matter urgent). (Art 
84, Section 5 GG)
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place only after having used all other [also non-legal] means* 313. It would thus be an ultima 
ratio means, the invoking of which necessitates taking the principle of proportionality into 
consideration. It requires, in addition, the consent of the Bundesrat, i.e. the approval of the 
majority of the Länder executives.
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1.3. P r a c t ic a l  i m p l i c a t i o n s
There has been some debate over whether the substitutive power would be only of a 
temporary character314, that is to say that the substitutive measure would automatically lose 
its force if the respective Land takes the necessary measure (particularly the necessary 
enactment). This solution seems obviously to respect more the autonomy of the Länder. This 
solution has also been enshrined in Article 16, Section 6 of the Austrian Constitution. 
Nevertheless other authors have stressed the permanent character315 of the substitutive action.
In addition to the legal limitations, it is obvious that as a consequence of the necessity of 
consent of the Bundesrat, federal enforcement must presuppose at first a broad political 
consent. It can be presumed that, regardless the party-political confrontation between the so- 
called A and B Länder (Länder governed by the SPD or CDU/CSU), Länder will stand together 
to defend their common institutional interest316 317vis-à-vis the Bund. This adds to the notion of 
Politikverflechtung^17 and its consequences for our case. Needless to say such federal 
enforcement has never taken place in Germany. A similar phenomenon was observed for 
conflicts between the components of the federal system before the Constitutional Court:
The role of the Court has rather been to clarify boundaries between federal and Lander 
powers, not to move them in one or the other direction. It thus can be said that the decisions 
of the court on matters of federalism were less path-breaking than those in other fields; [...).
Because the possible opponents take the shaping of the system into their hands, by agreeing 
about controversial issues and by not fighting them out, the role of the Court as an arbiter is 
less in demand. The Court, basically, enhanced this essentially ’peaceful' character of the
d. ) The Federal Government can start proceedings against a Land before the Federal Constitutional 
Court. (Art 93, Section 1, Number 3)
e. ) The Bund may act by way of federal enforcement. (Art 37 GG)
3l3In this sense e.g. Grabitz, Die Rechtssetzungsbefugnis von Bund und Ländern bei der Durchführung 
von Gemeinschaftsrecht, AöR 1986, 32.
314Zuleeg, Die Stellung der Länder und Regionen im europäischen Integrationsprozeß, DVB11992, 1332; 
In this sense also Gubelt: "[...] that the (legislative) measures are tobe repealed as soon the Land will fulfil its 
duties." ■ Cubelt in: van Münch, Grundgesetz Kommentar  ^Bd 2, Art 37, Rndz 15.
^Riegel, Überlegungen zum Problem EG-Richtlinien und nationale Rahmenkompetenz, EuR 1976, 86f; 
Riegel, Gliedstaalkompetenzen im Bundesstaat und Europäisches Gemeinschaftsrecht, DVB11979,250.
3*6In this sense also Scharpf who argued that the role of the Bundesrat would be that of a ’switchmen’. - 
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federal system by its only real judicial invention in the field of federalism, namely by
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creating the concept of Bundestreue which requires mutual respect and cooperation.
Given the legal and political restraints that an invoking of a substitutive power must 
meet, the conclusion of part I of this paper seems to be confirmed: that talking about a 
substitutive power in the context of cooperative federalism requires an extremely hypothetical 
argumentation, that its invoking in practice can - with all the legal and political constraints - 
never take place in a state characterised by sophisticated legal guarantees for Länder and a 
politico-administrative culture dominated by cooperative patterns. Yet the debate about 
substitutive powers reveals that theoretical problems as regards the relation of European law 
to a legal order with different levels of law making and law enforcement remain to exist. 
Doctrine, though, has approached the problems of coordination between the levels in general 
from a limited perspective, that is to say a merely legal point of view neglecting the other 
dimensions319 of federalism. *31
^^Bothe, The Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany and the Powers of the German 
Länder, in: Orban, Fédéralisme et Cours Suprêmes, 135f.
31 Particularly the role of the élites and their patterns of behaviour should be taken into consideration.; 
"[...1 that federalism is largely the result not of societies, but of constitutions and the policy-making élites 
working within them." - Bakvis/Chandler, Federalism and Comparative Analysis, in Bakvis/Chandler (Ed.), 
Federalism and the Role of the State, 5; This should, though, no' neglect the impact of legal institutions on 
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2. I ta ly :  T h e  p a tr ia rc h a l s o l u t i o n
The following chapter will not only show similarities and diversities between federal 
systems and a regionalist state organisation model in the field of the implementation of EC 
acts of law, but may - once again - show the difficulties that regionalism320 had to face even in 
the decade of its final realisation (i.e. the 1970s). What was brought forward in the early 1960s 
only by a small part of German doctrine321, namely that the state (the Bund) - and not the sub­
national entities - should be empowered in general with the transposing and implementation 
of Community law, was the dominant position in Italy more than a decade later. While the 
debate in Germany had already shifted to participation of the sub-national level in the 
decision-making process in matters of European Integration, in Italy the descending phase322 
was to remain at centre of attention for a long period.
It thus seems necessary to give, first, an overview of the development of the competence 
to implement Community law in Italy. Second, the status quo will be outlined with special 
attention to the substitutive competence of the (central) Italian State vis-à-vis the Regions. The 
reader will become immediately aware of the legal formalism and of the complexity of the 
regulations in question. Despite the actual changes, it is likely that this features as well as the 
dominant patterns of behaviour and the attidudes of the political elite will also characterise 
future developments in this field. I shall thus, once again, stress the dominance of continuity 
and not on the changes caused by reform. To quote only Georg lellinek: ’[...) also in the new 
order the power of the past will continue to have an effect.'323
2.1 . T h e  d e l e g a t e d  d e c r e e s  o f  1972: E x c lu s iv e  p o w e r  o f  t h e  
c e n t r a l  s t a t e  a s  " s t a r t in g  p o in t"
In 1972 both state legislator and Constitutional Court upheld the principle that the whole 
implementation of Community law (and international law) would be a responsibility of the 
(central) state, because it falls within the competence of foreign affairs. In one of the first 
delegated decrees, which in January 1972 transferred administrative functions and personnel 
from the state to the regions, the central state reserved (not only the international relations and 
the relations to the EC but also) the right to implement regulations, directives and other acts of 
the EC which concern price and market politics, trading in agricultural products and
320The historic background of Italian regionalism has often been told and is not to be repeated here once 
again. For the long and arduous way from regions to regionalism as an example for the "freezing” 
(congelamento) of the Italian Constitution of 1948, which in a second period was only realized very slowly, 
see for example: Balboni/Pastori, 11 govemo regionale e locale, in: Amato/Barbera, Manuale di diritto pubblico, 
576ff.
321 Compare Chapter H. 1.2.
322For participation in the ’ascending' phase in Italy see: Agostini, The Role of the Italian Regions in 
Formulating Community Policy, The International Spectator 1990,87.
323/<?//mefc, Gesetz und Verordnung, Aalen 1964, 114 - reprint of the edition of 1887.
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interventions in the matter of agricultural structures324. This position of the central state was 
confirmed only a few months later by the Constitutional Court, which argued that reference 
to article 189, section 3 EC-Treaty, which refers to the internal organisation of each member 
state, would be insufficient for claiming unconstitutionality of central state's "implementation- 
power" to. In sentenza 24 luglio 1972, n.142325 he stated:
"(...] thaï every distribution of the power to implement Community rules which would be in 
favour of the minor authorities differing from contracting state (which is, although, 
responsible for observing and fulfilling its obligations assumed vis-à-vis the Community), 
presupposes that the central state is in possession of appropriate means to assure the 
implementation also in case of inertia by the regions invested to implement Community 
rules. Such means are, although, absent in our legal system and cannot, in addition, be 
substituted by state's competence in policy and coordination according to article 17 of the 
legge di delegazione^2^ which provides no shelter against inobservance I...]."
It seems to me questionable that the state's competence in policy and coordination cannot be 
an appropriate means to ensure implementation of Community law, given the wide range of 
powers it offers. "Invented in the silence of the Constitution"327 by article 17 legge n.281/1970 
it gives, in brief, the state the possibility to issue directives328 or to pass a law329 also in the 
field of competences attributed to the regions by article 117 Cl. Although the CC emphasised 
the principle of legality (sentenza n.150/1982) as well as the principle of proportionality 
(sentenza n.170/1988), the Italian State exercised the competence in policy and coordination in a 
very detailed manner330. This often led to a real expropriation331 of the regions also in the 
area of their legislative competence under article 117 of the Italian Constitution. Even though
324articolo 4, lettera a e b del d.P.R. 15 gennaio 1972, n.ll (Trasferimento alle Regioni a statuto ordinario 
delle funzioni amministrative statali in materia di agricoltura e foreste, di caccia e di pesca nelle aque 
interne e dei relativi personali ed uffici), G.U. suppl. ord. n.46 del 19 febbraio 1972; Compare also d.P.R. 15 
gennaio 1972, n.10 (Trasferimento alle Regioni a statuto ordinario delle funzioni amministrative statali in 
materia di istruzione artigiana e professionale e del relativo personale), G.U. suppl. ord. n.41 del 14 febbraio 
1972, articolo 7, lettera b: Restano ferme le competenze degli organi statali in ordine: (...) alla vigilanza ai fini 
dell'osservanza della legislazione sociale); The (delegated) decrees were based on article 17 of the legge 16 
maggio 1970, n.281 ("financial-law") which - as a legge delega or legge di delegazione- conferred the right to 
issue legislative decrees (decreti legislativi, compare article 76 Cl) concerning the passage of functions and 
personal, attributed to the regions by article 117 of the Italian Constitution and foreseen by article VIII disp. 
trans, e fin. of the Italian Constitution, to the government.
323CC, sentenza 24 luglio 1972 ("Agriculture"), Giur. Cost 1972,1451 (1432)
326This refers to the legge 16 maggio 1970, n.281.
*27Pastori, Il governo regionale e locale in: Amato/Barbera, Manuale di diritto pubblico, 584.
*28
""deliberazione del Consiglio dei Ministri, deliberazione delegata.
329legge, atto avente forza di legge.
**/\
uThe CC confirmed the constitutionality of the central state's power in policy and coordination in 
numerous decisions: In sentenza 4 marzo 1971, n.39 (Foro Italiano 1971, 1180ff) he stated that the creation of 
this competence "lay in the discretion of the state legislator, and would thus not be arbitrary". Furthermore, it 
would be "only the other side of the limit of the national interest" (art. 117 Cl).; Compare also: CC, sentenze 
nn. 150/1982, 340/1983, 195/1986, 64/1987,177/1988, 242/1989.
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article 3 of legge n.382/1975 added the term "Community obligations" to the tasks of the stale's 
power in policy and implementation, which were enshrined in article 17 lit a of legge n.281 /1970 
with "the safeguarding of Unitarian necessities, also in the field of economic planning, and of 
international obligations", the detailed and broad use of the competence in policy and 
coordination by the Italian State should satisfy imitarían necessities332.
Given the well-known use the Italian State has made of the power in policy and 
coordination, one cannot easily argue that this competence would have left the state in a 
position of "helplessness" vis-à-vis the regions, or that it was not a suitable means of ensuring 
the implementation of Community law. It is nevertheless implicit in the decision of the 
Constitutional Court that other appropriate means of ensuring the regions' implementation of 
Community law must be created, before entrusting them with the implementation of 
Community law. A substitutive power was, however, not explicitly mentioned by the 
Constitutional Court in 1972.
The argumentation of the CC that article 189, section 3 EC Treaty would not be relevant 
for the case is debatable as well. If this provision would have been taken into consideration the 
outcome would have been significantly different. The CC could thus stress unwritten 
preconditions inherent in international law (such as the possession of appropriate means), and 
not rely on the competences guaranteed to the regions by the Italian Constitution.
In sentenza n.142/1972 the CC pleaded simply for "the creation of necessary means" 
when the power to implement Community law should be assigned to the regions. Three years 
later the legislator created a means that was intended to guarantee correct implementation by 
regions. In legge 22 luglio 1975, n. 382, which entrusted to the government the power to 
transfer the functions under article 117 Cl to the regions, a substitutive competence of the central 
state was foreseen in case of persistent inactivity333.
332This can be see also in endless controversies especially between the autonomous provinces Trento 
and Bozen and the Italian State before the Constitutional Court. Compare the decisions of the CC in FN 330 
above.
333legge 22 luglio 1975, n 382 (Norme sull'ordinamento regionale e sulla organizzazione della pubblica 
amministrazione), Art. 2:
In caso di persistente inattività degli organi regionali nell'esercizio delle funzioni delegate, qualora le 
attività relative alle materie delegate comportino adempimenti da svolgersi entro termini perentori previsti 
dalla legge o risultanti dalla natura degli interventi, il Consiglio dei Ministri, su proposta del Ministro 
competente, dispone il compimento degli atti relativi alla sostituzione dell'amministrazione regionale.
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2.2. The legge n.153/1975: A solution "in the middle of the 
road"
A sim ilar p rov ision  is to b e  found  in  article 27 legge 9 m aggio  1975, n. 153, concerning 
the im plem entation of directives issued b y  the  Council o f th e  E uropean C om m unity in  the 
field of agricu ltu ral reform s334. This p rovision w as cause for several regions to  lodge a 
com plaint before the  Constitutional C ourt335, lam enting th a t article 27 legge n.153/1975 
w ould invade the ir com petences un d er the  Italian C onstitu tion336 an d  their respective 
statutes.
The CC sta ted  in sentenza n .182/1976:
[...] that membership of the Community limits the sovereignty of the state and must therefore 
have repercussions on the autonomy (of the regions and the autonomous provinces), which is 
subordinated to international obligations as well as to the national interest, [and] that if the 
regions were empowered to implement Community directives and the state would lack a 
substitutive competence, the latter would be completely disarmed in case of region’s inertia.
A lthough the  C ourt d id  no t exclude337 38 that regions could be  ’com petent national 
authorities according to article 189, section 3 EC Treaty’, it aga in  em phasised  the responsibility 
of the state vis-à-vis the Com m unity.
As regards the  conditions un d er w hich the substitutive pow er cou ld  be invoked by  the 
state, the C ourt sta ted  that given that it presupposes an  inactivity  extended beyond every 
reasonable lim it (and not only in  observance of term s set u p  by  law ) and  a  hearing of the 
president o f the regional council (of the affected region), th e  substitu tive pow er w ould  also be 
adequate and  appropria te . The d raft m ade by  the Comissione affari costituzionali^, how ever, 
contained in add itio n  three o th er conditions: first, tha t the  sta te  is held internationally 
responsible (i.e. th a t the ECJ w o u ld  have decided that Italy  had  n o t fulfilled its obligations); 
second, that the parliam entary  com m ission fo r regional questions h a d  been consulted; third, 
that a deadline, se t b y  the governm ent, h ad  passed. It seem s ev ident tha t these requirem ents 
w ould have guaran teed  the ultima-ratio-character of the sta te ’s substitu tive pow er m ore than
334legge 9 maggio 1975, n. 153 (attuazione delle direttive del Consiglio delle Comunità europee per la 
riforma della agricoltura) Art. 27:
In caso di persistente inadempimento degli organi regionali nello svolgimento delle attività 
amministrative di attuazione delle direttive comunitarie di cui all'art. 1, il Consiglio dei Ministri, su 
proposta del Ministro per gli affari esteri o del Ministro per l'agricoltura e le foreste, sentito il presidente 
della giunta regionale interessata, autorizza il Ministro per l'agricoltura e le foreste a disporre il 
compimento degli atti relativi in sostituzione dell'amministrazione regionale, proponendo, ove occorra, le 
opportune variazioni di bilancio.; The provision thus offers only a sectoral solution.
335CC, sentenza 22 luglio 1976, n. 182 ("Agricul ture-Community directives"), Giur.Cost. 19761,1138ff.
336i.e. Art. 116,117,118 CI.
337I lere thè position of thè CC has changed slightly compared with sentenza n.142/1972.
338Amato/Caretti/Condorelli, Le Regioni e l'attuazione delle direttive comunitarie in agricoltura: una 
vittoria o una sconfitta?, Le Regioni 1975,887f.
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article 27 of legge n .l53/1975 d id . It seem s then that, in  spite o f the  judgem ent o f the 
Constitutional C ourt339, the sta te  has q u ite  considerable discretionary  powers. This is 
particularly ev iden t if one com pares th is  conditions w ith  the constra in ts o f the  federal 
enforcem ent in  G erm any. The 'extension beyond every reasonable limit' is subject to 
interpretation a n d  the hearing o f the p resid en t o f the regional council is a m erely form al 
restraint.
2.3. Substitutive power today: Are regional autonomy and 
international obligations subordinated to the national
interest?340
The above-quoted conditions w ere finally  enshrined in  Article 6 o f d.P.R. 24 luglio 1977, 
n.616341 w hich states, as follows:
The competence to implement regulations of the European Economic Community as well as 
the bringing into force of there directives, which have to be converted into state laws 
indicating explicitly the fundamental principles, is transferred to the regions in the matters
defined by this decree.
In the absence of a regional law, the state law is to be observed in all its provisions.
In case of verified inactivity of the regional authorities, which brings with it the risk of non* 
compliance with international obligations, the government may prescribe with deliberation 
of the Council of Ministers, having heard the opinion of the parliamentary commission for 
regional questions and the interested region, a congruent time-limit to provide for measures.
If the inactivity of the regional organs continues after the deadline, the Council of Ministers 
may adopt the necessary measures in substitution of the regional administration.
Thereby the  com petence to  im plem ent C om m unity  regulations and C om m unity  
directives in the field of article 117 of the  Italian C onstitution w as finally  transferred to  the 
regions. In fact d.P.R. n.616/1977 w as an  im portan t step in  the progressive recognition that 
regions are em pow ered  to im plem ent an d  transpose C om m unity  law .
By v irtue o f article 6 d.P.R. n.616/1977, however, the  C om m unity  directives h ad  to  be 
converted into state law s before being  im plem ented  by  the regions. In reality, conversion into
339CC, sentenza 22 luglio 1976, n.182: "Il legislatore ha regolato questo potere sostitutivo con opportune 
ed idonee garanz.ie."
340The question refers to a judgement of the Italian Constitutional Court (sentenza n.182/1976) in which 
it stated that the regional autonomy is subordinated to international obligations as well as to the national 
interest.
341Forthe legal basis, see: art. 1 legge 22 luglio 1975, n. 382 and articolo unico legge 27 novembre 1976, 
n. 894; Compare also article 2 of the delegation law ( 1. n.382/1975), which foresaw the state's substitutive 
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state law  w as n o t o n ly  often ta rd y  b u t w as even "occasionally of episod ic nature"342. This d id  
not change w hen article 12 of legge n.183/1987343 (legge Fabbri) ob liged the governm ent to 
make a d raft for th e  conversion law  in the shortest period of tim e possible.
A rticle 2 of the  legge 9 m arzo  1989, n.86 (legge La Pergola) th en  stated  that this is to be 
done annually  b y  a so-called legge comunitaria, the task of w hich  is period ic  adaptation  of the 
Italian legislation to  C om m unity legislation344. It has been criticised th a t the legge La Pergola, 
designed to  p rov ide a fram ew ork for im plem entation of C om m unity  legislation, w as only 
enacted on  a sta tu to ry  level and  not as a provision of th e  C onstitution. Its im pact on  a 
parliam ent that is n o t bound by it and  thereby the future practice of im plem entation w ould  be 
uncertain345. G iven the  recent developm ents in Italian politics, it seem s to m e that the 
argum ent that the  legge La Pergola '[m ight be] of a dub ious legal basis b u t w idespread  
acceptance in political circles'346 could  not be  m aintained.
The requirem ent of a conversion of EC directives in to  state law  in the field of regional 
com petences led to  harsh criticism 347 b y  doctrine, accord ing  to  w hich the legislative 
conversion w ould  either be in vain  because o f repeating on ly  the conten t of the (already very 
precise) directive o r w ould  be unconstitu tionally  invade the  regional com petences because of 
its extrem ely detailed  character. In addition , it m ay - a n d  d id  - resu lt in the regions' 
incapacity348 to im plem ent C om m unity  d irectives not converted  in to  a  state law. The prim ary
342Marzo«ii, Struttura giuridica d cl l'am minist razione nel confronto tra diritto comunitario e diritto 
interno in: Angiolini/Marzona, Diritto comunitario - diritto interno: effetti costituzionali e amministrativi, 69.
343legge 16 aprile 1987, n.183 (Coordinamento delle polìtiche riguardanti l'appartenenza dell'Italia alle 
Comunità europee ed adattamento deH'orientamento interno agli atti normativi comunitari); Tizzano, for 
example, argued that the title of the legge Fabbri would be more ambitious than the real content. - Tizzano, 
Sull'altuazione della normativa comunitaria in Italia: legge n.183/1987, Il Foro Italiano 1988, 219.
344Article 1 of the legge n.86/1989 (Norme generali sulla partecipazione dell'Italia al processo 
normativo comunitario e sulle procedure di esecuzione degli obblighi comunitari) solemnly emphasizes 
"that through the measures foreseen in this law the Italian State guarantees the fulfillment of the obligations 
resulting of its memberhip of the European Communities"; Compare also article 3; Caja, New developments 
ina continuing story: The relationship between EEC law and italian law, CMLRev, 1990, 90.
345Ca/fl, New developments in a continuing story: The relationship between EEC law and Italian law, 
CMLRev. 1990,90.
346TizziffH0, Note introduttive alla legge La Pergola, Il Foro Italiano 1988, 324ff.
347Compare, for example: D'Atena, Zur Problematik von EG-Richtlinien vornehmlich in Italien, Europa- 
Institut der Universität des Saarlandes Nr.79, 28 f; Onida, Il ruolo delle regioni nel sistema comunitario. Le 
Regioni 1991,7ff.
° Only the regions with a special statute and the autonomous provinces, Trento and Bozen, are, 
according to article 13 of legge n.183/1987 and to article 9 of legge n.86/1989, enabled to implement EC 
directives immediately; The possibility of constructing by mere linguistic interpretation of article 9, number 
2 legge la Pergola a competence of regions with ordinary statutes to implement Community directives, if the 
state legislator has missed a conversion in the first legge comm unitaria enacted after the notification of the 
EC directive, is here ignored. First, because it was obviously not the aim of the quoted provision and could 
even be understood as a reversal of the provision; second, because it is not very clear which deadline is to be 
applied (has the parliament to postpone the enactment of i legge comm unitaria when a Community 
directive was notified only a few days before the date of the voting?); third, because a later enacted state-law 
also requires a modification of a regional-law, which thereby assumes only interim character (this certainly
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aim  of the legge La Pergola, nam ely  to im prove the Italian perform ance in im plem enting 
C om m unity  legislation, is thereby partially  frustrated in th e  case o f the  regions. La Pergola 
said:
Le inadempienze vanno rimosse ed evitate: offuscano l'immagine deH'Italia e compromettono la 
nostra credibilità nel consenso europeo. L'Italia detiene, in ambito comunitario, un mortificante 
primato. Il nostro attegiamento è stato più volte sanzionato dalla Corte di giustizia. [...] Resta il 
fatto, però, che il nostro contenzioso per inadempimento è anormalmente elevato, in senso sia 
assoluto, sia relativo; inoltre - ed è forse il dato più significativo - esso è in larga parte costituto 
da mancati recepimenti di direttive. Sono vicende che denotano incapacità a mantenere il ritmo 
della produzione comunitaria.*^
C om paring  the  figures* 350 o f the suspected  infringem ents o f C om m unity  legislation by 
the Italian Republic in the years 1988-1992 a  substantial im provem ent afte r the enacting of the 
legge La Pergola is not visible. H ow ever, th is should no t b e  understood  as a  fundam ental 
critique of the legge La Pergola an d  the foreseen legge comunitaria, w hich undoubted ly  has its 
merits: it gives a good  overview  o f C om m unity  directives, takes the  judgem ents o f the  ECJ 
into account an d  categorises the EC legislation according to  the  m eans necessary for 
im plem entation351.
C om m unity  directives requ ire  a tw o-step  legislative procedure: in  Italy it is the state that 
in substance takes the  second step. The question  of the ro le  o f the  Italian regions in  the 
'ascending' phase is beyond the scope of th is paper. It sh o u ld  here b e  noted that the Italian 
regions do  not participate in the decision-m aking p rocess in  European m atters in a 
com parable w ay to the Länder in  G erm any o r Austria. T he regions are to  be inform ed of 
C om m unity recom m endations and  directives w ithin 30 days (article 10 legge n.183/1987), and 
an opinion of the Conferenza Stato-Regioni (article 10 legge n.8611989) is n o t (legally) binding. 
The state is not even obliged to give reasons for a deviation from  th is statement. A part from 
the legal restrain ts Italian regions meet in the participation in  the decision-m aking process in 
European m atters, patterns of 'cooperative federalism ' are ra th e r underdeveloped in Italy.
does not encourage the regions to implement Community directives). This interpretation in favour of the 
regions with normal statute (and also the fulfilling of Community obligations) has also had an influence on 
German literature. See: Engel, Rcgionen in der EG - Rechtliche Vielfalt und integrationspolitische 
Rollensuche, 149f.
'iAQLa Pergola. Relazione ad un proprio disegno di legge, Alti Senato, X Legislatura, n.835.
3501988:245 1989:285 1990:255 1991:177 1992:207 - Commission ofthe European Communities, 
Tenth Annual Report on the monitoring of the application of Community law 1992, 152; The optimism 
expressed by some scholars must thus be revised. Grottanelli Santi, for example had argued, that "the 
implementation process of EC norms is very likely going to change after the adoption of the law no. 86 of 
1989". - Grottanelli de Santi, The impact of EC integration on the Italian form of government, in: Francioni (ed.), 
Italy and EC Membership Evaluated, 185.
|
a.) legislative delegation to the government; b.) legislative delegation to the government requiring 
the opinion of a permanent parliamentary commission; c.) regulation; d.) administrative action.
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H ow ever, C om m unity  directives are no t brought in to  force before the state has 
'converted' them  v ia  the  annual 'legge com m unitaria'. This can neither favour a p ro m p t 
realisation of the tasks of C om m unity  law  n o r does it p rom ote  the regional autonom y. It 
seems to m e that the notion of ,supremacy> of national interests (i.e. of central policy) is 
dom inant. A s regards the  substitutive pow er o f the central state one can only w onder w hat 
role this com petence should  p lay  in  this situation. It seems paradoxical tha t a state that has 
such a strong  position  as regards the  im plem entation of C om m unity  law  should, in practice, 
have any add itiona l need for a substitutive pow er. In this light the argum entation that the 
central state w ou ld  otherw ise be 'com pletely disarm ed' also seem s ra ther puzzling. It has to be 
noted that the substitu tive com petence as p u t into concrete term s by  the legge La Pergola 
concerns regions w ith  norm al statu tes as well as regions w ith special statutes and  the 
autonom ous provinces352.
Looking at th e  form al conditions for an  invoking of a substitu tive pow er it is apparen t 
that the d ifferent o rgans of the (central) states bureaucracy participate to  a large extend. The 
Minister for the C oordination of C om m unity  Politics initiates the invoking of the substitutive 
com petence353. Article 11 of the legge La Pergola states that he  m ust act in agreem ent w ith  the 
Minister for Regional Affairs and  the m inister com petent for the respective materia. A hearing 
of the parliam en tary  com m ission for regional questions and  the interested region then  takes 
place. The council o f ministers shall set u p  a deadline fo r the region to provide for the 
required m easures. If the inactivity of the region will continue after the  setting of th is tim e­
limit the governm ent m ay take a substitutive action (the presiden t o f the interested region 
then participates in the council o f m inisters w ith a consultative opinion). The invoking of the 
substitutive m easure is, in practice, en trusted  to an  ad-hoc com m ission354. This three-m em ber 
com m ission (one adm inistrative judge  and  a  m em ber designated  by  th e  interested region) is 
headed by  the commissario del goucrno355.
A part from  the fact that the  above procedure m ight b e  perceived as a  good exam ple of 
extreme legal form alism  and o f dem ands o f different bureaucratic apparatuses, the practical 
im plications of such  a  procedure should  no t b e  forgotten. The invoking of a com petence that 
requires the  cooperation  of different m inistrys w ithin a coalition governm ent m ust necessarily 
be determ ined p rim arily  by 'p a rty  reasons' and  not necessities o f integration or regional
352/ij Pergola argued: "Inoltre la funzione sostitutiva così regolata viene estesa alle Regioni a statuto 
speciale e alle Province autonome nella considerazione che le particolari guarantigic a queste ultime non 
comportano un esonero dal limite dell'osservanza degli obblighi assunti unitariamente dallo Stato nei 
rapporti con le Comunità europee." - la Pergola, Relazione ad un proprio disegno di legge. Atti Senato, X 
Legislatura, n.835.
353Due to the fact that it is the state which is responsible for converting EC directives into legislative 
measures the substitutive power of the central state will mainly concern single administrative measures.
354/ji Pergola spoke of an organo straordinario. - La Pergola, Relazione ad un proprio disegno di legge. Atti 
Senato, X Legislatura, n.835.
355The figure of the commissario del governo is, as is shown in many analyses, an illuminating example of 
the politico-administrative culture of Italy. See: Pochmarski, Der Regierungskommissar - Organ der 
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autonom y dem ands. In addition , experience has show n th a t regional questions w ere  in 
general su b o rd in a ted  to  p arty  interests356. A probable result m ight thus be political 
bargaining on  the  national (party  o r governm ent) level in o rder to  determ ine the 'national 
interest'. To b rin g  th is interest to  the fore, though, the central state has m ore effective 
instrum ents at its d isposal than the com plex u ltim a ratio com petence nam ed  potere sostitutivo. 
In addition, due  to  the  fact that the  causes for the poor im plem entation perform ance of the 
Italian Republic lie o n  another stage, this com petence will n o t be of relevance as regards the 
im proving of the  im plem entation  perform ance. Correctly it h a s  been argued  that in  Italy  
w hen w e tu rn  f ro m  grand  decisions to  im plem entation, the degree of Europeanism  
declines"357.
t-
356Compare for example: Spotts/Wieser, Italy. A Difficult Democracy, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1986,229.
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3.Austria
W ith A ustria jo in ing  the E uropean U nion the num ber o f M em ber States with a federal 
structure w ill increase. This is no t the  place to  deal w ith the long  and a rduous road358 th a t led, 
first, to  the  decision  of the A ustrian  council o f ministers o f July 4, 1989 and  the "letter to 
Brussels " of Ju ly  17,1989 (in w hich A ustria app lied  for the th ree  Com m unities) and, second, to 
the overw helm ing  resu lt o f the referendum  of June 12,1994 w hen  66.6% of the A ustrian voters 
decided in  favour o f the constitutional law  regarding the accession to  the European U nion 
(Beitritts-Verfassungsgesetz).
N either w ill th is chapter focus on an  evaluation of interests o f th e  (different) regional 
actors and  their represen ta tion  in  the  process o f European integration. I shall refer here o n ly  to 
the exhaustive s tu d y  o f Michael Morass359. H ow ever, since the  joining o f the EEA (that entered 
into force o n  Ja n u ary  1, 1994) a n d  the E uropean Union (January 1, 1995) have b rough t (and 
will bring) w ith  it  several changes360 of the  A ustrian  Constitution, it w ill be necessary to  give 
a brief sum m ary  of the  m ost recent developm ents. It should b e  said tha t the am endm ents to 
the A ustrian  Federal-C onstitutional Law are  n o t yet conclusive. This concerns particularly  the 
federal state reform (Bundesstaatsreform). W hile the constitutional law  regarding supporting  
m easures for th e  accession to  the EU (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz-Novelle 1994, BGB1 
1994/1013, 21.12.1994) w as enacted  only a few  days before the accession to the U nion, the 
federal state reform w as unexpectedly  cancelled form the agenda. The federal state (or structural) 
reform has been subject o f intense debates a n d  negotiations in  the last legislature (GP XVIII). 
The political p ac tu m  between the  Lander a n d  the Bund signed on O ctober 8,1992 stressed the 
context w ith  A ustria 's  accession to  the E uropean Union361. This is n o t the  place to evaluate the 
reasons tha t caused  the failure o f  the federal state reform  in D ecem ber 1994. The national 
elections of O ctober 9, 1994 have changed the political landscape o f A ustria totally: the two 
coalition parties (the form er tw o b ig  parties) d o  no longer d ispose over a  tw o-third m ajority  in 
parliam ent necessary  for am endm ents to  the  Constitution. So for the enactm ent of projects like 
a structural reform n ew  coalitions will be necessary. As a lready  po in ted  ou t it is inheren t to 
federal system s th a t they never stand  still. It necessarily follow s tha t every description and
358For the history see Schneider, Gerader Weg zum klaren Ziel? Die Republik Österreich auf dem Weg 
in die Europäische Union., ÖZP1994,5.
359Morass, Länderinteressen und EG-Beitritt - Wandel der Beziehungen zwischen Ländern und Bund 
in Österreich angesichts ihrer Integration ins "Drciebenensystem" der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, Ph.D. 
Thesis European University Institute, Florence, 1992; revised version: Regionale Interessen auf dem Weg in 
die Europäische Integration, Wien: Braumüller, 1994.
360A/o/s Mock, Austrian Foreign Minister, recently stressed "the necessity of inner-state legal 
adaptations (...) due to membership in the EC” - profil 1993/46, 22; Heinz Fischer, President of the National 
Assembly, argued "that it is the democratic thought which calls for accompanying measures on the 
constitutional level - and not only a referendum - in the course of the coming closer of Austria to the EC." - 
Fischer, Die europäische Demokratie auf dem Prüfstand, Europäische Rundschau 1993/4,84; Thomas Klestil, 
Federal President, said "that European Integration will led lo important changes in the inner-state structure 
of Austria. In particular, this is a great challenge to the federal principle." - Präsidentschaftskanzlei, 
Ansprache von Bundespräsident Thomas Klestil anläßlich des Festaktes "75 Jahre selbständiges Land 
Vorarlberg" am 3.11.1993, 3.
361"[.„] the European Integration will bring with in a fundamental new quality in the relations 
between the territorial entities” - peamble of the political pactum.
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evaluation o f developm ents in  this context can assum e on ly  a  provisorial character. 
N evertheless som e concepts and trends should  a t least be sketched ou t. I will refer here 
particularly  to  the  p ro p o sa l of the governm ent o f sum m er 1994362. In sp ite  of the failure of 
this p roposal it seem s useful to  m e to  highlight som e of its contents as far as they are relevant 
for the concept o f substitu tive com petences. In addition this proposal m ight be a good basis 
for the next debate363 abou t federal state reform.
3.1. The Lander's competence in administration - main feature of 
Austrian federalism
A lthough, d u r in g  the federal-state reform  attem pts w ere  m ade to give the Länder m ore 
legislative com petences364 it shou ld  be pointed  out that the strength of Austrian federalism  
rem ains to be  based  on a strong Landers' com petence in the field of adm inistration rather than 
on their com petence to  legislate. The fact th a t Article 15, Section 1 B-VG reserves - in the form 
of a general clause - all com petences (in legislation) not attribu ted  to  the Federation for the 
Landers' in d ep en d en t area of com petence (selbständiger Wirkungsbereich), m ight be misleading. 
Either in the so-called com petence articles (Article 10 to 15 B-VG) o r in  additional provisions 
outside the  Federal-C onstitutional Law the com petence in legislation for all im portant m atters 
is attribu ted  to the Bund. The project of federal-state reform  thus contained a  (dem onstrative) 
enum eration  of the  com petences o f the Länder in  the field o f  legislation in  the new  Article 15 
B-VG. In add ition  the  legislator ought to  incorporate365 every  change in  the division of 
com petences366 (in  the area of legislation as well as adm inistra tion) w ithin the Federal- 
Constitutional law  (A rt 44, Section 2 B-VG new 367).
The m ain  fea tu re  of the A ustrian  federalist system is (and  w ill b e  in  the future) tha t - in 
general - it is the Länder (i.e. the Land governor) that are com peten t to  im plem ent law s o f the 
Federation via ind iv idual adm inistrative acts. It is significant th a t this system is called 
adm inistrative-federalism 368 (Vollzugsföderalismus) or executive-federalism. This scheme w ould
3621706 Big Sten Prot NR GP XVIII.
363For this debate see: Pochmarski, Noch einige Anmerkungen zur Bundesstaatesreform, Journal für 
Rechtspolitik 1995/1 (forthcoming).
364For a critique of the division of competences compare: Pemthaler, Kompetenzverteilung in der 
Krise - Voraussetzung und Grenzen der Kompetenzinterpretation, Wien: Wilhelm Braumüllcr, 1989; 
Bundcskanzleramt-Verfassungsdienst (Hrsg.), Neuordnung der Kompetenzverteilung in Österreich, Wien: 
1991.
365The influence of the incorporation-duty embodied in Article 7911] of the German Basic Law cannot 
be ignored.
366It should be noted that it was an amendment in 1984 that gave the Länder a right of veto against 
changes in the competence system that affect them (via a two third majority in the Federal Council). 
Compare B-VG Nov 1984: BGBI1984/490.
367In the following "new" will refer to the government proposal of federal-state reform (1706 Big Sten 
ProtNRGPXVin).
368It has also been stressed that the administrative federalism is a sort of compensation for the weak 





not have changed in  principle w ith  the p roposed  federal-state reform. A ccording to the so-called 
'political pac tum ' betw een the Bund (i.e. the  Bundesregierung) an d  the Länder (i.e. the 
Conference of th e  Land governors) of O ctober 8, 1992 and  th e  proposal of the governm ent of 
sum m er 1994369, the  form er indirect federal adm inistration370 (mittelbare Bundesverwaltung) 
should have becom e part of the Länder's independent area o f com petence371. This aim ed to 
give the Länder m ore  autonom y372.
In th e  indirect federal administration the Bund (i.e. the ind iv idual m inisters o r the  council 
of m inisters) has the  right to issue instructions vis-à-vis a Land governor (Art 103[ 1 ] an d  20 [1] 
B-VG) an d  to ind ict h im  before the C onstitutional Court, in  case of non-com pliance w ith  such 
instructions or w ith  general regulations (A rt 142[2J lit e  B-VG373). In practice neither 
instructions nor legal sanctions have p layed a relevant role since 1945. O nly once in the second 
republic w as a Land governor indicted for culpable legal contravention for not obeying an  
instruction374. In th is context Jürgen Weiss, form er Minister for Federal Affairs, said that 'an 
instruction (Weisung) is a m yth  rather than  an effective m eans'375 given the num ber of 
instructions not obeyed and the fact that there  has only been one case w here a Land governor 
was m ade legally responsible.
The federal-state reform  w ould  have pu t an end  to this fiction of hierarchical 
interference376. H ow ever, it w as considered necessary that the Bund be  able to interfere in the 
Landers' im plem entation  of federal laws.
3691706 Big Sten Prot NR GP XVIII.
370For a legal analysis of the indirect federal administration see the exhaustive study of Weber, Die 
mittelbare Bundesverwaltung, Wien: Wilhelm Braumüller, 1987.
371 In the framework of the Lands' administration this means that the competence will pass from the 
Land governor to the Land government as a whole. Up to now administrative acts in the Lands' independent 
area are signed in the name of the Land government, while acts of indirect federal administration are signed 
in the name of the Land governor.
372It should be noted that this tendency is counterbalanced by the attribution of more and more 
competences to administrative courts (Unabhängige Vermltungssenate in den Ländern) to decide in individual 
administrative cases.
373The Constitutional Court has the following three possibilities: a. to deprive the Land governor of 
his office b. to deprive hin • in addition - temporarily of his political rights c. to declare that the behaviour of 
the Land governor was illegal (in minor cases) - only sanction c was once imposed; An indictment before the 
Constitutional Court is now also foreseen for the Austrian representative in the Council - Art 142(21 lit c 
(BGBL 1994/1013). See Appendix III.
374see FN 215.
375Weiss, Die Um welt Verträglichkeitsprüfung als Teil der Verwaltungsreform, in:
Koht/Ofner/Stirnemann, Österreichisches Jahrbuch für Politik 93,460.
376It should be noted that Article 10(3] B-VG new would have allowed the administration of matters 
that fall under the Bund's competence in legislation and administration (direct federal administration) to be 
delegated to Land authorities. In this delegated federal administration the Bund would have had the right to 
issue instructions. The same is true for the administration of federal properties which was planned to be 
entrusted to Land authorities (Article 104[1( and [2] B-VG new) and the administration of federal buildings 
(Article 15 B-VG new). In these cases or if information rights are hindered (Art 102 B-VG new) or in the case 
of non-compliance with a ministerial request (Art 103 B-VG new), the federal government would also have 
had the possibility to bring members of a Land government before the Constitutional Court (Article 142(2] lit 
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K now ledge a b o u t the im plem entation phase is - as for th e  im plem entation of E uropean 
law  - an  ind ispensab le precondition  to being  able to exercise an  efficient influence. T hus the 
program m ed am endm en t should  have enshrined  the Bund's righ t to  inspect records an d  the 
obligation o f the Lander to  give inform ation abou t the im plem entation  o f federal laws (A rt 102 
B-VG new ). A h indering  o f these rights w ou ld  have constituted a reason for the im peachm ent 
of a Land m in ister before the C onstitutional C ourt (Article 142 [2] lit d  B-VG new)377.
To exert influence on the Landers' im plem entation of federal law s it was proposed  that 
the Bund should  h av e  the follow ing three instrum ents available:
a. the possibility of substitutive action for administrative acts in situations of emergency (Art 
103 B-VG new) - Kompetenzübergang
b. the right to appeal before the administrative court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof) in the case of 
dilatori ness in the issuing of an individual administrative decision (Bescheid) (Art 132,
Section 2 B-VG new) - Säumnisbeschwerde
c. the right to appeal before the administrative court in the case of unlawfulness of an 
individual administrative decision (Art 131, Section 1, Z 2 B-VG) - Amtsbeschtoerde
Substitutive com petences have a  longer tradition in  the A ustrian  constitutional 
system378. In th is context the substitu tive com petence of the B und as regards the 
im plem entation o f international treaties b y  Länder is of particu lar relevance (Article 16[4] B- 
VG379). Substitutive pow ers, how ever, have never been the  subject o f a  special study . There 
has been a  tendency  tow ards proliferation380 in  recent years.
O ne artice of the  proposed federal-state-reform  m erits particu lar attention: Art 103 B-VG 
new. This article is an em ergency provision. If the com peten t o rgan  of a Land fails to 
im plem ent an adm inistrative act w hich shou ld  be done ex officio in  order to  rem edy  
grievances that endanger life and  health o f persons or to avert an obvious and not red  ressable 
damage to  the general public o r  to avoid a serious financial dam age for the Bund, the 
com petent m inister can request that the Land governm ent im plem ent this act w ith in  a 
reasonable time lim it. If this tim e limit passes, the m in ister can declare vis-à-vis the Land 
governm ent that the  com petence for this m easure has now  been delegated  to him. In addition , 
the federal governm ent can im peach the com petent m em ber o f the Land governm ent for non- 
com pliance w ith a  m inisterial request before the C onstitutional C ourt (Article 142[2] lit d  B- 
VG new).
377The outcome of this procedure is the same as in an impeachment of a Land governor - compare FN
373.
378Art 12[3J B-VG regarding individual administrative acts in matters of electricity when more than 
one Land is concerned and the different authorities cannot reach an agreement in the matter; Art 15(6] frame 
legislation of the Bund.
379Knshrined in Article 16[1] B-VG by amendment 1974 (BGB1 1974/444); now Article 16[4] B-VG 
(BGB1 1992/276); For a comparison with other federal systems see: Dehousse, Fédéralisme et relations 
interna tionales, 80ff.
38fi988: 16[3] B-VG; 1992: Art 16[6] B-VG; proposal of 1994: Art 11(91 B-VG new, Art 16[5] new; Art 
103 B-VG new; Art 12(3] B-VG new will deal with the frame legislation of the Bund [and thus replace Art 15, 
Section 6 B-VG); Art 15(4] new will deal with individual administrative acts in the cases of Art.ll, 11a, 12, 
14(2] and (3] and 14a[3] and[4] when more than one Land is concerned and the Lander are not able to reach 




It is particu larly  interesting th a t the Land has to bear the  costs if the Bund has used its 
substitutive pow er 'rightly'. This allow s it (albeit very indirect) control o f lawfulness before the 
Constitutional C ourt. If the Land does not pay  the costs dem anded  b y  the Bund and  the  Bund 
sues the Land accord ing  to Art 137 B-VG (Kausalgerichtsbarkeit381) before the Constitutional 
Court, the  latter m u s t exam ine th e  law fulness (as a  precondition). T he Verfassungsgerichtshof 
can not, how ever, declare the ac t void u n d e r  A rt 137 B-VG. The delegation of com petence 
takes place if on ly  the formal conditions (i.e. declaration of the federal minister) are fulfilled. 
This substitu tive ac tion  is thus o f perm anen t character. Thereby a w eakness in  the system  of 
A ustrian constitu tional ju risprudence is m a d e  visible. A ctions are strictly  limited an d  related 
to a certain  federal-state m odel. A m endm ents of the constitution regard ing  the rela tion  of 
Bund an d  Länder w ill thus n o t alw ays su it the actions available. H ere the advantage of a 
general clause fo r litigation betw een  Bund and  Lander - as em bodied in Article 93[1] of the 
German Basic L aw  - is particularly  obvious.
W ith the federal-state reform , the A ustrian system , alw ays based on criteria of 
com petence ra ther than of hierarchy, w ould  have become even m ore complex. Indeed yet the 
characterisation of Pizzorusso's descrip tion  seem s apt:
"[...] a very complex general framework typical of a federally structured system, in which 
law-making and law-enforcement are placed at different levels in a web of relationships so 
closely woven as to be perhaps unequalled even in similar systems."38^
In the  course of this developm ent, w hich aims, generally speaking, to b roaden  the 
autonom y of the  Lander, substitutive p ow ers replace instructions. T hey  are less hierarchical, 
more indirect and  usually  a m eans for ex traord inary  cases. This explains w hy Austrian Länder 
have no t objected to  the creation o f substitutive pow ers. It should, in  addition, be po in ted  out 
that the G erm an experiences as regards the (non-) exercise of substitu tive action in practice are 
w ell-know n in A ustria. The L änder obviously expect that substitu tive action as an ultima ratio 
means w ill rem ain hypothetical.
3.2. Germany as example: some similarities and differences
The know ledge of the G erm an federal an d  European experience and its perception383 
are an illustration  of the influence that G erm an developm ents in th is field have in A ustria. A 
good exam ple is the adoption (or ’reception’) of the G erm an Lander-participation-procedure *38
38 * Art 137 B-VG: The Constitutional Court renders judgement concerning pecuniary legal claims 
upon the Bund, the Länder, the districts, communes and associations of communes which cannot be settled 
either by means of the ordinary judicial process nor by a ruling of an administrative authority.
382Pizzorusso, Law in the making, 139.
Austrian Land representatives traditionally have close connections with their German 
counterparts, either in multilateral cooperation-structures (ARGE ALP, ALPE-ADRIA) or in bilateral 
contacts. For an overwiew of these relations, see: Pernthater (Hrsg.), Außenpolitik der Gliedstaaten und 
Regionen, Wien: Braumüller, 1991; For similarities and differences in the Austrian and German 
constitutional structure of federalism, see: Weber, Kriterien des Bundesstaates. Eine systematische, 
historische und rechtsvergleichende Untersuchung der Bundesstaatlichkeit der Schweiz, der Bundesrepublik 




{Länderbeteiligungsverfahren) of 1986384 in  the  1992 am endm ent o f the  Austrian Federal- 
C onstitu tional L aw  (Art 10, Sections 4 ,5 ,6  B-VG). As in  the G erm an solution of 1986 the  Bund 
was obliged to in fo rm  the Lânder im m ediately  about a n y  project in  the fram ew ork  of 
European In tegration  th a t concerned either m atters o f their independen t dom ain o r m atters 
that w ould  be of o th e r relevant in terest to them . The Länder, o n  the o th er hand, w ere g iven  the 
right to m ake a sta tem ent on this w ithin a reasonable time, w hich w ou ld  bind the Bund in 
negotiations and  vo ting  if concerning a m atte r where the Länder h av e  the com petence to 
legislate. A deviation  from  such a statem ent m ust be justified and is on ly  adm issible w here 
there are com pelling  foreign and  integration policy reasons. This so lu tion  is, how ever, m uch 
less developed then  the  participation-m odel now  em bodied in  Art 23 of the G erm an Basic 
Law.
The A ustrian  L änder-participation-procedure of 1992 enshrined in  Article 10, Section 4 
to 6 B-VG (with B-VG Novelle 1994 this tw o sections were transferred  to  A rt 23d Section 1 and  
2 B-VG385) is to b e  p u t into concrete form s by  an agreem ent betw een the Bund and the  Länder 
according to Article 15a B-VG. This agreem ent (BGBl 1992/775) requires that the Lander's 
statem ent o r op in ion  m ust be m ad e  w ith unanim ity386. It also states that the Länder should 
give th is sta tem en t via the so-called ’Integration Conference of the Länder' 
{Integrationskonferenz der Under, in the following: IKL). In a  second agreem ent betw een the 
Länder of M arch 12, 1992 (W iener LGB1 1992/29) it w as stated  that the participants o f the IKL 
are the Land governors (with the  right to  vote) and  the P residents o f the Land parliam ents 
(with the right to  a ttend  sessions an d  to speak  b u t not to  vote). The presidency of the Federal 
Council (Bundesrat) m ay also a ttend  sessions, b u t w ithout the  righ t to  vote.
In fact, th e  IKL is the  nucleus o f the existing Conference of Land governors 
(Landeshauptmännerkonferenz) p lu s  representatives of the Land parliam ents and the Federal 
Council. This Conference, w h ich  constitutes an  inform al horizontal cooperation and 
coordination betw een  the Land governors (that according to  A rticle 105, Section 1 B-VG 
represent the Länder outw ardly387), has - in  sp ite of its political im portance - been little dealt 
w ith in the  doctrine388. The federal-state reform  project 1994 w anted  to  enshrine the LHK in 
Article 105, Section 2 B-VG new.
384Art 2 dt Gesetz vom 19.12.1986 zur Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte vom 28.Februar 1986, dt 
BGBl 1986II, 1102; For an overview of Länder participation in Germany in EC related decision-making up to 
1986, see: Ilrbek, The German Länder and the European Community - Towards a Real Federalism?, in: 
Hrbek/Thaysen(Hrsg.), Die Deutschen Länder und die EG, 223ff.
385see Appendix III.
386Unanimity exists when 5 Länder vote in favour and no Land against (Art 3, Nr 3 Wiener LGB1 
1992/29). The IKL was constituted on June 21,1993. The routine work is to be done by the Verbindungsstelle 
der Bundesländer (liaison office of the Länder), which also works as the secretariate of the Conference of 
Land governors.
387It should be noted that, in addition to this monopoly in 'foreign affairs’, its de facto governmental 
power is very strong given its position as 'personnel manager' and its power in financial matters.
388Compare but Morass, Regionale Interessen auf dem Weg in die Europäische Union, 239ff with 
references.
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W ithout go ing  in to  details the difference in  the participation-m odels (Austria: v ia  IKL; 
Germany: via B undesrat389) m ay be explained by the fact th a t the A ustrian  Bundesrat is not 
only an institu tionally  w eak body390 bu t has never become a real representative of regional 
interests391. It w as  th u s not very  surp rising  that such a b u n d le d  articulation of interests ' 
praeter Bundesrat w as  set up  to  deal w ith  questions of European integration that w ere 
perceived as  vital for the interests of the A ustrian  Länder. This m odel w as understood  as 
conceivable392 (g iven the constitutional reality) and  as perm issible from  a  constitutional po in t 
of view  a s  w ell. A lso  w ithout the laying d o w n  of the Conference of the Land governors (LHK) in 
the C onstitution (A rt 105[2] B-VG new ) yet n o  doubts about the  constitu tional adm issibility  of 
this participation-m odel shall rem ain . The Austrian Länder-participation model and the creation 
of possibility to  sen d  a  representative of th e  A ustrian  Lander to  the C ouncil (Art 23 d , Section 
3 B-VG, B-VG N ovelle 1994393) dem onstrate  tha t the A ustrian  Länder d ispose de facto o f a 
m uch h igher d egree  of bargaining capacity  a n d  political influence than  a  purely  constitutional 
analysis w ou ld  suggest. We should  thus be  aw are  that the form al constitutional structures are 
not the m ain  w a y  in  w hich L änder in terests are articulated and  b rough t to bear in the 
decision-m aking process394. The ro le of the  LHK is certainly an ou tstand ing  exam ple for this 
assessm ent.
As far as th e  participation o f the legislatures of the Länder (Landtage) is concerned, the 
attendance of the Land parliam ents' p residen ts at the IKL w ithout the right to vote is no t the 
prim ary channel o f interest represen ta tion395. First, because the President of the  Land 
parliam ents are (nearly  always) m em bers o f the  sam e party  as  the Land governor and, second, 
because o ther (form al) participation-m odels do  exist.
389For the differences between the Austrian and the German Federal Council see, for example: 
Esterbauer, Stellung und Reform des Bundesrates in der Bundesrepublik und in Österreich, BayVBl 1980,
225ff.
Walter/May er, Grundriß des österreichischen Bundesverfassungsrechts, Rndz 413; According to 
Ermacora the Federal Council ‘would be of little importance in the conatitutional reality'. - Ermacora, 
Österreichische Verfassungslehre, Wien: 1970; Luther, Bund-Länder Beziehungen: Formal- und
Realverfassung, in: Dachs et al, Handbuch des politischen Systems Österreichs, 818ff
39 ^ he basic tendency towards 'party-political fractionating' in the Bundesrat is almost an cliché in 
the Austrian literature. See: Adamowich/Funk, Österreichisches Verfassungsrecht, 127; This tendency has 
increased in the Great Coalition between the SPÖ and the ÖVP: In the coalition-treaty of December 17, 1990 
they were obliged to make sure that their parliamentary parties in the National rat and the Bundesrat(!) will 
vote unanimously.- see point 4 of the coalition treaty in: Kohi/Ofner/Stirnemann, Öst. Jahrbuch für Politik 
1990, 203ff; The dominance of the national party line over ‘regional loyalties' within a second chamber is 
thus particularly evident in the Austrian case.
392See the study of Pernthaler, Das Länderbeteiligungsverfahren an der Europäischen Integration, in 
particular p 78f.
393Compare Article 23, Section 6 dt GG, see Appendix I and III.
394In this sense: Luther, Bund-Länder Beziehungen: Formal- und Realverfassung, in: Dachs et al 
(Hrsg.), I landbuch des politischen Systems Österreichs, 821 f; Morass, Regionale Interessen auf dem Weg in 
die Europäische Union.
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The Styrian m odel m ay serve as an  example; the Landtag elects a Com m ittee for 
European Integration . The Land governm ent is obliged to inform  the Com m ittee im m ediately 
about all projects in  the fram ew ork  of European integration if they concern m atters w here  the 
Land has the  com petence in legislation. A statem ent o f the  C om m ittee binds the Land 
governm ent and  th u s the Land governor in  the IKL. For a deviation from  this statem ent - 
because o f com pelling  integration policy reasons - a w ritten m otivation m ust been given. In 
addition, the L and governm ent h as  to  give the Land parliam ent a w ritten  report ab o u t the 
state of E uropean  integration every  quarter.396 Similar p rocedures w ere  installed in Salzburg, 
Tyrol and  U pper A ustria397 on the  level o f the Land-Constitutional Law and in the other 
Länder on  the basis o f Land governm ent decisions398. It is obvious th a t the model described 
above is a repetition  of the Länder participation model for the  on the  federal level. It is thus 
also a copy of th e  G erm an m odel of 1986, that - in an adap ted  version - w as applied tw ice in 
Austria (i.e. on th e  national and on the regional level).
The A ustrian  Länder have often claim ed com pensation in the  course of European 
Integration399. It has even been argued  th a t the participation-m odel fo r the A ustrian Länder 
w ould be a com pensation400 for their d u ty  to im plem ent E uropean law  (as it is em bodied in 
Article 23d, Section 5 B-VG). H ow ever, it rem ains to be seen if th is m odel, com posed of 
Germ an elem ents, (that have in the  m eantim e been replaced in G erm any by new  ones) and 
A ustrian structu res can, in practice, w ork efficiently or if the result is only a 'federalism  of 
com plications'401.
396l.and constitutional law of June 23, 1992 amending the Land-Constitutional Law 1960 (Styrian
LGB1 1992/47).
397Salzburger Land constitutional law of December 12, 1992 (Big 166 Sten Prot Salzburger LT Sess 5 
GP X); Tirolyan Land constitutional law (Tiroler LGB1 1993/17); Upper Austrian Land constitutional law of 
December 3, 1993 (Oberösterreichisches LGB1 1994/7).
398Lelter from Univ.-Prof.Wielinger, chief of the legal depatment of the Styrian Land government, 
April 7, 1994 to the author.
399E.G.: Novak, Europäische Neugestaltung und Verfassungsautonomie der Länder, 5; Schreiner, Die 
Mitwirkung der Länder im Zuge der EG-Integration in: Kohl/Ofner/Stirnemann, Österreichisches Jahrbuch für 
Politik 1992, 184; Renner-Loqucnz, Einbindung der österreichischen Bundesländer in den europäischen 
Integrationsprozeß in: Ginther/!$ak/Po$ch, Recht und Politik in einem größeren Europa, 129,131.
400Sfaui/ig/, Zur Rolle der österreichischen Länder im europäischen Integrationsprozeß, Austrian 
Journal of Public International Law 1993, 51.








3.3. The Bund's substitutive competence in the framework of 
European Integration: Article 23d, Section 5 B-VG
As a  'first s tep ' o f E uropean Integration that found its expression in the A ustrian 
Constitution, the 1992 am endm ent402 enshrined a duty of the Länder to  im plem ent E uropean 
law. Given that on  O ctober 22,1991 the trea ty  on the EEA w as concluded (it entered in to  force 
on January  1, 1993) an d  that the  negotiations about the joining o f  the European U nion 
officially s ta rted  in  sp rin g  1993 the provision referred to E uropean Integration403 in general.
W ith the 1994 am endm en t of the B-VG (BGBl 1994/1013) Article 16, Section 6 w as transferred  
to Article 23d, Section 5 B-VG.
The Länder are obliged to take measures in their independent domain, which become 
necessary to implement acts within the framework of European Integration; if a Land is not 
compliant with this obligation timely and this is declared by a court in Ihe framework of the 
European Union [former version: a court within the framework of European Integration] vis- 
ä-vis Austria, the Bund shall become competent for this measures, in particular the required 
enactment. A measure taken by the Bund under this provision, in particular an enactment 
and a regulation, loses its force when the Land takes the necessary measure.
The provision  finds its parallel in section 4 of A rticle 16 B-VG that concerns the 
im plem entation o f international treaties (Staatsverträge) by  the  Länder. W hile the obligation ex 
constitution to im plem entation  m easures by regional authorities seem s to  be useful as  regards 
international treaties, it is debatable if this is not superfluous in the context of European 
Integration, because all (competent) state organs have, by  v irtue  of C om m unity law, the du ty  
to im plem ent E uropean  acts404. It is, how ever, the basis for a substitu tive action of the B und in 
the case of non-com pliance of the  responsible Land authority.
The 1988 am endm en t405 allow ed the Länder to  conclude international treaties with 
adjacent states o r  regions in the areas w here they have the com petence in  legislation (A rt 16[1] 
B-VG). S im ultaneously , the righ t of veto and  the right to  d em an d  from the Land the 
term ination of such  a  treaty w as reserved to  the Bund. If a Land does not com ply w ith  a 
dem and fo r term ination , the righ t to  term inate the treaty w ou ld  devolve to the Bw«rf406. This 
case thus offers a  so rt o f substitu tive action, although w ith effect on th e  international p lane.
A rticle 23d, section 5 B-VG presupposes that the sta te  organisation, particularly  the 
federal struc tu re  an d  the vertical division of com petences, is left 'untouched ' by  C om m unity
402Federal constitutional law June 5, 1992 amending the Federal-Constitutional Law (BGB1
1992/276).
403This was the first time that the term 'European integration’ was embodied in an Austrian 
Constitution.
404See my argumentation in Chapter I. 3.3.
405Federal constitutional law November 29, 1988 amending the Federal-Constitutional Law (BGBI 
1988/685).
40^ It is beyond the scope of this paper to examine the question of whether a termination by the Bund 













law. The im p lem enta tion  of E uropean law  thus follows the sam e ru les a s  the im plem entation 
of dom estic law . If ac ts a t the European level require an  implementation via legislation it is the 
'competence-articles' o f  the Federal-C onstitutional Law that determ ine the  responsible au tho rity  
(Bund or Land).
If C om m unity  acts are direcly applicable it is necessary to ascertain which level w ould  
be com petent if th is  m atter w as to  be  enacted on the national level. In the case of a Land's 
com petence in legislation, the Land w ould  also be responsible for ind iv idual adm inistrative 
acts (no tw ithstand ing  the com petence of independent adm inistrative tribunals to decide in  the 
last instance). If the  Bund is com petent for the m atter in legislation w e have to distinguish: it 
m ay be, first, a case o f direct federal adm inistration (see Article 10[1] B-VG), or, second, a  case 
of indirect federal adm inistration  (w ith th e  righ t of the Bund to  issue instructions).The Bund 
has thus a t his d isposal a right to  issue instructions as well as to  act in  substitution. The 
indirect federal adm inistra tion  as w ell as the  Bund’s right to  issue in  this area should  have 
been abolished b y  the  federal-state reform . This change is likely to  rem ain  on the agenda, 
given also  that the  existance of substitutive powers is som ew hat inconsistent w ith  the 
perdu ranee of the  rig h t to  issue instructions.
A rticle 23d[5] B-VG uses the  w ord  'measures' three times. This is a  reference to  Article 5 
Ec-Treaty and  sh o u ld  therefore also  be in terpreted  in the sense of ’all appropriate m easures, 
w hether general o r particu lar’. Article 23d[5{ B-VG obliges the Land authorities to  take all 
legislative and adm inistrative m easures tha t are necessary to  ensu re  the fulfilm ent of 
obligations w ithin the  fram ew ork of the European Union (Article 16, Section 6 B-VG had 
referred to  the EEA and  the EU). T he explicit nom ination of law s an d  regulations fu rthe r on in 
Article 23d[5] B-VG does by no m eans exclude individual adm in istra tive acts.
Article 23d[5] B-VG entitles the Bund, on  the other han d , no t on ly  to subsititutive laws 
and regulations b u t also  to substitu tive adm inistrative acts.
The exercise o f the substitutive com petence m ust m eet the follow ing tw o conditions:
a. an obligation within the framework of European Inlegration is not fulfilled because of 
dormancy or insufficient measures of a Land's authority
b. this infringement of European law is declared by the ECJ
If these tw o  requirem ents a re  fulfilled, the com petence for the  appropriate general or 
particular m easure autom atically  devolves to  the Bund. N o add itional dem and to  take 
m easures and no  declaration o f the com peten t m inister (as foreseen in  Article 103 B-VG new) 
is necessary.
Every substitu tive action o f the B und will lose its force autom atically  w hen the Land 
takes the necessary m easure. It is thus u p  to  the Land to act o r to leave the m easures taken by 
the Bund in force. Especially in the case of individual adm inistra tive acts it will be  m ore 
conveniant to leave the substitutive m easure in force because of unequivocal adm inistration  of 
the law.
The requirem ent of a declaratory  judgem ent of a court in  the fram ew ork  of the E uropean 
Union an d  the tem porary  effect o f the substitu tive action underline  its  character o f an  ultim a 
ratio m eans. The possibility of a  Land to  end  the force of the substitu tive m easure b y  taking 
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Constitutional C o u rt in o rder to declare the substitutive action unconstitutionally  (Art 140[1] 
B-VG for law s; A rt 139[1] B-VG for regulations) superfluous. The replacem ent o f hierarchical 
means, th e  non-com pliance of w hich m ight (in theory) lead  to  an  im peachm ent th a t w as 
envisaged by the  federal-state-reform , w ith  tem porary substitu tive m eans w ould  have 
undoub ted ly  been a n  institutional step fo rw ard  in the developm ent o f A ustrian federalism . 
The creation of A rticle 16[6] B-VG that happened  quasi en passant407 in  1992 has no t caused 
preoccupation o f th e  Länder408 because it cou ld  be interpreted as a  step  tow ards the right 
direction. G iven th e  experiences w ith  sanctions for the non-com pliance w ith  instructions in  the 
fram ew ork of indirect federal administration it seem ed also likely that 'sanctions' (in the form  of 
a substitu tive action) in  the fram ew ork of indirect European adm inistra tion  will be avoided. It 
can thus be assum ed  tha t Article 23d[5] B-VG will not p lay  an  im portan t role either in  the 
relationship betw een  B und and Länder o r the  acceleration of the im plem entation of European 
law. The fact tha t a  substitutive action can take place only after a declara tory  judgem ent o f the 
ECJ certainly does n o t allow it to  becom e a  means for im proving  the im plem entation 
perform ance. A rticle 23d[5] B-VG respects the autonom y of the L änder as regards the 
im plem entation o f European law; it cannot, how ever, by v irtue  o f its concrete content an d  the 
constitutional rea lity  becom e a relevant factor in  the im plem entation process.
407Compare the supplements: 372 Big Sten Prot NR GP XVHI; In the report of the Parliamentary 
Committee for Constitutional Questions the provision in question was not even discussed: 470 Big Sten Prot
nr gp xvm.
408Letter from HR Dr.Gerhard Wietinger, chief of the legal service of the Styrian government, to the 
author, March 1, 1994; The same is true for the German Lander.- Letter from G.Matschiner, chief of the state 
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III. C o n c lu s io n s
'Re-federalisation* - o r in  the  case o f Italy  even 'fédéralisation* - is a  topic perceived as en 
vogue in  all the th ree  countries exam ined in  this study. The political debate as w ell as the 
juridical analysis have focused p rim arily  on  technical structures. Formal participation- 
structures for sub-national units a t the dom estic decision-m aking process in  European affairs, 
a shift o f com petences to  the reg ions an d  the  replacem ent o f hierarchical instrum ents w ith 
m ore indirect m eans are b u t one dim ension o f this process. E uropean integration is certainly 
not the only , a n d  n o t even the p redom inan t factor that has led to  this situation of 'creative 
tension’409, w h ich  could  be used in favour of claims for 'fédéralisation'. Times of 'crisis’ have 
always allow ed either regional o r national actors to take advantage of and  to change the 
institutional w eigh ts in this relationship, th a t per definition can never be static. Any research 
in this field has to  face m ore com plex problem s due to the fact that "[...] it is no longer sim ply 
a m atter o f w hether federalism m akes a difference but ra ther how  and  h ow  well it w orks"410. 
Hence it is abso lu te ly  necessary to consider the constitutional reality  and the dom inant 
patterns of the behav iou r of the actors (elites) as another d im ension of system s with different 
levels of governm ent. According to  the classical definition o f Wheare, in federal system s the 
pow ers a re  d iv ided  so that the general and  regional governm ents are each, w ith in  a 
sphere, coord inate and  independent"411. European integration enlarges the coordinative 
sphere. H ow ever, the m odel o f the  nation state characterised by  external sovereignty and 
internal h ierarchical authority412 is m ore a legal fiction than a  reality. In  the fram ew ork of the 
coordinative sphere  (international, transnational and regional), netw orks and  an interlocking 
of policies and  po litics p lay a m o re  and m o re  im portant role. It is aga in st this background that 
substitutive p ow ers m ust be evaluated.
In G erm any as well as in  A ustria the regions are en tru sted  w ith  a broad p art of the 
im plem entation o f  European law . In Italy their role in  this respect is far less relevant an d  the 
recent developm ents m ake every assesm ent o f their future p a r t in  the im plem entation process 
very difficult. The European level does n o t interfere in the in ternal constitutional system  of the 
M ember States, they  rem ain free to  allocate areas of in ternal legal com petence. All com petent 
state o rgans are b o u n d  by E uropean law to take all app rop ria te  m easures, whether general or 
particular to  ensu re  the fulfilm ent of obligations of the E uropean Com m unity T reaty or 
resulting from actions taken b y  the institu tions of the C om m unity . Additional dom estic 
provisions that oblige state o rgans in general o r regional authorities in  particular to  carry  out 
im plem entation activities are adm issible if they  refer to  European integration an d  d o  not
409Spf«f//i, The European Adventure. Tasks for the Enlarged Community, London: 1972,15.
^Bakvts/Chandler, Federalism and Comparative Analysis, in: Bakvis/Chandler, Federalism and the Role 
of the State, 4.
411 Wheare, Federal Government, 11.
412Scfurp/, Versuch über Demokratie in Verhandlungssystemen, Max-Planck-Institut für 
Gesellschaftsforschung, Köln Discussion Paper 92/9,5.
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disguise the  E uropean  'character' o f the im plem entation obligation. T hey  m ust, how ever, have 
a p rim arily  'sym bolic' value and  be - if ever - functional of secondary  im portance. The 
(additional) obligation arising of national (constitutional) la w  m u st b e  perceived m ain ly  as  a 
theoretical background  for the concept of substitutive pow ers.
The role of reg ions as key actors for the effectiveness o f E uropean law  is u nderp inned  by 
the no tions of im plem entation  theory. The im portance of th e  im plem entation  phase w as also 
perceived by the  Com m ission: 'Success depends upon  tw o things. It depends upon  political 
will and on  the ab ility  to  translate tha t political will into practical achievem ent.'413 Substitutive 
pow ers a re  a national instrum ent to  ensure im plem entation o f  E uropean law. Their utilisation 
will thus be  p rim arily  determ ined by the relationship betw een the national and the  regional 
level, and  no t by  'necessities of European Integration'. The (short) legal analyses of substitutive 
pow ers have assum ed  that the trias 'm onitoring-evaluation-sanction' w ould  be o f relevant 
influence on the  im plem entation perform ance of the sub-national u n its  (thus using a  'top- 
dow n approach '). According to  these concepts substitutive action o f the central authorities 
w ould also  be a k ind  of sanction. These notions, however, p resu p p o se  tha t the state is able to 
gather sufficient inform ation abou t the im plem entation perform ance an d  has instrum ents at 
its disposal that are  really idoneus to influence the actions of the  sub-national entities. In 
addition, they im plicitly argue that the state is (more) w illing to  b rin g  the necessities of 
European integration  to the fore than its regions and is rea d y  to  accept political repercussions 
on the dom estic level, nam ely a political conflict w ith the regions.
At the  sam e tim e substitutive pow ers w ere understood  o r created  as only a resort of the . 
last instance. First, this m akes the invoking of a substitutive com petence vis-à-vis regions - 
even in theory - rare. Similarly, substitu tive pow ers becom e a w eak  if not superfluous 
instrum ent for im proving com pliance if com pared  w ith com un ita rian  instrum ents (but even 
the procedure of Article 169ff EC-Treaty has often been m erely decrlaratoy) o r ind iv idual 
enforcem ent (Francovich, direct effect). Substitutive pow ers, particu larly  when o f tem porary  
effect, a re  not o n ly  an em pty threat, bu t often  not even a th reat. The m ore this assessm ent is 
true in th e  'Realverfassung' o f A ustria and  Germ any. The substantial adm inistrative resources 
are in the  hands of the Länder and, m aybe m ore im portan t, the 'policystyle' in the  Bund- 
Länder relationship  is dom inated  by consensual and cooperative patterns. In addition , the 
Länder, nam ely the Land governm ents, have  associated - not least in  the fram ew ork of 
European Integration - so that a (thinkable) policy of 'divide et impera' is m ade im possible. This 
system m ight be an exam ple for the  bo ttom -up  approach, tha t is characterised by the "strategic 
interaction am ong m ultiple actors in a policy network"414.
Substitutive pow ers are a dom estic instrum ent and  are  determ ined  by the  dom estic 
context. If substitu tive action w ere ever invoked, it w ould easily  b e  seen as a sanction against 
an 'aw kw ard ' region. As observed in the case of instructions not obeyed  by  Land governors in
413Commission, Second report to the Council and the European Parliament on the implementation of 
the Commission's White Paper on completing the internal market, COM (87) 203 final, 24.
414Sflfwii>r, Top-Down and Bottom-Up Approaches to Implementation Research: a Critical Analysis and 
Suggested Synthesis, Journal of Public Policy 1986, 33.
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A ustria, the  conflict w ould  be defined in  te rm s o f federalism , and  m aybe even anti-centralism  
(anti-Vienna an d  anti-Brussels), w hich w o u ld  substantially increase th e  support fo r th e  Land 
governor w ith in  its territory41®. Consequently, substitutive pow ers represen t a  classical 'no- 
win* situation  fo r the  governm ents in  b o th  A ustria and G erm any. This, albeit hypothetical, 
scenario illustrates the  possible abuse o f non-com pliance a n d  substitu tive action fo r party  
disputes. The G erm an  experience show s th a t in  such a  context substitu tive com petences m ust 
necessarily rem ain  d ead  law. In the federal fram ew ork the shift from  instructions tha t could 
(theoretically) lead  to  an  im peachm ent [A] to  tem porary  substitu tive action , that is understood  
only as u ltim a ra tio  m eans, could certainly b e  envisaged as a  step  fo rw ard  tow ards m o re  also 
formal au tonom y.
This study  has further tried  to  show  th a t European in tegration  has led to  a  system  of 
responsibilities th a t is m uch m o re  com plex than  the advocats of a  substitutive pow er of the 
state vis-à-vis reg ions have claim ed. First, a  state upon w hich a lu m p  sum  and  a  penalty  
paym ent has been  im posed u n d er Article 171 [2] EC-Treaty, because o f non-com pliance of one 
of its regions w ith  a ECJ-judgement, can have this paym ent refunded  (via national courts). 
Second, Länder in G erm any and A ustria as legal entities are a s  a  consequence of the 
Francovich judgem ent liable for the non-transposition of a  directive. In the absence of any 
C om m unity legislation, it is in  accordance w ith the ru les  o f national liability tha t the 
reparation m ust be  m ade. Given that the provisions regard ing  public  liability in A ustria and 
G erm any lack a liability for 'legislative defau lt' I have stressed h ere  the im perative of an 
am endm ent. Third, w e have to rem em ber tha t individuals can rely  u p o n  directly applicable 
directives vis-à-vis 'all organs of the adm inistration '* 416, hence also  vis-à-vis regions. 
Responsibility is shared one than  resting exclusively upon  the  state (in a  narrow  sense).
C ontrary  to  G erm any and  A ustria, in Italy hierarchical lines continue to  exist 
sim ultaneously w ith  a substitutive com petence. Here there is a sim ilar outcome, nam ely  the 
non-invoking o f the substitutive pow er, as  a result of a d ifferent system . In theory it seems 
unlikely that a substitutive pow er will be  envoked considering that the central state disposes 
of hierarchical instrum ents. It is true that in  the relationship state-regions political bargaining 
took place417, b u t this did not lead to  a  consensual form  of cooperation that could  be 
com pared w ith the  patterns in the tw o federal states com pared  in this paper. The "fashionable 
w atchw ord of political discourse changed  in the 1980s from  'participation' to 
'decisionismo'"418. In addition, Italian Regions w ere not ab le  to associate vis-à-vis the  centre
41®See: Miiller, Austrian Governmental Institutions: Do They Matter, WFP 1992, 125.
416FCJ Case 103/88 Fratelli Costanzo Spa v Commune di Milano, ECR 1989, 1839f.
417Leonardi/Nanetti/Putnam, Italy - Territorial Politics in the Post-War Years: The Case of Regional 
Reform, WEP 1987/4,105f; In fact, bargaining, compromise and the sharing of powers - that were envisaged 
as features of the Italian political system behind the apparent conflictuality and disorder - have been 
concentrated primarily on the national level. Compare the study of La Palombara, Democracy Italian Style, 
New I laven/London: Yale University Press, 1987; In addition, it has been stressed that 'every aspect of local 
government has been subordinated to party interests'. - Spotts/Wieser, Italy. A Difficult Democracy, 
Cambridge: University Press, 1986,229.
418/fme, Governing Italy. The Politics of Bargained Pluralism, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, 266.
81
\
Substitutive Powers - Conclusions
due to  th e ir  fundam en ta l divisions, so that the concept 'divide et impera' could have effect. It is 
not likely th a t the endem ic conflictuality w ith  its litigation before the Constitutional C ourt will 
be rep laced  in th e  near future. It seems either less if w e consider the degree to  w hich 
'consociativismo* a n d  cooperative patterns in  public policy are discredited  in Italy today. 
Predictions, how ever, are difficult a t this m om ent. H owever, the Italian  perform ance in  the 
im plem entation  o f E uropean law  m ight b e  conceptualised using  a  'top -dow n approach '. The 
system atic failu re in  the im plem entation-process m ust also b e  understood from  this 
view point. In fact, a  recent exam ple show s th a t Italy is able to  fulfil its C om m unity obligations 
if the political w ill exists: Council directive 93/98/EE C 419 harm onised the term of protection 
of copyright and  certain  related rights; in  particular, it extended the  period  of authors' rights 
to 70 years after h is /h e r  death. M em ber States are required to  transpose the directive before 
July 1,1995. On June 30,1994 (i.e. one year before[!J the lim it set u p  b y  the Council) decree n. 
421 w as enacted , w hich concerned 'em ergency financial m easures in  publishing and 
brodcasting’. By article 7 of this decree the  duration  of au thors’ rights w as extended to  a period 
of 70 years after h is /h e r  dead420. H ow ever, European integration w ill m ore often dem and 
m easures tha t coincide less well w ith  certain aims of the governm ent. Problem s concerning the 
im plem entation-stage of European law  seem  not to be caused p rim arily  a t the regional level, 
as in general it m u st be converted into a state law  before regions can  im plem ent it. Regions 
might perhaps be  used by national politics as a additional tool fo r the slowing dow n of 
unw elcom e E uropean taws. It therefore does not seem to be o u t o f p lace to  argue that in  Italy 
the dem ands of a regional structure and  the  necessities of European integration are 'concealed' 
in favour of 'national interests', and  thus at the price of regional autonom y and European 
integration. For the relationship state-regions as for the system  as a w ho le we m ust b e  aw are 
that "[...] it is also  the sum  of attitudes and  values of its citizens a n d  its political class, and 
these are  not easily  shifted by the  stroke of a reform ing pen"421.
Substitutive com petences are not a suitable instrum ent for concealing the d em ands of 
federalism  w ith the necessities of European integration. They are a fiction: fiction th a t finally 
the needs of E uropean integration will be  brough t to the fore; a fiction tha t regional au tonom y 
will be best p reserved by tem porary  'substitutive ' m eans of the national level. Like all fictions 
they are not undesired . They are  idoneous to cover theortical lacks b o th  in the understand ing  
of European Integration and in the process of adapting  national constitutions to  European 
Integration.
419Counril Directive 93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993, OJ No L 290/9.
420FAZ 11.8.1994, Nr 185, 23.
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A p p e n d i x  I: L e g a l  M a te r i a l s  - G e r m a n y
I. A r t 23 GG
(11 Zur Verwirklichung eines vereinten Europas wirkt die Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei der Entwick­
lung der Europäischen Union mit, die demokratischen, rechtsstaatlichen, sozialen und föderativen 
Grundsätzen verpflichtet ist und einen diesem Grundgesetz im wesentlichen vergleichbaren Grundrechts­
schutz gewährleistet. Der Bund kann hierzu durch Gesetz mit Zustimmung des Bundesrates Hoheitsrechte 
übertragen. Für die Begründung der Europäischen Union und für Änderungen ihrer vertraglichen 
Grundlagen, durch die dieses Grundgesetz seinem Inhalt nach geändert oder ergänzt wird oder solche 
Änderungen oder Ergänzungen ermöglicht werden, gilt Art. 79 Abs. 2 und 3.
(2] In Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union wirken der Bundestag und durch den Bundesrat die 
Länder mit. Die Bundesregierung hat den Bundestag und den Bundesrat umfassend und zum frühest­
möglichen Zeitpunkt zu unterrichten.
[31 Die Bundesregierung gibt dem Bundestag Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme vor ihrer Mitwirkung an 
Rechtssetzungsakten der Europäischen Union. Die Bundesregierung berücksichtigt die Stellungnahmen 
des Bundestages bei den Verhandlungen. Das nähere regelt ein Gesetz.
[4] Der Bundesrat ist an der Willensbildung des Bundes zu beteiligen, soweit er an einer entsprechenden 
innerstaatlichen Massnahme mitzuwirken hätte oder soweit die Länder innerstaatlich zuständig wären.
[51 Soweit in einem Bereich ausschliesslicher Zuständigkeiten des Bundes Interessen der Länder berührt 
sind oder soweit im übrigen der Bund das Recht zur Gesetzgebung berücksichtigt die Bundesregierung die 
Stellungnahme des Bundesrates. Wenn im Schwerpunkt Gesetzgebungsbefugnisse der Länder, die 
Einrichtung ihrer Behörden oder ihre Verwaltungsverfahren betroffen sind, ist bei der Willensbildung des 
Bundes insoweit die Auffassung des Bundesrates massgeblich zu berücksichtigen; dabei ist die gesamt­
staatliche Verantwortung des Bundes zu wahren. In Angelegenheiten, die zu Ausgabenerhöhungen oder 
Einnahmeminderungen für den Bund führen können, ist die Zustimmung der Bundesregierung erforder­
lich.
[6] Wenn im Schwerpunkt ausschliessliche Gesetzgebungsbefugnisse der Länder betroffen sind, soll die 
Wahrnehmung der Rechte, die der Bundesrepublik Deutschland als Mitgliedstaat der Europäischen Union 
zustehen, vom Bund auf einen vom Bundesrat benannten Vertreter der Länder übertragen werden. Die 
Wahrnehmung der Rechte erfolgt unter Beteiligung und in Abstimmung mit der Bundesregierung; dabei ist 
die gesamtstaatliche Verantwortung des Bundes zu wahren.


















II. Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bundesregierung und 
Deutschem Bundestag in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen 
Union vom 12. März 1993 (EUZBTG; BGBl. 1993 1 S. 311f.)
§ 1 In Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union wirkt der Bundestag an der Wiliensbildung des Bundes 
mit.
§ 2 Der Bundestag bestellt einen Ausschuss für Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union, der Bundes­
tag kann den Ausschuss ermächtigen, für ihn Stellungnahmen abzugeben.
§3 Die Bundesregierung unterrichtet den Bundestag umfassend und zum frühestmöglichen Zeitpunkt 
über alle Vorhaben im Rahmen der Europäischen Union, die für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
von Interesse sein könnten.
§ 4 Die Bundesregierung übersendet dem Bundestag insbesondere die Entwürfe von Richtlinien und 
Verordnungen der Europäischen Union und unterrichtet den Bundestag zugleich über den wesentli­
chen Inhalt und die Zielsetzung, über das beim Erlass des geplanten Rechtsetzungsakts innerhalb 
der Europäischen Union anzu wend ende Verfahren und den voraussichtlichen Zeitpunkt der 
Befassung des Rates, insbesondere den voraussichtlichen Zeitpunkt der Beschlussfassung im Rat. Sie 
unterrichtet den Bundestag unverzüglich über ihre Willensbildung, über den Verlauf der 
Beratungen, über die Stellungnahme des Europäischen Parlaments und der Europäischen Kommis­
sion, über die Stellungnahmen der anderen Mitgliedstaaten sowie über die getroffenen Entscheidun- 
gen.
§ 5 Die Bundesregierung gibt vor ihrer Zustimmung zu Rechtsetzungsakten der Europäischen Union 
dem Bundestag Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme. Die Frist zur Stellungnahme muss so bemessen sein, 
dass der Bundestag ausreichend Gelegenheit hat, sich mit der Vorlage zu befassen. Die 
Bundesregierung legt die Stellungnahme ihren Verhandlungen zugrunde.
§ 6 Tür den Bereich des Artikels 235 EWG-Vertrag gelten die Vorschriften dieses Gesetzes bereits vor 
Gründung der Europäischen Union entsprechend.
§ 7 Dieses Gesetz tritt mit dem Tage der Gründung der Europäischen Union in Kraft.1 Dieser Tag ist im 





III. Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Landern in 
Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union vom 12. März 1993 
(EUZBLG, BGBl. 1993 I S. 313ff.)
§ 1 In Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union wirken die Länder durch den Bundesrat mit.
§ 2 Die Bundesregierung unterrichtet den Bundesrat unbeschadet des Artikels 2 des Gesetzes zu den 
Verträgen vom 25. März 1957 zur Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft und der 
Europäischen Atom gern einschaft vom 27. Juli 1957 (BGBl. II S. 753) umfassend und zum frühest­
möglichen Zeitpunkt über alle Vorhaben im Rahmen der Europäischen Union, die für die Länder 
von Interesse sein könnten.
§ 3 Vor der Festlegung der Verhandlungsposition zu einem Vorhaben der Europäischen Union gibt die 
Bundesregierung dem Bundesrat rechtzeitig Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme binnen angemessener 
Frist, soweit Interessen der Länder berührt sind.
§ 4 Soweit der Bundesrat an einer entsprechenden innerstaatlichen Massnahme mitzuwirken hätte oder 
sowie die Länder innerstaatlich zuständig wären, beteiligt die Bundesregierung vom Bundesrat 
benannte Vertreter der Länder an Beratungen zur Festlegung der Verhandlungsposition zu dem
Vorhaben.
Gegenstand der Beratungen nach Absatz 1 ist auch die Anwendung der §§5 und 6 auf das 
Vorhatten. Dabei ist zwischen Bund und Ländern ein Einvernehmen anzustreben.
§ 5 Soweit in einem Bereich ausschliesslicher Zuständigkeit des Bundes Interessen der Länder berührt 
sind oder sowie im übrigen der Bund das Recht zur Gesetzgebung hat, berücksichtigt die Bundes­
regierung die Stellungnahme des Bundesrales bei der Festlegung der Verhandlungsposition zu dem
Vorhaben.
Wenn bei einem Vorhaben im Schwerpunkt Gesetzgebungsbefugnisse der Länder betroffen sind 
und der Bund kein Recht zur Gesetzgebung hat oder ein Vorhaben im Schwerpunkt die Einrichtung 
der Behörden der Länder oder ihre Verwaltungsverfahren betrifft, ist insoweit bei Festlegung der 
Verhandlungsposition durch die Bundesregierung die Stellungnahme des Bundesrates massgeblich 
zu berücksichtigen; im übrigen gilt Absatz 1. Die gesamtstaatliche Verantwortung des Bundes, ein­
schliesslich aussen-, verteidigungs- und integrationspolitisch zu bewertender Fragen, ist zu wahren. 
Stimmt die Auffassung der Bundesregierung nicht mit der Stellungnahme des Bundesrates überein, 
ist ein Einvernehmen anzustreben. Zur Herbeiführung dieses Einvernehmens erfolgt erneute 
Beratung der Bundesregierung mit Vertretern der I.ander. Kommt ein Einvernehmen nicht zustande 
und bestätigt der Bundesrat daraufhin seine Auffassung mit einem mit zwei Dritteln seiner Stimmen 
gefassten Beschluss, so ist die Auffassung des Bundesrates massgebend. Die Zustimmung der 
Bundesregierung ist erforderlich, wenn Entscheidungen zu Ausgabenerhöhungen oder Einnahme­
minderungen für den Bund führen könnten.
Vor der Zustimmung zu Vorhaben, die auf Art. 235 E.WG-Vertrag gestützt werden, stellt die 
Bundesregierung das Einvernehmen mit dem Bundesrat her, soweit dessen Zustimmung nach inner­
staatlichem Recht erforderlich wäre oder soweit die [.ander innerstaatlich zuständig wären,
§ 6 Bei einem Vorhaben, bei dem der Bundesrat an einer entsprechenden innerstaatlichen Massnahme 
mitzuwirken hätte oder bei dem die Länder innerstaatlich zuständig wären oder das sonst wesentli­
che Interessen der Länder berührt, zieht die Bundesregierung auf Verlangen der Vertreter der 
Länder zu den Verhandlungen in den Beratungsgremien der Kommission und des Rates hinzu, 
soweit ihr dies möglich ist. Die Verhandlungsführung liegt bei der Bundesregierung; Vertreter der 
Länder können mit Zustimmung der Verhandlungsführung Erklärungen abgeben.
Bei einem Vorhaben, das im Schwerpunkt ausschliessliche Gesetzgebungsbefugnisse der I.ander 
betrifft, soll die Bundesregierung die Verhandlungsführung in den Heratungsgremien der Kommis­
sion und des Rates und bei Ratstagungen in der Zusammensetzung der Minister auf einen Vertreter 
der Länder übertragen. Für diese Ratstagungen kann vom Bundesrat nur ein Mitglied einer Landes­
regierung im Ministerrang benannt werden. Die Ausübung der Rechte durch den Vertreter der 
Länder erfolgt unter Teilnahme von und in Abstimmung mit dem Vertreter der Bundesregierung. 
Die Abstimmung der Verhandlungsposition mit dem Vertreter der Bundesregierung im Hinblick auf 
eine sich ändernde Verhandlungslage erfolgt entsprechend den für die interne Willensbildung 
geltenden Regeln und Kriterien.
Absatz 2 gilt nicht für die Rechte, die der Bundesrepublik Deutschland als Vorsitz im Rat 
zustehen. Bei der Ausübung dieser Rechte setzt sich die Bundesregierung, soweit Vorhaben im Sinne 
des Absatzes 2 Satz 1 betroffen sind, mit dem Vertreter der Länder ins Benehmen.




Absatz 2 keine Anwendung, wenn diese Behandlung mit dem Vertreter der Länder abgestimmt 
worden ist.
§ 7 Die Bundesregierung macht auf Verlangen des Bundesrates unbeschadet eigener Klagerechte der 
Länder von dem im Vertrag über die Europäische Union vorgesehenen Klagemöglichkeiten Ge­
brauch, soweit die Länder durch ein Handeln oder Unterlassen von Organen der Union in Bereichen 
ihrer Gesetzgebungsbefugnisse betroffen sind und der Bund kein Recht zur Gesetzgebung hat. Dabei 
ist die gesamtstaatliche Verantwortung des Bundes, einschliesslich aussen-, verteidigungs-und 
integrationspolitisch zu bewertender Fragen, zu wahren.
Absatz 1 gilt entsprechend, wenn die Bundesregierung im Verfahren vor dem Europäischen 
Gerichtshof Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme hat.
Hinsichtlich der Prozessführung vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof stellt die Bundesregierung 
in den in den Absätzen 1 und 2 genannten Fällen sowie für Vertragsverletzungsverfahren, in denen 
die Bundesrepublik Deutschland Partei ist, mit dem Bundesrat Einvernehmen her, soweit Gesetz­
gebungsbefugnisse der Länder betroffen sind und der Bund kein Recht zur Gesetzgebung hat
§ 8 Die Länder können unmittelbar zu Einrichtungen der Europäischen Union ständige Verbindungen 
unterhalten soweit dies zur Erfüllung ihrer staatlichen Befugnisse und Aufgaben nach dem 
Grundgesetz dient. Die Länderbüros erhalten keinen diplomatischen Status. Stellung und Aufgaben 
der Ständigen Vertretung in Brüssel als Vertretung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bei den 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften gelten uneingeschränkt auch in den Fällen, in denen die Wahr­
nehmung der Rechte, die der Bundesrepublik Deutschland als Mitgliedstaat der Europäischen Union 
zustehen, auf einen Vertreterder Länder übertragen wird.
§9 Einzelheiten der Unterrichtung und Beteiligung der Länder nach diesem Gesetz bleiben einer 
Vereinbarung zwischen Bund und Ländern Vorbehalten.
§10 Bei Vorhaben der Europäischen Union ist das Recht der Gemeinden und Gemeindeverbände zur 
Regelung der Angelegenheiten der örtlichen Gemeinschaft zu wahren und sind ihre Belange zu 
schützen.
§11 Dieses Gesetz gilt nicht für den Bereich der Gemeinsamen Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik der
Europäischen Union.
§12 Dieses Gesetz gilt auch für Vorhaben, die auf Beschlüsse des Rates und der im Rat vereinigten 
Vertreter der Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten gerichtet sind.
§ 13 Die in § 9 genannte Vereinbarung kann weitere Fälle vorsehen, in denen die Länder entsprechend 
diesem Gesetz mitwirken.
§14 Die Bundesregierung schlägt dem Rat als Mitglieder des Ausschusses der Regionen und deren 
Stellvertreter die von den Ländern benannten Vertreter vor. Die Länder regeln ein Beteiligungsver­
fahren für die Gemeinden und Gemeindeverbände, das sichert, dass diese auf Vorschlag der 
kommunalen Spitzenverbände mit drei gewählten Vertretern im Regionalausschuss vertreten sind.
§ 15 Artikel 2 des Gesetzes vom 19. Dezember 1986 zur Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte vom 28. Februar 
(BGBl. II S. 1102) tritt mit Inkrafttreten dieses Gesetzes ausser Kraft.
§ 16 Dieses Gesetz tritt mit dem Tage der Gründung der Europäischen Union in Kraft. Dieser Tag ist im 





IV. Vereinbarung zwischen der Bundesregierung und den 
Regierungen der Länder über die Zusammenarbeit in 
Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union in Ausführung von § 
9 des Gesetzes über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und 
Ländern in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union vom 12. 
März 1993 vom 29. Oktober 1993 (Bundesanzeiger Nr. 226 vom 2. 
Dezember 1993, S. 10425ff.)
’’Bundesregierung und Regierungen der Länder bekennen sich zur Verwirklichung eines vereinten Europas 
und der Entwicklung der Europäischen Union auf der Grundlage der Verträge über die Gründung der 
Europäischen Gemeinschaften einschliesslich deren Folgerecht und des Vertrages über die Europäische 
Union sowie zu den sich daraus ergebenen Informations- und Handlungspflichten in wechselseitigem 
Treueverhältnis. Sie arbeiten auf der Grundlage von Art. 23 CG und des dazu ergangenen Gesetzes über 
die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union (EUZBI.G) eng 
und vertrauensvoll zusammen. Zur Durchführung der diese Zusammenarbeit regelnden Bestimmungen 
vereinbaren sie folgendes:
/. U n t e r r i c h t u n g  d e s  B u n d e s r a t e s
1. Die Bundesregierung unterrichtet den Bundesrat laufend und in der Regel schriftlich über alle 
Vorhaben im Rahmen der Europäischen Union, die für die Länder von Interesse sein könnten. Dies 
geschieht insbesondere durch Übersendung von der Bundesregierung vorliegenden
a) Dokumenten
der Kommission und ihrer Dienststellen, soweit sie an den Rat gerichtet 
oder der Bundesregierung auf sonstige Weise offiziell zugänglich gemacht worden sind; 
des Europäischen Rates, des Rates, der informellen Ministertreffen und der Ratsgremien.
b) Berichten und Mitteilungen von Organen der Europäischen Union über Sitzungen
des Europäischen Rates, des Rates und der informellen Ministertreffen;
des Ausschusses der Ständigen Vertreter und sonstiger Ausschüsse oder Ar­
beitsgruppen der Rates;
der Beratungsgremien bei der Kommission.
c) Berichten der Ständigen Vertretung über
Si zungen des Rates und der Ratsgruppen2, der informellen Ministertreffen und des Aus­
schusses der Ständigen Vertreter;
Sitzungen des Europäischen Earlaments und seiner Ausschüsse;
Entscheidungen der Kommission,
wobei die Empfänger dafür Sorge tragen, dass diese Berichte nur an einen begrenzten 
Porsonenkreis in den jeweils zuständigen obersten Landesbehörden weitergeleitet werden.
d) Dokumenten und Informationen über förmliche Initiativen, Stellungnahmen und Erläuterungen 
der Bundesregierung für Organe der Europäischen Union."*
Die Unterrichtung bezieht sich auch auf Vorhaben, die auf Beschlüsse der im Rat vereinigten 
Vertreter der Regierungen der Mitgliedstaaten gerichtet sind.
Im übrigen oder ergänzend erfolgt die Unterrichtung mündlich in ständigen Kontakten.
2. Die Bundesregierung übersendet die Unterlagen dem Bundesrat zum frühestmöglichen Zeitpunkt 
auf dem kürzesten Weg.
3. Die Ministerien des Bundes und der Länder eröffnen sich untereinander und dem Bundesrat im 
Rahmen der geltenden Datenschutzvorschriften Zugang zu ressortübergreifenden Datenbanken zu 
Vorhaben im Rahmen der Europäischen Union. Die Bundesregierung wird sich bemühen, dass EG- 
Datenbanken, die den Regierungen der Mitgliedslaaten zugänglich sind, auch dem Bundesrat und 
den Regierungen der Länder zugänglich gemacht werden. Einzelheiten müssen gesondert geregelt 
werden.
/ƒ. Vorbereitende Beratungen
1. Das innerhalb der Bundesregierung federführende Bundesressort lädt die Ländervertreter zu 
Beratungen zur Festlegung der Verhandlungsposition zu Vorhaben ein, soweit der Bundesrat an *3
^Darunter falten auch Beruhte über Sitzungen der Freunde der Präsidentschaft sowie der Anlici-Cruppe.
3Die Unterrichtung bezieht sich auch auf die Sammelweisung Jur den Ausschuss der Ständigen Vertreter sowie auf förmliche Initiativen der 
Regierungen anderer Mitgliedslaaten gegenüber Rat und Kommission, die der Bundesregierung nlli/iell zugänglich gemacht wurden und die 






einer entsprechenden innerstaatlichen Massnahme mitzuwirken hätte oder soweit die Länder 
innerstaatlich zuständig wären. Dabei soll auch Einvernehmen über die Anwendung von §§ 5 und 6 
EUZBLG auf ein Vorhaben angestrebt werden!
2. Bei der Einordnung eines Vorhabens unter die Regelungen des EUZBLG ist auf den konkreten Inhalt 
der EG-Vorlage abzustellen. Die Zuordnung zur Zuständigkeit des Bundes oder der Länder folgt aus 
der innerstaatlichen Kompetenzordnung.
Bei Beurteilung der Frage, ob bei einem Vorhaben der Bund im nationalen Bereich das Recht zur 
Gesetzgebung hat, ist in Fällen der konkurrierenden und der Rahmengesetzgebung auch darauf ab­
zustellen, ob ein Bedürfnis nach bundesgesetzlicher Regelung im Sinne von Art. 72 Abs. 2 GG 
bestehen würde.
Hinsichtlich des Regelungsschwerpunktes des Vorhabens ist darauf abzustellen, ob eine Materie 
im Mittelpunkt des Vorhabens steht oder ganz überwiegend Regelungsgegenstand ist. Das ist nicht 
quantitativ bestimmbar, sondern das Ergebnis einer qualitativen Beurteilung.
3. In den Fällen, in denen innerstaatlich eine Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern vorgesehen ist, 
ist - unbeschadet der Bestimmungen des EUZBLG im einzelnen - bei Festlegung der Verhandlungs- 
Position - auch auf Gemeinschaftsebene - ein gemeinsames Vorgehen anzustreben5.
/ƒ/. Stellungnahme des Bundesrates
1. Um die rechtzeitige Abgabe einer Stellungnahme zu ermöglichen, informiert die Bundesregierung 
den Bundesrat unbeschadet der Unterrichtung nach Teil I dieser Vereinbarung bei allen Vorhaben, 
die Interessen der Länder berühren, über den zeitlichen Rahmen der Behandlung in den Rats­
gremien.
Je nach Verhandlungslage teilt die Bundesregierung dem Bundesrat auch mit, bis zu welchem 
Zeitpunkt eine Stellungnahme wegen der sich aus dem Verfahrensablauf der Europäischen Union 
ergebenden zeitlichen Vorgaben noch berücksichtigt werden kann.
2. Der Bundesrat kann seine Stellungnahme im Verlauf der Beratung des Vorhabens in den Gremien 
der Europäischen Union anpassen und ergänzen. Zu diesem Zweck unterrichtet die Bundes­
regierung den Bundesrat durch ständige Kontakte - in einer der Sache jeweils angemessenen Form - 
über wesentliche Änderungen bei diesen Vorhaben.
3. Beschlüsse des Bundesrates sind auch solche, die von der Europakammer des Bundesrates (Art. 52 
Abs. 3a GG) abgegeben werden.
4. Stimmt in den Fällen von § 5 Abs. 2 EUZBLG die Auffassung der Bundesregierung nicht mit der 
Stellungnahme des Bundesrates überein, unterrichtet sie den Bundesrat und lädt unverzüglich die 
vom Bundesrat benannten Ländervertreter zur erneuten Beratung ein, um möglichst Einvernehmen6 
zu erzielen. Kommt ein Einvernehmen nicht zustande, beschliesst der Bundesrat unverzüglich 
darüber, ob seine Stellungnahme aufrechterhalten wird.
5. Weicht die Bundesregierung von einer Stellungnahme des Bundesrates ab, so teilt sie auf Verlangen 
des Bundesrates nach Abschluss eines Vorhabens die massgeblichen Gründe mit.
I V .  H i n z u z i e h u n g  v o n  L ä n d e r v e r t r e t e r n  z u  V e r h a n d l u n g e n  i n  G r e m i e n  d e r  E u r o p ä i s c h e n  U n i o n
1. Werden in Gremien des Rates oder der Kommission Vorhaben behandelt, zu denen dem Bundesrat 
vor Festlegung der Verhandlungsposition Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme zu geben ist, so unter­
richtet die Bundesregierung den Bundesrat unverzüglich über den Ort, den Zeitpunkt und die 
Beratungsgegenstände der Sitzungen dieser Gremien. Dasselbe gilt soweit möglich für vorbereitende 
Aktivitäten der Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaft wie formelle Anhörungen, Kon­
sultationen und Expertengesp räche.
2. Unbeschadet der gesetzlichen Regelungen des § 6 Abs. 1 EUZBLG führen die Bundesregierung und 
die Regierungen der Länder gemeinsam eine Liste der Beratungsgremien  ^bei Kommission und Rat, 
in denen Vorhaben behandelt werden, bei denen der Bundesrat an einer entsprechenden inner­
staatlichen Massnahme mitzuwirken hätte, bei denen die Lander innerstaatlich zuständig wären
^Die Länder weisen darauf hin, dass es sich hier nur um vorläufige Festlegungen handeln kann, die gegebenenfalls unter den Vorbehalt einer 
Beschlussfassung des Bundesrates zu stellen sind.
^Entsprechend wird bei Festlegung der Verhandlungsposition verfahren, wenn der Regelungsschwerpunkt des Vorhabens schwer 
feststellbar ist.
ftDie Lander weisen darauf hin, dass das Einvernehmen gegebenenfalls unter den Vorbehalt einer Beschlussfassung des Bundesrates zu 
stellen ist.
^Darunter fallen auch die Gremien nach dem Beschluss des Rates vom 13. Juli 1VH7 zur Festlegung der Modalitäten für die Ausübung der 
Kommission übertragenen Durchführungsbefugnisse sowie der Koordtnierungsausschuss nach K 4 EU-V. Beim Ausschuss der Ständigen 
Vertreter sowie beim Sonderausschuss Landwirtschaft werden die Linder durch Teilnahme von LJndervertretem an den Sitzungen zur 





ober bei denen wesentliche Interessen der Länder betroffen sind. Diese Liste kann einvemehmlich 
geändert werden, ohne dass es einer förmlichen Änderung dieser Vereinbarung bedarf.
3. Der Bundesrat benennt der Bundesregierung die Ländervertreter bzw. das die Vertreter entsendende 
Ressort einer Landesregierung. Für die in der Liste erfassten Gremien kann dies ebenfalls listenmäs- 
sig für einen bestimmten Zeitraum erfolgen. Werden Ländervertreter im Einzelfall ausserhalb oder 
in Änderung der listenmässig benannten Vertreter bestellt, teilt dies der Bundesrat vor den Verhand­
lungen mit.
Die Bundesregierung wird dem Verlangen auf Hinzuziehung mindestens eines Ländervertreters, 
bei Vorliegen der Voraussetzungen von § 5 Abs. 2 EUZBLG von zwei Ländervertretem, entsprechen, 
soweit ihr das möglich ist.
Die Bundesregierung wird sich im Einzelfall jeweils bemühen, die Hinzuziehung eines Länder­
vertreters zu ermöglichen.
Nimmt in diesen Fällen des § 6 Abs. 1 EUZBLG kein benannter Ländervertreter teil oder ist noch 
kein Ländervertreter vom Bundesrat benannt, kann im Einzelfall die Sitzung von einem Vertreter 
wahrgenommen werden.
4. Über die Hinzuziehung von Ländervertretem zu informellen Treffen, soweit im Schwerpunkt aus­
schliessliche Gesetzgebungsbefugnisse der Länder betroffen sind, verständigen sich Bundes­
regierung und Länder im Einzelfall.
5. Für Ratstagungen in der Zusammensetzung der Minister, bei denen Vorhaben behandelt werden, die 
im Schwerpunkt ausschliessliche Gesetzgebungsbefugnisse der Länder betreffen, benennt der 
Bundesrat gern, g 6 Abs. 2 EUZBLG Mitglieder von Landesregierungen im Ministerrang, auf die die 
Bundesregierung für diese Vorhaben die Verhandlungsführung übertragen soll. Die Länder stellen 
eine den Anforderungen von Art. 146 EG-V entsprechende Vertretung bei diesen Ratssitzungen 
sicher. Bei Verhinderung der Ländervertreter nimmt ein Vertreter der Bundesregierung oder der 
Ständige Vertreter die Verhandlungsführung wahr.
6. Vertreter der Länder sind Mitglieder der deutschen Delegation. Sie nehmen an Delegationsbespre­
chungen vor Ort teil, die zur Vorbereitung während der Sitzungen durchgeführt werden. Vor­
ausgehende gemeinsame Vorbereitungen, die auch von den Ländervertretem angeregt werden 
können, bleiben unberührt.
7. Die Delegat ionsiet tung liegt bei der Bundesregierung. Sie wird - unbeschadet der Verhandlungs- 
führung zu einzelnen Vorhaben - vom Vertreter der Bundesregierung im Benehmen mit dem 
Vertreter der Länder wahrgenommen.
Soweit die Verhandlungsführung nicht auf einen Ländervertreter übertragen ist, kann dieser in 
Arbeitsausschüssen und -gruppen mit Zustimmung des Delegationsleiters Erklärungen abgeben.
V. Verfahren vor den Europäischen Gerichten
1. Im Hinblick auf die hier zu wahrenden Verfahrensfristen unterrichtet die Bundesregierung den 
Bundesrat unverzüglich von allen Dokumenten und Informationen über Verfahren vor dem 
Europäischen Gerichtshof und dem Gericht erster Instanz, an denen die Bundesregierung beteiligt 
ist. Dies gilt auch für Urteile zu Verfahren, an denen sich die Bundesregierung beteiligt ist. Dies gilt 
auch für Urteile zu Verfahren, an denen sich die Bundesregierung beteiligt.
2. Macht die Bundesregierung bei Vorliegen der Voraussetzungen von § 7 Abs. 1 EUZBLG auf 
Beschluss des Bundesrates von den im Vertrag über die Europäische Union vorgesehenen Klage­
möglichkeiten Gebrauch, so fertigt sie die entsprechende Klageschrift. Von den Ländern wird hierfür 
rechtzeitig eine ausführliche Stellungnahme zur Sache zur Verfügung gestellt.
3. Nr. 2 gilt entsprechend, wenn Bundesregierung in Verfahren vor dem Europäischen Gerichtshof 
Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme hat.
Vi. Zusammenarbeit zwischen Ständiger Vertretung und Länderbüros
Die Bundesregierung unterstützt über die Ständige Vertretung und gegebenenfalls die bilaterale Botschaft
im Rahmen der gegebenen Möglichkeiten und soweit erforderlich die Länderbüros in Einzclfragen im
Hinblick auf ihre Aufgaben. Einzelheiten sind in direktem Kontakt zwischen der Ständigen Vertretung und
den Länderbüros zu klären.
VH. Anwendung dieser Vereinbarung
1. Die Regelungen dieser Vereinbarungen gelten für alle Vorhaben im Rahmen des Vertrages über die 
Europäische Union - einschliesslich sog. «Gemischter Beschlüsse» und der Vorbereitung und dem 
Abschluss von völkerrechtlichen Abkommen® - sowie für Vorhaben, die in dem «Abkommen
®ln der Frag«, ob und inwieweit darüber hinaus gegebenenfalls innerstaatlich eine Zustimmung der Lander nach der Lindauer Absprache 









zwischen 11 Mitglied Staaten über die Sozialpolitik» ihre Grundlage haben.
2. Hinsichtlich der Regierungskonferenzen nach Art. N EU-V gilt:
- Der Bundesrat wird über die Verhandlungen unterrichtet, soweit Länderinteressen betroffen sein 
könnten.^
- Die Bundesregierung berücksichtigt die Stellungnahme des Bundesrates bei den Verhandlungen 
in entsprechender Anwendung von g 5 EUZBLG.
- Die Länder können mit einem Beobachter - maximal mit zwei Beobachtern, falls ausschliessliche 
Länderkompetenzen betroffen sind - an Ressortgesprächen zur Vorbereitung der Regierungskon­
ferenzen sowie - soweit möglich von Fall zu Fall - an den Regierungskonferenzen selbst 
teil nehmen.
3. Hinsichtlich der Erweiterungsverhandlungen nach Art. O EU-V gilt:
- Der Bundesrat wird über die Verhandlungen unterrichtet, soweit Länderinteressen betroffen sein 
könnten.
Die Bundesregierung berücksichtigt die Stellungnahme des Bundesrates bei den Verhandlungen 
in entsprechender Anwendung von § 5 EUZBLG.
Die Länder können mit einem Ländervertreter an Ressortabstimmungen der Verhandlungs­
position sowie - soweit möglich - an der Ad-hoc-Gruppe "Erweiterung" des Rates teilnehmen, 
wenn der konkret zu behandelnde Fragenbereich die ausschliessliche Gesetzgebungskompetenz 
der Länder oder deren wesentliche Interessen berührt.
4. Hinsichtlich der AssoziierungsVerhandlungen nach Art. 238 EWG-V sowie für die Abkommen nach 
Art. 113 Abs. 3 EWG-V gelten die Regelungen des EUZBLG und dieser Vereinbarung mit der 
Ausnahme, dass sich die Teilnahme des Ländervertreters auf die Verhandlungen in der Ratsgruppe 
zur Aushandlung des Mandats für die Kommission beschränkt.
V I I I .  S c h l u s s b e s t i m m u n g e n
1. Das Gesetz über die Zusammenarbeit von Bund und Ländern in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen 
Union und diese Vereinbarung ersetzen das Verfahren nach Art. 2 des Gesetzes vom 19. Dezember 
1986 zur Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte und die dazu getroffene Vereinbarung zwischen Bundes­
regierung und der Regierungen der Länder.
2. Die Regierungen von Bund und Ländern werden durch geeignete institutioneile und organisa­
torische Vorkehrungen sicherstcllen, dass die Handlungsfähigkeit der Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
und eine flexible Verhandlungsführung auf EG-Ebene gewährleistet bleiben.
3. Ergänzende Formen der fachlichen Zusammenarbeit und Fachkontakle zwischen Bund und Ländern
- z.B. auch im Bildungs- und Kulturbereich - werden nach Massgabe von Art. 23 GG und des 
EUZBLG fort geführt.
4. In Fällen des § 5 Abs. 2 EUZBLG ist die Zustimmung der Bundesregierung erforderlich, wenn 
Entscheidungen zu Ausgabenerhöhungen oder Finnahmeminderungen für den Bund führen können.
5. Der Beobachter der Länder hat die Aufgabe, die Länder bei der Wahrnehmung ihrer Rechte nach 
dem EUZBLG zu unterstützen. Seine Informations- und Beteiligungsmöglichkeiten gegenüber den 
Institutionen und Gremien der Europäischen Gemeinschaft sowie der Bundesregierung bleiben 
bestehen.^ ®
6. Die Länder übermitteln der Bundesregierung ihre Vorschläge für die Besetzung des Ausschusses der 
Regionen rechtz.eitig vor Ablauf der jeweiligen Mandatsperiode.
7. Die Vereinbarung gilt gern. § 11 EUZBLG nicht für den Bereich der Gemeinsamen Aussen- und 
Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union.
8. Die Vereinbarung tritt mit dem Tage der Gründung der Europäischen Union in Kraft. Bund und 
Länder überprüfen diese Vereinbarung zum 01, Juli 1996 im Lichte der bis dahin gesammelten 
Erfahrungen, insbesondere im Hinblick auf die Anwendung der §§ 5 und 6 EUZBLG im Bereich der 
konkurrierenden und der Rahmengesetzgebung.
Protokollnotizcn zu der Vereinbarung
1. Die Unterlagen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften werden im allgemeinen offen weitergegeben. 
Mitteilungen der EG-Organe über eine besondere Vertraulichkeit werden vom Bundesrat beachtet.
Eine eventuell nach Abschnitt I Nr. 1 des Rundschreibens des Bundesministers des Innern vom 
10. Oktober 1985 vorzunehmende VS-Einstufung wird vor Versendung an den Bundesrat vom
Absprache überlassen.
4Das Kilt auch für den Fall, dass die Verhandlungen von Persönlichen Beauftragten geführt werden sollten.
,(>Der Bund ist bereit, die Möglichkeit der Abordnung von Beamten aus dem Linderbereich in die Ständige Vertretung einzuriumen. 
Einzelheiten werden zwischen Bund - vertreten durch AA - und Lindem einvemehmlich festgelegt. Im Zuge einer solchen Regelung werden 




Bundesministerium fur Wirtschaft - oder den sonst zuleitenden Ministerien vorgenommen.
2. Das jeweils federführende Ressort in der Bundesregierung trägt dafür Sorge, dass bei Vorhaben, die 
ausschliessliche Gesetzgebungsmaterien der Länder betreffen oder deren wesentliche Interessen 
berühren, dem Bundesrat auch dem Ressort vorliegende vorbereitende Papiere der Kommission zur 
Verfügung gestellt werden, die für die Meinungsbildung der Länder von Bedeutung sein können. 




A p p e n d i x  II : L e g a l  M a te r i a l s  - I ta ly
I. Legge 9 marzo 1989, n.86: Norme generali sulla partecipacene 
dell'Italia al processo normativo comunitario e sulle procedure di 
esecuzione degli obblighi comunitari (GU10 marzo 1989, n.58)
1. (Finalità)
[1| Con i procedimenti e le misure previste dalla presente legge, lo Stato garantisce l’adempimento degli 
obblighi derivanti all'appartenenza dell’Italia alle Comunità europee che consistono:
a) all’emanazione dei regolamenti, direttive, decisioni e raccomandazioni (CECA) che, in conformità alle 
norme deit trattati istitutivi della Comunità europea del carbone e dell'acciaio, della comunità economica 
europea e della comunità europea dell’energia atomica, vincolano la Repubblica italiana ad adottare 
provvedimenti di attuazione;
b) all’accertamento giurisdizionale, con sentenza della Corte di giustizia delle Comunità europee, della 
incompatibilità di norme legislative e regolamenti con le disposizioni dei sudetti trattati.
[2] Con le modalità stabilite dalla presente legge, il Governo assicura l'informazione del Parlamento sullo 
svolgimento dei processi normativi comunitari.
2. (Legge comunitaria)
(1] Entro il 31 gennaio di ogni anno il Ministro per il coordinamento delle politiche comunitarie, sulla base 
degli atti emanati dalle istituzioni delle Comunità europee, verifica, con la collaborazione delle amministrazioni 
interessate, lo stato di conformità dell'ordinamento interno all’ordinamento comunitario e sottopone al Consiglio 
dei Ministri, di concerto con il Ministro degli affari esteri e gli altri Ministri interessati, un disegno di legge 
recante: "Disposizioni per l’adempimento di obblighi derivanti all’ appartenenza dell’ Italia alle comunità 
europee" (legge comunitaria per l’anno in riferimento).
]2] Il disegno di legge è presentato alle Camere entro il 1 marzo succesivo.
[3] Nella relazione introduttiva del disegno di legge si dà conto, in particolare, della giurisprudenza della 
Corte di giustizia delle Comunità europee per quanto riguarda le sentenze avente riflessi, sotto il profilo 
giurid¡co-istituzionale, sull'ordinamento interno e per quelle relative alle eventuali inadempienze e violazioni 
degli obblighi comunitari da parte della Repubblica italiana.
[4] All’artìcolo 10 della legge 16 aprile 1987, n.183 [1987,609[, il comma 2 è sostituto dal seguente:
"[2] Il Governo, entro il termine di novanta giorni, riferisce per iscritto alle Camere sullo stato di 
conformità o meno delle norme vigenti nell'ord ina mento interno alle prescrizioni della raccomandazione o 
direttiva comunitaria."
3. (Contenuti della legge comunitaria)
[1[ Il periodico adeguamento dell'ordinamento nazionale all'ordinamento comunitario è assicurato, di 
norma, dalla legge comunitaria annuale, mediante:
a) disposizioni modificative o abrogative di norme vigenti in contrasto con gli obblighi indicati all'articolo 
1, comma 1;
b) disposizioni occorrenti per dare attazione, o assicurare l’applicazione, agli atti del Consiglio o della 
Commissione delle Comunità europee di cui alla lettera a) del comma 1 dell’articolo 1, anche mediante 
conferimento ai Governo di delega legislativa;
c) autorizzazione al Governo ad attuare in via regolamentare le direttive o le raccomandazioni (CECA) a 
norma dell’articolo 4, 9
9. (Competenze delle regioni e delle provincie autonome)
[1J Le regioni a statuto speciale e le provincie autonome di Trento e di Bolzano, nelle materie di 




[2] Le regioni a statuto speciale e Ie provincie autonome di Trento e di Bolzano, nelle materie di 
competenza concorrente, possono dare attuazione alle direttive dopo l'entrata in vigore della prima legge 
comunitaria successiva alla notifica delta direttiva.
[3J La legge comunitaria o altra legge dello Stato che dia attuazione alle direttive in materia di competenza 
regionale indica quali disposizioni di principio non sono derogabili dalla legge regionale sopravenuta e 
prevalgono sulle contrarie disposizioni eventualmente già emanate dagli organi regionali. Nelle materie di 
competenza esclusiva, le regioni a statuto speciale e Ie provincie autonome si adeguano alla legge dello Stato nei 
limiti della Costituzione e dei rispettivi statuti.
(4) In mancanza degli atti normativi della Regione, previsti nei commi 1, 2 e 3, si applicano tutte le 
disposizioni dettate per l'adempimento degli obblighi comunitari dalla legge dello Stato ovvero dal regolamento 
di cui all'articolo 4.
J5) La funzione di indirizzo e coordinamento delle attività amministrative delle regioni, nelle materie di 
cui hanno riguardo le direttive, attiene ad esigenze di carattere unitario, anche in riferimento agli obiettivi della 
programmazione economica ed agli impegni derivanti agli obblighi intemazionali.
[6] Fuori dei casi di cui si esercita con legge o con atto avente forza di legge nei modi indicati dal comma 3 
o, sulla base della legge comunitaria, con il regolamento preveduto dall'articolo 4, la funzione di indirizzo e 
coordinamento di cui al comma 5 è esercitata mediante deliberazione del Consiglio dei Ministri, su proposta del 
Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri, o del Ministro per il coordinamento delle politiche comunitarie, d’intesa 
con i Ministri competenti.
11. (Inadempimenti delle regioni e delle provincie autonome)
[11 Se {'inadempimento di uno degli obblighi previsti dall'articolo 1, comma 1, dipende da inattività 
amministrativa di una regione o di una provincia autonoma, il Ministro per il coordinamento delle politiche 
comunitarie, d'intesa con il Ministro per gli affari regionali ed i Ministri competenti, avvia la procedura prevista 
dall'articolo 6, terzo comma, del decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 24 luglio 1977, n.616.
[2] Il Consiglio dei Ministri, con la deliberazione prevista dall'articolo 6, terzo comma, del decreto del 
Presidente della Repubblica 24 luglio 1977, n.616, succesivamente alla scadenza del termine assegnato alla 
regione o alla provincia autonoma interessata per provvedere, dispone, con le modalità di cui all'articolo 6, 
comma 3, della presente legge, l'intervento sostitutivo dello Stato; a tal fine può conferire, con le opportune 
direttive, ì poteri necessari ad una commissione da nominarsi con decreto del Presidente del Consiglio dei 
Ministri, su proposta del Ministro per gli affari regionali, sentito il Ministro per il coordinamento delle politiche 
communitarie.
[31 La commissione di cui al comma 2 è composta:
a) del commissario del Governo, che la presiede
b) da un magistrato amministrativo o da un avvocato dello Stato o da un professore universitario di ruolo 
di materie giuridiche
c) da un terzo membro designato dalla regione o dalla provincia autonoma interessata o, in mancanza di 
tale designazione entro il termine die trenta giorni dalla richiesta, dal presidente del tribunale avente sede nel 
capoluogo della regione o della provincia, il quale con riferimento alle categorie di cui alla lettera b)
14] Le funzioni di segretaria della commissione sono svolte dal personale del commissariato del Governo. 12
12. (Inadempimenti degli enti pubblici)
[11 Se l'inadempimento dì uno degli obblighi previsti daU'articolo 1, comma 1, dipende da inattività di un 
ente pubblico diverso dallo Stato, da una regione o una provincia autonoma, il Presidente del Consiglio dei 
Ministri, su proposta del Ministro per il coordinamento delle politiche comunitarie, di concerto con i Ministri 
competenti per materie ed aquiste le osservazioni dall’ente interessato, emana le direttive necessarie, assegnando 
all'ente medesimo un termine per provvedere.
|2] Perdurando l'inattività oltre il termine predetto, il Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri conferisce ad 




II. Decreto del Predidente della Repubblica 24 luglio 1977, n.616: 
Attuazione della delega di cui all'art.l della legge 22 luglio 1975, n.382 
(GU 29 agosto 1977, n.234)
4. (Competenze dello Stato)
[1] Lo Stato, nelle materie definite dal presente decreto, esercita soltanto le funzione amminisrative 
indicate negli articoli seguenti, nonché la funzione di indirizzo e di coordinamento nei limiti, nelle forme e con le 
modalità previste dall'art. 3 della legge 22 luglio 1975, n.382, e le funzioni, anche nelle materie trasferite o 
delegate, attinenti ai rapporti internazionali e con la Comunità economica europea, alla difesa nazionale, alla 
pubblica sicurezza.
[2] Le regioni non possono svolgere all'estero attività promozionali relative alle materie di loro 
competenza se non con previa intesa con il Governo e nell'ambito degli indirizzi e degli atti di coordinamento di 
cui al comma precedente,
[3] Il Governo della Repubblica, tramite il commissario del Governo, impartisce direttive per l'esercizio 
delle funzioni amministrative delegate alle regioni, che sono tenute ad osservarle, ed esercita il potere di 
sostituzione previsto dall'art. 2 della legge n.382 del 22 luglio 1975.
6. (Regolamenti e direttive della Comunità economica europea)
[1] Sono trasferite alle regioni in ciascuna delle materie definite dal presente decreto anche le funzioni 
amministrative relative all'applicazione dei regolamenti della Comunità economica europea nonché 
all'attuazione delle sue direttive fatte proprio dallo Stato con legge che indica espressamente le norme di 
principio.
[2} In mancanza della legge regionale, sarà osservata quella dello Stato in tutte le sue disposizioni.
(3)11 Governo della Repubblica, in caso di accertata inattività degli organi regionali che comporti 
inadempimento degli obblighi comunitari, può prescrivere con deliberazione del Consiglio dei Ministri, su 
parere della Commissione parlamentare per le questioni regionali e sentita la regione interessata, un concreto 
termine per provvedere. Qualora la inattività degli organi regionali perduri dopo la scadenza di tale termine, il 





A p p e n d i x  II I :  L e g a l  M a te r i a l s  -  A u s t r i a
I.B undes-V erfassungsgese tz  [B-VG]
state according to the amend ment 1994 [Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz-Novelle 1994 - B-VCN 1994 - BGBl 
1994/1013; NR: GP XIX RV 27 AB 58 S 11], 21.12.1994
"Erstes Hauptstück
Allgemeine Bestimmungen. Europäische Union
[...]
Art 16 [1] Die Länder können in Angelegenheiten, die in ihren selbständigen Wirkungsbereich fallen,
Staatsverträge mit an Österreich angrenzenden Staaten oder deren Teilstaaten abschließen.
[2] Der Landeshauptmann hat die Bundesregierung vor der Aufnehme von Verhandlungen über 
einen solchen Staatsvertrag zu unterrichten. Vor dessen Abschluß ist vom Landeshauptmann die 
Zustimmung der Bundesregierung einzuholen. Die Zustimmung gilt als erteilt, wenn die Bundesregierung 
nicht binnen acht Wochen von dem Tage, an dem das Ersuchen um Zustimmung beim Bundeskanzleramt 
eingelangt ist, dem Landeshauptmann mitgeteilt hat, daß die Zustimmung verweigert wird. Die 
Bevollmächtigung zur Aufnahme von Verhandlungen und der Abschluß des Staatsvertrages obliegen dem 
Bundespräsidenten auf Vorschlag der Landesregierung und mit Gegenzeichnung des Landeshauptmannes.
[3] Auf Verlangen der Bundesregierung sind Staatsverträge nach Abs. 1 vom Land zu kündigen. 
Kommt ein Land dieser Verpflichtung nicht rechtzeitig nach, so geht die Zuständigkeit dazu auf den Bund über.
[4] Die Länder sind verpflichtet, Maßnahmen zu treffen, die in ihrem selbständigen 
Wirkungsbereich zur Durchführung von Staatsverträgen erforderlich werden; kommt ein Land dieser 
Verflichtung nicht rechtzeitiig nach, so geht die Zuständigkeit zu solchen Maßnahmen, insbesondere zur Erlassung der 
notwendigen Gesetze, auf den Bund über. Eine gemäß dieser Bestimmung vom Bund getroffene Maßnahme, 
insbesondere ein solcherart erlassenes Gesetz oder eine solcherart erlassene Verordnung tritt außer Kraft, sobald das 
Ijand die erforderlichen Maßnahmen getroffen hat.
[5| Ebenso hat der Bund bei Durchführung völkerrechtlicher Verträge das Überwachungsrecht 
auch in solchen Angelegenheiten, die zum selbständigen Wirkungsbereich der Länder gehören. Dem Bund 
kommen bei Durchführung völkerrechtlicher Verträge auch in solchen Angelegenheiten, die zum 




[11 Die von der Republik Österreich zu entsendenden Abgeordneten zum Europäischen Parlament 
werden auf Grund des gleichen, unmittelbaren, geheimen und persönlichen Wahlrechtes der Männer und 
Frauen, die vor dem l.Jänner des Jahres der Wahl das 18.Lebensjahr vollendet haben und am Stichtag der 
Wahl entweder die österreichische Statsbürgerschaft besitzen und nicht nach Maßgabe des Rechtes der 
Europäischen Union vom Wahlrecht ausgeschlossen sind oder die Staatsangehörigkeit eines anderen 
Mitgliedstaates der Europäischen Union besitzen und nach Maßgabe des Rechtes der Europäischen Union 
wahlberechtigt sind, nach den Grundsätzen der Verhältniswahl gewählt. Durch Bundesgesetz werden die 
näheren Bestimmungen über das Wahlverfahren getroffen.
[2] Das Bundesgebiet bildet für die Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament einen einheitlichen 
Wahlkörper.
[3) Wählbar sind alle Männer und Frauen, die vor dem l.Jänner des Jahres der Wahl das 
19.Lebensjahr vollendet haben und am Stichtag der Wahl entwederdie österreichische Statsbürgerschaft 
besitzen und nicht nach Maßgabe des Rechtes der Europäischen Union vom Wahlrecht ausgeschlossen sind 
oder die Staatsangehörigkeit eines anderen Mitglied Staates der Europäischen Union besitzen und nach 
Maßgabe des Rechtes der Europäischen Union wahlberechtigt sind.
14] Die Ausschließung vom Wahlrecht und von der Wählbarkeit kann nur die Folge einer 
gerichtlichen Verurteilung sein.
[5] Die Durchführung und Leitung der Wahlen zum Europäischen Parlament obliegt den für die 




Wahlbehörde erfolgen. Die näheren Bestimmungen über die Stimmabgabe im Ausland können vom 
Nationalrat nur in Anwesenheit von mindestens der Hälfte der Mitglieder und mit einer Mehrheit von zwei 
Dritteln der abgegebenen Stimmen beschlossen werden.
[6] Die Wählerverzeichnisse werden von den Gemeinden im übertragenen Wirkungsbereich
angelegt.
Art 23b
[1] Öffentlich Bediensteten ist, wenn sie sich um ein Mandat im Europäischen Parlament 
bewerben, die für die Bewerbung um das Mandat erforderliche freie Zeit zu gewähren. Öffentlich 
Bedienstete, die zu Mitgliedern des Europäischen Parlaments gewählt wurden, sind für die Dauer der 
Mandatsausübung unter Entfall der Dienstbezüge außer Dienst zu stellen. Das Nähere wird durch Gesetz 
geregelt.
[2] Hochschullehrer können eine Tätigkeit in Forschung und Lehre und die Prüfungstätigkeit auch 
während der Zugehörigkeit zum Europäischen Parlament fortsetzen. Die Dienstbezüge für diese Tätigkeit 
sind entsprechend den tatsächlich erbrachten Leistungen zu bemessen, dürfen aber 25% der Bezüge eines 
Hochschullehrers nicht übersteigen.
[3] Insoweit dieses Bundesverfassungsgesetz die Unvereinbarkeit von Funktionen mit der 
Zugehörigkeit oder mit der ehemaligen Zugehörigkeit zum Nationalrat vorsieht, sind diese Funktionen auch 
mit der Zugehörigkeit oder mit der ehemaligen Zugehörigkeit zum Europäischen Parlament unvereinbar.
Art 23c
II] Die österreichische Mitwirkung an der Ernennung von Mitgleidem der Kommission, des 
Gerichtshofes, des Gerichtes erster Instanz, des Rechnungshofes, des Verwaltungsrates der Europäischen 
Investitionsbank, des Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschusses sowie des Aussschusses der Regionen im Rahmen 
der Europäischen Union obliegt der Bundesregierung.
[2] Für die Mitgleider der Kommission, des Gerichtshofes, des Gerichtes erster Instanz, des 
Rechnungshofes und des Verwaltungsrates der Europäischen Investitionsbank hat die Bundesregierung 
dabei das Einvernehmen mit dem I lauptausschuß des Nationalrates herzustellen. Die Bundesregierung hat 
den Hauptausschuß des Nationalrates und den Bundespräsidenten gleichzeitig von der von ihr 
beabsichtigten Entscheidung zu unterrichten.
[3] Für die Mitglieder des Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschusses sind von der Bundesregierung 
Vorschläge der gesetzlichen und sonstigen beruflichen Vertretungen der verschiedenen Gruppen des 
wirtschaftlichen und sozialen I.ebens einzuholen.
[4] Die österreichische Mitwirkung an der Ernennung von Mitgliedern des Ausschusses der 
Regionen und deren Stellvertretern hat auf Grund von Vorschlägen der Länder und des Österreichischen 
Städtebundes und des Österreichischen Gemeindebundes zu erfolgen. Hiebei haben die Länder je einen, der 
Österreichische Städtebund und der Österreichische Gemeindebund gemeinsam drei Vertreter 
vorzuschlagen.
[5] Von den gemäß Abs.3 und 4 namhaft gemachten Mitgliedern hat die Bundesregierung dedn 
Nationalrat zu unterrichten. Von den gemäß Abs. 2, 3 und 4 namhaft gemachten Mitgliedern hat die 
Bundesregierung den Bundesrat zu unterrichten.
Art23d
[1] Der Bund hat die Länder unverzüglich über alle Vorhaben im Rahmen der europäischen 
Integration, die den selbständigen Wirkungsbereich der Länder berühren oder sonst für sie von Interesse 
sein könnten, zu unterrichten und ihnen Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme zu geben. Solche Stellungnahmen 
sind an das Bundeskanzleramt zu richten. Gleiches gilt für die Gemeinden, soweit der eigene 
Wirkungsbereich oder sonstige wichtige Interessen der Gemeinden berührt werden. Die Vertretung der 
Gemeinden obliegt in diesen Angelegenheiten dem Österreichischen Städtebund und dem Österreichischen 
Gemeindebund (Art 115 Abs 3).
[2] Liegt dem Bund fristgerecht eine einheitliche Stellungnahme der Länder zu einem Vorhaben im 
Rahmen der europäischen Union vor, das Angelegenheiten betrifft, in denen die Gesetzgebung Landessache 
ist, so ist der Bund bei Verhandlungen und Abstimmungen in der Europäischen Union an diese 
Stellungnahme gebunden. Er darf davon nur aus zwingenden außen- und integralionspolitischen Gründen 
abweichen. Der Bund hat diese Gründe den Ländern unverzüglich mitzuteilen.
[3] Soweit ein Vorhaben im Rahmen der Europäischen Union auch Angelegenheiten betrifft, in 
denen die Gesetzgebung Landessache ist, kann die Bundesregierung einem von den Ländern namhaft 




Befugnis erfolgt unter Beteiligung des zuständigen Mitgliedes der Bundesregierung und in Abstimmung mit 
diesem. Für einen solchen Ländervertreter gilt Abs.2. Der Vertreter der Länder ist dabei in Angelegenheiten 
der Bundesgesetzgebung dem Nationalrat, in Angelegenheiten der Landesgesetzgebung den Landtagen 
gemäß Art. 142 verantwortlich.
|4] Die näheren Bestimmungen zu den Abs. 1 bis 3 sind in einer Vereinbarung zwischen dem Bund 
und den Ländern (Artikel 15a Abs 1) festzulegen.
[51 Die Länder sind verpflichtet, Maßnahmen zu treffen, die in ihrem selbständigen 
Wirkungsbereich zur Durchführung von Rechtsakten im Rahmen der europäischen Integration erforderlich 
werden; Jtommf ein Land dieser Verpflichtung nicht rechtzeitig nach und wird dies von einem Gericht im Rahmen der 
Europäischen Union gegenüber Österreich festgestellt, so geht die Zuständigkeit zu solchen Maßnahmen, insbesondere 
zur Erlassung der notwendigen Gesetze, auf den Bund über. Eine gemäß dieser Bestimmung vom Bund getroffene 
Maßnahme, insbesondere ein solcherart erlassenes Gesetz oder eine solcherart erlassene Verordnung, tritt außer Kraft, 
sobald das Land die erforderlichen Maßnahmen getroffen hat.
Art 23e
m  Das zuständige Mitglied der Bundesregierung hat den Nationalrat und den Bundesrat 
unverzüglich über alle Vorhaben im Rahmen der Europäischen Union zu unterrichten und ihnen 
Gelegenheit zur Stellungnahme zu geben.
[2] Liegt dem zuständigen Mitglied der Bundesregierung eine Stellungnahme des Nationalrates zu 
einem Vorhaben im Rahmen der Europäischen Union vor, das durch Bundesgesetz umzusetzen ist oder das 
auf die Erlassung eines unmittelbar anwendbaren Rechtsaktes gerichtet ist, der Angelegenheiten betrifft, die 
bundesgesetzlich zu regeln wären, so ist es bei Verhandlungen und Abstimmungen in der Europäischen 
Union an diese Stellungnahme gebunden. Es darf davon nur aus zwingenden außen- und 
in lergat ionspolitischen Gründen ab weichen.
[31 Wenn das zuständige Mitglied der Bundesregierung von einer Stellungnahme des 
Nationalrates gemäß Abs.2 abweichen will, so hat es den Nationalrat neuerlich zu befassen. Soweit der in 
Vorbereitung befindliche Rechtsakt der Europäischen Union eine Änderung des geltenden 
Bundesverfassungsrechtes bedeuten würde, ist eine Abweichung jedenfalls nur zulässig, wenn ihr der 
Natiunalrat innerhalb angemessener Frist nicht widerspricht.
[4] Wenn der Nationalrat eine Stellungnahme gemäß Abs.2 abgegeben hat, so hat das zuständige 
Mitglied der Bundesregierung dem Nationalrat nach der Abstimmung in der Europäischen Union Bericht zu 
erstatten. Insbesondere hat das zuständige Mitglied der Bundesregierung, wenn es von einer Stellungnahme 
des Nationalrates abgewichen ist, die Gründe hiefür dem Nationalrat unverzüglich mitzutcilen.
[5] Die Wahrnehmung der Zuständigkeiten des Nationairates gemäß den Abs.l bis 4 obliegt 
grundsätzlich dessen Ilauptausschuß. Die näheren Bestimmungen hiezu werden durch das Bundesgesetz 
über die Geschäftsordnung des Nationalrates getroffen. Dabei kann insbesondere geregelt werden, 
inwieweit für die Behandlung im Rahmen der Europäischen Union anstelle des I lauptausschusses ein 
eigener Unterausschuß des Hauptausschusses zuständig ist und die Wahrnehmung der Zuständigkeiten 
gemäß den Abs.l bis 4 dem Nationalrat selbst Vorbehalten ist. Für den ständigen Unterausschuß gilt Art.55 
Abs.2.
[6] Liegt dem zuständigen Mitglied der Bundesregierung eine Stellungnahme des Bundesrates zu 
einem Vorhaben im Rahmen der Europäischen Union vor, das zwingend durch ein 
Bundesverfassungsgesetz umzusetzen ist, das nach Art.44 Abs.2 der Zustimmung des Bundesrates bedürfte, 
so ist es bei Verhandlungen und Abstimmungen im Rahmen der Europäischen Union an diese 
Stellungnahme gebunden. Es darf davon nur aus zwingenden außen- und integrationspolitischen Gründen 
ab weichen. Die Wahrnehmung der Zuständigkeiten des Bundesrates gemäß Abs.l und diesem Absatz wird 





fl] Österreich wirkt an der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen Union 
auf Grund des Titels V des Vertrages über die Europäische Union mit. Dies schließt die Mitwirkung an 
Maßnahmen ein, mit denen die Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zu einem oder mehreren dritten Ländern 
ausgesetzt, eingeschränkt oder vollständig eingestellt werden.
[2] Für Beschlüsse im Rahmen der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik der Europäischen 
Union auf Grund des Titels V des Vertrages über die Europäische Union sowie für Beschlüsse im rahmen 
der Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Justiz und Inneres auf Grund des Titels VI des Vertrages über die 
Europäische Union gilt Art.23e Abs.2 bis 5.
(...)
Sechstes Hauptstück





m  Der Verfassungsgerichtshof erkennt über die Anklage, mit der die verfassungsmäßige 
Verantwortlichkeit der obersten Bundes- und Landesorgane für die durch ihre Amtstätigkeit erfolgten 
schuldhaften Rechtsverletzungen geltend gemacht wird.
(2] Die Anklage kann erhoben werden:
a] gegen den Bundespräsidenten wegen Verletzung der Bundesverfassung: durch Beschluß der
Bundesversammlung;
b| gegen die Mitglieder der Bundesregierung und die ihnen hinsichtlich der Verantwortlichkeit 
gleichgestellten Organe wegen Gesetzesverletzung: durch Beschluß des Nationalrates;
c| gegen einen österreichischen Vertreter im Rat wegen Gesetzesverletzung in Angelegenheiten, in 
denen die Gesetzgebung Bundessache wäre: durch Beschluß des National rates, wegen Gesetzes Verletzung in 
Angelegenheiten, in denen die Gesetzgebung Landessache wäre: durch gleichlautende Beschlüsse aller 
Landtage;
dj gegen die Mitglieder einer Landesregierung und die ihnen hinsichtlich der Verantwortlichkeit 
durch dieses Gesetz oder durch Landesverfassung gleichgestellten Organe wegen Gesetzesverletzung: durch 
Beschluß des zuständigen Landtages;
e] gegen einen Landeshauptmann, dessen Stellvertreter (Artikel 105 Absatz 1) oder ein Mitglied 
der Landesregierung (Artikel 103 Absatz 2 und 3) wegen Gesetzesverletzung sowie wegen Nichtbefolgung 
der Verordnungen oder sonstigen Anordnungen (Weisungen) des Bundes in Angelegenheiten der 
mittelbaren Bundesverwaltung, wenn es sich um ein Mitglied der Landesregierung handelt, auch der 
Weisungen des Landeshauptmannes in diesen Angelegenheiten: durch Beschluß der Bundesregierung;
f| gegen Organe der Bundeshauptstadt Wien, soweit sie Aufgaben aus dem Bereich der 
Bundesvollziehung im eigenen Wirkungsbereich besorgen, wegen Gesetzesverletzung: durch Beschluß der 
Bundesregierung;
gl gegen einen Landeshauptmann wegen Nichtbefolgung einer Weisung gemäß Artikel 14 Abs. 8: 
durch Beschluß der Bundesregierung
h] gegen einen Präsidenten oder Amtsführenden Präsidenten des Landesschulrates wegen 
Gesetzesverletzung sowie wegen Nichtbefolgung der Verordnungen oder sonstigen Abordnungen 
(Weisungen) des Bundes: durch Beschluß der Bundesregierung.
[3) Wird von der Bundesregierung gemäß Absatz 2 lit e die Anklage nur gegen einen 
Landeshauptmann oder dessen Stellvertreter erhoben, und erweist es sich, daß einem nach Artikel 103 
Absatz 2 mit Angelegenheiten der mittelbaren Bundesverwaltung befaßten anderen Mitglied der 
Landesregierung ein Verschulden im Sinne des Absatzes 2 lit e zur Last fällt, so kann die Bundesregierung 





[4] Das verurteilende Erkenntnis des Verfassungsgerichtshofes hat auf Verlust des Amtes, unter 
besonders erschwerenden Umständen auch auf zeitweiligen Verlust der politischen Rechte, zu lauten; bei 
geringfügigen Rechtsverletzungen in den in Absatz 2 unter c, e, g und h erwähnten Fällen kann sich der 
Verfassungsgerichtshof auf die Feststellung beschränken, daß eine Rechtsverletzung vorliegt. Der Verlust 
des Amtes des Präsidenten des Landesschulrates hat auch den Verlust des Amtes zur Folge, mit dem das 
Amt des Präsidenten gemäß Artikel 81 a Abs. 3 lit b verbunden ist.
[5] Der Bundespräsident kann von dem ihm nach Art. 65 Abs. 2 lit c zustehenden Recht nur auf 
Antrag des Vertretungskörpers oder der Vertretungskörper, von dem oder von denen die Anklage 
beschlossen worden ist, wenn aber die Bundesregierung die Anklage beschlossen hat, nur auf deren Antrag 




II. V ere in b aru n g  z w isc h e n  B und  u n d  L ä n d e rn  gem äß A rt 15a B-V G  
ü b e r  d ie  M itw irk u n g  d e r L ä n d e r u n d  G e m e in d e n  in  
A n g e leg en h e iten  d e r  E u ro p ä isch en  In te g ra tio n  [BGBl 1992/775]
Der Bund, vertreten durch die Bundesregierung, 
und die Länder
Burgenland, Kärnten, Niederösterreich, Oberösterreich, Salzburg, Steiermark, Tirol, Vorarlberg und Wien, 
jeweils vertreten durch den Landeshauptmann - im folgenden Vertragsparteien genannt sind 
übereingekommen, gemäß Art 15a B-VG die nachstehende Vereinbarung zu schließen:
Art 1 (Informationspflicht des Bundes)
m  Der Bund unterrichtet die Länder unverzüglich im Wege der Verbindungsstelle der 
Bundesländer über alle Vorhaben im Rahmen der Europäischen Integration, die den selbständigen 
Wirkungsbereich der Länder berühren oder sonst für sie von Interesse sein könnten. Gleichs gilt für die 
Gemeinden, soweit der eigene Wirkungsbereich oder sonstige wichtige Interessen der Gemeinden berührt 
werden. Die Vertretung der Gemeinden obliegt in diesen Angelegenheiten dem österreichischen Städtebund 
und dem österreichischen Gemeindebund.
[2] Die Unterrichtung erfolgt insbesondere durch Übersendung der dem Bund vorliegenden
a) Dokumente, Berichte und Mitteilungen von Organen und Einrichtungen der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften, der Europäischen Freihandelsassoziation und des Europäischen Wirtschaftsraumes,
b) Dokumente, Berichte und Mitteilungen über informelle Ministerlreffen und Germien im 
Rahmen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, der Europäischen Freihandelsassoziation und des Europäischen 
Wirtschaftsraumes,
c) Dokumente und Informationen über Verfahren vor Europäischen Gerichten und 
Streitbeilegungseinrichtungen, an denen die Republik Österreich beteiligt ist, sowie
d) Berichte der österreichischen Mission bei den Europäischen Gemeinschaften
[3] Über Vorhaben des Bundes in Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Integration werden die 
Länder und Gemeinden im Wege der Einrichtungen gemäß dem Bundesgesetz über die Errichtung eines 
Rates für Fragen der österreichischen Integrationspolitik, BGBl 389/1989, und gemäß der Verordnung des 
Bundeskanzlers über die Einsetzung und Geschäftsordnung der Arbeitsgruppe für Integrationsfragen, BGBl 
574/1989, unterrichtet. Diese Unterrichtung erfolgt insbesondere durch Übermittlung von Dokumenten und 
Informationen über förmliche Initiativen, Stellungnahmen und Erläuterungen der Bundesregierung für 
Organe der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, der Europäischen Freihandelsassoziation und des Europäischen 
Wi r t schaf tsraum es.
Art 2 (Verfahren)
[1] Die Übermittlung von Informationen im Sinne des Art 1 Abs 1 und 2 an die 
Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer, an den österreichischen Städtebund und an den Gemeindebund erfolgt 
schriftlich.
[2] Das Bundeskanzleramt kann der Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer, dem österreichischen 
Städlcbund und dem Österreichischen Gemeindebund Informationen, insbesondere in dringenden Fallen, 
ausnahmsweise auch mündlich übermitteln.
[3] Der Verbindungsstelld der Bundesländer obliegt die Verteilung und Weitergabe dieser 
Informationen an die länder.
[4] Die Übermittlung der Informationen erfolgt zum frühestmöglichen Zeitpunkt. Das 
Bundeskanzleramt übermittelt die Unterlagen der Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer in zwei Exemplaren, 
dem österreichischen Städtebund und dem österreichischen Gemeindebund in je einem Exemplar.
Art 3 (Zugangzu einschlägigen Datenbanken)
[1] Soweit dem Bund Zugang zu Datenbanken im Rahmen der europäischen Integration gewährt 
wird, wird er sich bemühen, diese nach Maßgabe der rechtlichen und technischen Möglichkeiten und gegen 
Kostenersatz auch den Ländern, dem österreichischen Städtebund und dem österreichischen Gemeindebund 
auf deren Ersuchen zugänglich zu machen.
12] Soweit dies zur Wahrnehmung integrationspolitischer Belange erforderlich und 
datenschutzrechtlich zulässig ist, gewährt jede Vertragspartei den übrigen Vertragsparteien auf deren 





[1] Gleichzeitig mit der Übermittlung der Informationen gemäß Art 1 Abs 1 und 2 gibt das 
Bundeskanzleramt der Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer, dem österreichischen Städtebund und dem 
österreichischen Gemeindebund nach Mögichkeit den vorgesehenen Zeitplan der Behandlung des jeweiligen 
Vorhabens durch die im Rahmen der europäischen Integration zuständigen Organe bekannt.
[2] Das Bundeskanzleramt teilt der Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer, dem österreichischen 
Städtebund und dem Österreichischen Gemeindebund mit, welche Frist den Ländern und Gemeinden für die 
Erstattung einer Stellungnahme im Hinblick auf den Verfahrensablauf vor den im Rahmen der europäischen 
Integration zuständigen Organen zur Verfügung steht. Bei der Festsetzung dieser Frist sind der 
Koordinationsbedarf der Länder und der Gemeinden und ein angemessener Zeitraum für die Auswertung 
der Stellungnahmen durch den Bund zu berücksichtigen.
Art 5 (Allgemeine Stellungnahmen)
[II Der Bund hat fristgerechte Stellungnahmen der Lander und Gemeinden zu Vorhaben im 
Sinne des Artl Abs 1 bei der Festlegung des Standpunktes der Republik Österreich in den zuständigen 
Organen der europäischen Integration entsprechend zu erwägen.
[21 Stellungnahmen der Länder, des österreichischen Städtebundes und des österreichischen 
Gemeindebundes sind schriftlich an das Bundeskanzleramt zu richten.
Art 6 (Bindende Stellungnahmen der Länder)
[1] Liegt dem Bund fristgerecht eine einheitliche Stellungnahme der Länder zu einem Vorhaben 
im Rahmen der europäischen Integration vor, das Angelegenheiten betrifft, in denen die Gesetzgebung 
Landessache ist, so ist der Bund bei Verhandlungen und Abstimmungen an diese Stellungnahme gebunden. 
Er darf davon nur aus zwingenden außen- und integrationspolitischen Gründen abweichen.
[2] In welche Weise die Länder eine einheitliche Stellungnahme herbeiführen, ist ausschließlich 
Sache der Länder. Insbesondere kommt dafür eine Ländervereinbarung gemäß Art 15a B-VG in Betracht.
[31 Das Bundeskanzlerant teilt den Ländern im Wege der Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer 
die Gründe für ein Abweichen von einer einheitlichen Stellungnahme der Länder gemäß Abs 1 
unverzüglich, spätestens jedoch binnen acht Wochen nach der amtlichen Kundmachung des betreffenden 
Rechtsaktes, schriftlich mit.
Art 7 (Nachträgliche Abänderung von Stellungnahmen)
[1] Wenn Vorhaben im Rahmen der europäischen Integration, von denen die Länder oder 
Gemeinden gemäß Art 1 Abs 1 und 2 unterrichtet wurden, in weiterer Folge durch die im Rahmen der 
europäischen Integration zuständigen Organe geändert werden, dann unterrichtet das Bundeskanzleramt 
davon unverzüglich die Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer, den österreichischen Gemeindebund und den 
österreichischen Städtebund.
[21 Wenn sich daraus Auswirkungen für die einheitliche Stellungnahme der Länder gemäß Art 6 
Abs 1 ergeben, steht es den Ländern frei, ihre einheitliche Stellungnahme entsprächend anzupassen oder zu 
ergänzen. Die Organe des Bundes berücksichtigen eine geänderte oder ergänzte einheitliche Stellungnahme 
der Länder gemäß Art 6 Abs 1, wenn diese im Hinblick auf den Stand des Verfahrens vor den im Rahmen 
der europäischen Integration zuständigen Organen rechtzeitig eintrifft.
Art 8 (Einbindung von Ländervertretem in die Verhandlungsdelegation)
m  Wenn Verhandlungen oder Beratunden der europäischen Integration Angelegenheiten 
betreffen, die den selbständigen Wirkungsbereich der Länder berühren oder sonst für sie von Interesse sein 
könnten, dann gibt der Bund dies den Ländern im Wege der Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer bekannt. 
Das Bundeskanzlerant unterrichtet die Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer über Zeitpunkt, Ort und 
Verhandlungs- oder Beratungsgegenstand, wenn die Länder darum ersuchen und dies integrationspolitisch 
tatsächlich möglich ist, dann werden der österreichischen Delegation Vertreter der Länder auf deren Kosten 
bei gezogen.
[2[ Die Vertragsparteien erarbeiten gemeinsam eine Liste jener Strukturen im Rahmen der 
europäischen Integration, an denen Ländervertreter gemäß Abs 1 teinehmen können.
[3] Die Vertreter der Länder gemäß Abs 1 werden von den Landeshauptmännern im Wege der 
Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer namhaft gemacht. Für Wortmeldungen solcher Vertreter im Rahmen 
der jeweiligen Delegation ist das Einvernehmen mit dem Delegationsleiter erforderlich.




Die Lânder sind berechtigt, im Einvernehmen mit dem Bundesministerium für auswärtige Angelegenheiten 
auf ihre Kosten Vertreter und sonstiges Personal an die österreichische Mission bei den Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften zu entsenden.
Art 10 (Klagserhebung)
[1] Wenn im Falle einer EG- Mitgliedschaft Österreichs ein rechtswidriges Handeln oder 
Unterlassen von Organen der Europäischen Gemeinschaften eine Angelegenheit betrifft, in welcher die 
Gesetzgebung Landessache ist, dann ergreift der Bund auf Ansuchen eines Landes die nach dem 
Gemeinschaftsrecht hierfür in Betracht kommenden Rechtsbehelfe vor dem Gerichtshof der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften, sofern kein anderes Land diesem Ansuchen widerspricht und nicht zwingende außen- und 
integrationspolitische Gründe dagegen sprechen.
[2] Ansuchen gemäß Abs 1 sind dem Bundeskanzlerant schriftlich zu übermitteln. Solche 
Ansuchen haben die in den Vorschriften des Gemeinschaftsrechts vorgesehenen wesentlichen Inhalte einer 
Klage vor dem Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften, insbesondere der Begründung, zu enthalten.
Art 11 (Vertretung der Republik nach außen)
Die Befugnisse der Vertretung des Bundespräsidenten zur Vertretung der Republik nach außen werden 
duch die vorliegende Vereinbarung nicht berührt.
Art 12 (Kosten)
(11 In den Fällen des Art 10 sind die jeweils betroffenen Länder dem Bund zur ungeteilten Hand 
zum Ersatz der zur zweckentsprechenden Rechtsverfolgung notwendigen Kosten verpflichtet, die dem 
Bund im Zusammenhang mit Verfahren vor dem Gerichtshof der Europäischen Gemeinschaften erwachsen.
[2] Darüber hinaus sind die jeweils betroffenen Länder zur Tragung jener Kosten verpflichtet, 
die der Republik Österreich im Zusammenhang mit Verfahren vor dem Gerichtshof der Europäischen 
Gemeinschaften wegen eines EG-rechtswidrigen Verhaltens der Länder erwachsen.
Art 13 (Anpassung)
Die Vertragsparteien erklären sich bereit, diese Vereinbarung nach Maßgabe künftiger Entwicklungen im 
Rahmen der Europäischen Integration auf einen alfälligen Anpassungsbedarf hin zu überprüfen.
Art 14 (Inkrafttreten)
[1] Diese Vereinbarung tritt einen Monat nach Ablauf des Tages in Kraft, an dem
1. die nach den Landesverfassungen erforderlichen Voraussetzungen für das Inkrafttreten erfüllt 
sind und beim Bundeskanzleramt die Mitteilungen der Länder darüber vorliegen, sowie
2. die nach der Bundesverfassung erforderlichen Voraussetzungen für das Inkrafttreten erfüllt
sind.
[2] Das Bundeskanzleramt wird den Ländern die Erfüllung der Voraussetzungen nach Abs 1 
sowie den Tag des Inkrafttretens der Vereinbarung mitteilen.
Art 15 (Hinterlegung)
Diese Vereinbarung wird in einer Urschrift ausgefertigt. Die Urschrift wird beim Bundeskanzleramt 





III. V e re in b a ru n g  d e r L än d er u n te re in a n d e r  ü b e r  d ie  g em ein sam e 
W ille n sb ild u n g  in  A n g e leg en h e iten  d e r  e u ro p ä isc h e n  In teg ra tio n  
vom  12.3.1992 (W iener LG B 11992/29)
Die Länder Burgenland, Kärnten, Niederösterreich, Oberösterreich, Salzburg, Steiermark, Tirol, Vorarlberg 
und Wien schließen folgende Vereinbarung gemäß Art 15a B-VG über die gemeinsame Willensbildung der 
Länder in Angelegenheiten der europäischen Integration.
Art 1 (Einrichtung und Aufgaben der Integrationskonferenz der Länder)
1. Die Länder richten die "Integrationskonferenz der Länder” (IKL) ein.
2. Ihre Aufgabe ist, gemeinsame Länderinteressen in Angelegenheiten der europäischen 
Integration wahrzunehmen und wichtige integrationspolitische Fragen zu beraten.
Art 2 (Mitglieder)
In der Integrationskonferenz der Länder (IKL) sind alle Länder durch den Landeshauptmann und den 
Landtagspräsidenten vertreten. Das Präsidium des Bundesrates ist zur Teilnahme an den Sitzungen 
berechtigt.
Art 3 (Beschlußfassung)
1. Die Integrationskonferenz der Länder (IKL) trifft ihre Beschlüsse grundsätzlich in Sitzungen, 
in dringenden Fällen durch Umfrage.
2. Sie ist beschlußfähig, wenn die Einladung ordnungsgemäß versendet wurde und mindestens 
fünf Länder vertreten sind.
3. Jedes Land hat eine Stimme. Sie wird vom Landeshauptmann abgegeben.
4. Stimmenthaltungen sind zulässig. Wenn ein Land bei einer Sitzung nicht vertreten ist, gilt dies 
als Stimmenthaltung.
5. Lin Beschluß kommt zustande, wenn mindestens fünf Länder zustimmen und kein Land eine
Gegenstimme erhebt.
Art 4 (Einheitliche Stellungnahmen der Länder)
Stellungnahm er. der Integrationskonferenz der Länder (IKL) zu Vorhaben der europäischen Integration in 
Angelegenheiten, die in Gesetzgebung Landessache sind, gelten als einheitliche Stellungnahmen der Länder 
im Sinne des Art 10 Abs 5 B-VG, die den Bund bei zwischenstaatlichen Verhandlungen und Abstimmungen 
binden.
Art 5 (Vorsitz)
Der Vorsitz in der Integrationskonferenz der Länder (IKL) kommt jenem Landeshauptmann zu, der in der 
Landcshauptmänncrkonferenz den Vorsitz führt.
Art 6 (Geschäftsgang)
1. Der Vorsitzende hat die Integrationskonferenz der Länder (IKL) nach Bedarf durch die 
Geschäftsstelle zu Sitzungen einzuladen. Die Einladung ist mindestens 10 Tage vor der Sitzung, 
ausgerstattet mit Tagesordnung, durch die Geschäftsstelle zu versenden. In dringenden Fällen kann die 
Einladungsfrist mil Zustimmung aller Länder verkürzt werden.
2. Wenn von einem Land begründet eine Sitzung der Integrationskonferenz der Länder (IKL) 
verlangt wird, hat der Vorsitzende dies unverzüglich durch die Geschäftsstelle zu veranlassen.
3. Von jedem Land kann die Aufnahme eines Gegenstandes in die Tagesordnung verlangt 
werden. Wenn ein solcher Antrag nach Versendung der Einladung bei der Geschäftsstelle einlangt, kann er 
nur mit Zustimmung aller Länder behandelt werden.
4. Die Beurkundung und die Bekanntgabe der einheitlichen Stellungnahmen der Länder erfolgt 
für den Vorsitzenden der Integrationskonferenz der Ländedr (IKL) durch die Geschäftsstelle.
5- Die Geschäftsstelle der Integrationskonferenz der Länder (IKL) ist die Verbindungsstelle der 
Bundesländer.
Art 7 (Ständiger Integrationsausschuß der Länder)
Der Ständige In legrationsausschuß der Länder (SIL) hat in Angelegenheiten der europäischen Integration




b) Entscheidungen für die Integrationskonferenz der Länder (IKL) vorzubereiten,
c) im Rahmen der von der Integrationskonferenz der Länder (IKL) erteilten Ermächtigung zu handeln.
Art 8 (Inkrafttreten)
Die Vereinbarung tritt einen Monat nach dem Tag in Kraft, an dem bei der Verbindungsstelle der 
Bundesländer als Depositar die schriftlichen Mitteilungen aller Vertragsparteien eingelangt sind, daß die 
nach den Landesverfassungen erforderlichen Voraussetzungen für das Inkrafttreten der Vereinbarung 
erfüllt sind.
Art 9 (Ausfertigungen, Mitteilungen)
1. Die Urschrift dieser Vereinbarung wird von der Verbindungsstelle der Bundesländer 
(Depositar) verwahrt. Der Depositar übermittelt jeder Vertragspartei eine von ihm beglaubigte Abschrift der 
Vereinbarung.
2. Der Depositar hat die Vereinbarung unverzüglich nach Vorliegen der Mitteilungen gemäß Art 
8 der Bundesregierung zur Kenntnis zu bringen.
3. Alle die Vereinbarung betreffenden rechtserheblichen Mitteilungen sind an den Depositar zu 
richten. Sie gellen als im Zeitpunkt des Eintangons beim Depositar abgegeben. Der Depositar hat jede 
Vertragspartei von diesen Mitteilungen zu benachrichtigen.
Art 10 (Kündigung)
1. Diese Vereinbarung kann von jeder Vertragspartei gekündigt werden.
2. Die Kündigung wird zwei Monate nach ihrer schriftlichen Mitteilung an den Depositar
wirksam.
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